

Studies in Intelligence

Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Unclassified articles from *Studies in Intelligence* Volume 55, Number 2
(June 2011)

**Cultural Topography: A Research Tool
for Intelligence Analysis**

**Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelli-
gence**

**The Pursuit of Intelligence History in
the United Kingdom**

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The Evolution of US Army HUMINT

Reviews

Grappling with Covert Action after the Cold War

Takes on Intelligence and the Vietnam War

Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf



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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 2011		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Studies in Intelligence. Volume 55, Number 2				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for the Study of Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency,Washington,DC,20505				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 102	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Center for the Study of Intelligence
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Washington, DC 20505

ISSN 1527-0874

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John P. Finnegan was a US Army historian who focused on military intelligence history. He died two years after his unclassified article appeared in a classified issue of *Studies* in 2000. Unfortunately, it was not extracted for an unclassified issue at the time.

Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis

Jeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett

“
American decisionmakers have shown a need for help in isolating and understanding the complexity, weight, and relevance of culture as they consider foreign policy initiatives.
”

In the third edition of his “History of the World,” J.M. Roberts notes that “Historical inertia is easily underrated...the historical forces molding the outlook of Americans, Russians, and Chinese for centuries before the words capitalism and communism were invented are easy still to overlook.”¹ In this article, Jeannie Johnson and I offer a variation on Roberts’s view: Cultural inertia is easily underrated, and American decisionmakers have shown a need for help in isolating and understanding the complexity, weight, and relevance of culture as they consider foreign policy initiatives.

The view I bring to this discussion is not one of an anthropologist but rather one of a former economic analyst in US intelligence who has been a senior manager of analysts in various disciplines for a decade. My analytic and management positions have repeatedly brought me into indirect and sometimes direct interaction with top-level US decisionmakers including several US presidents. As I witnessed these decisionmakers in action and tried to help deliver insights they needed, I came to conclude that the “inertia of culture” was often underrated in their assessments of opportunities and obstacles, in part because few if any of their information sources offered a systematic and persuasive methodology for addressing this inertia and its implications for their policy options. I also came to conclude from direct observation and some readings out of the academic field of strategic culture that America’s cultural view features the notion that Americans can achieve anything anywhere including going to the moon—if they just invest enough resources.

This notion is understandable but perhaps hazardous. America’s remarkable history of achievement includes being the first nation actually to go to the moon, but the we-can-do-anything part of American self-identity also leads some to argue still that US failures in

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Vietnam were not the consequence of a poorly managed investment; they were the consequences of investing too little.² How many resources and over what period would have been sufficient to strike “success”—particularly if success would have required changes in Vietnam at the cultural level? I have rarely seen American policymakers ask “Will our desired foreign policy outcome require change over there at the cultural level? Over what period and with what resources is such cultural change achievable?”

The more I observed the policy-intelligence dynamic, the more I perceived a need for an analytic construct designed exclusively to illustrate clearly and persuasively the inertia of culture. Cultural influences are typically touched on within US Intelligence Community (IC) analyses as peripheral factors, described with passing references, and often in general and superficial terms. Although the IC is full of world-class expertise on foreign peoples, places, and organizations, this industry rarely isolates and illustrates culture as a factor deserving its own sophisticated and thorough treatment.

To remedy this perceived deficiency, I teamed with Jeannie Johnson—formerly an intelligence analyst at CIA and now with Utah State University—who had brought her academic training in strategic culture to a pursuit similar to mine. For some time she had been amassing training ideas in the area of cultural analysis for IC experts, and our combined efforts, along with significant input from other members of my former office,³ trial runs of intelligence products, research, and continued refinements over the past four years have resulted in a process we call “Cultural Mapping.” This process, or methodology, is designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distinguish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes. Mapping exercises done across time, spanning multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in understanding that society’s “Cultural Topography.” We describe the process below. -mtb

Target Audience: Intelligence Analysts

Understanding this methodology and its specific structure requires a grasp of the users for whom it was designed: intelligence analysts. Anthropologist Rob Johnston was hired in the wake of 9/11 to complete an ethnographic analysis of the IC’s analytic cadre and to offer suggestions for improving its performance. He observed biases produced by both ethnocentrism and expertise, which resulted in rather serious cognitive gaps, and he noted a lack of systematic tools for going after cultural data.⁴

Johnston defines ethnocentrism as the tendency to project “one’s own cognition and

norms onto others.” Intuition, a compass regularly employed by career analysts, is culturally encoded and, by nature, ethnocentric. Johnston warns of its use as a barometer for analyzing or predicting the behavior of foreign agents.⁵ According to Edward Stewart and Milton Bennett, American cultural tendencies are particularly unhelpful in this regard. Despite vast information resources and exposure to exotic cultures, Americans continue to overemphasize similarity and assume that other social groups have values and aspirations in line with their own.⁶

It may seem counterintuitive to see expertise as a source of bias but Johnston points out that “becoming an expert

requires a significant number of years viewing the world through the lens of one specific domain. This concentration gives the expert the power to recognize patterns, perform tasks, and solve problems, but it also focuses the expert’s attention on one domain to the exclusion of others.”⁷

Johnston’s cautionary counsel regarding the habits of experts echoes that penned by Richards Heuer two decades earlier:

Once people have started thinking about a problem one way, the same mental circuits or pathways get activated and strengthened each time they think about it. This facilitates the retrieval of informa-

tion. These same pathways, however, also become the mental ruts that make it difficult to reorganize the information mentally so as to see it from a different perspective.⁸

A third form of observed bias among analysts, which might be added to Johnston's list, has roots in academic training and is an institutional legacy that tends to leave culture out in the "all-source" approach to analysis. The academic backgrounds of most intelligence analysts stem from disciplines that emphasize power and wealth as the primary human motivators, leaving underexplored other motivators such as identity, preservation of social institutions, alternative value structures, powerful narratives, or perceptions of the security environment distinctive to a person's or group's region and history. Due to institutional habits, the educational paradigms of many of our experts, and the reticence of members of the anthropological community to accept positions within US security institutions, culture has received limited attention as a variable. Most analysts have simply not been introduced to the training or the research tools for going after cultural data effectively.

This bias also affects intelligence collection, which aims disproportionately at foreign

Despite vast information resources and exposure to exotic cultures, Americans continue to overemphasize similarity and assume that other social groups have values and aspirations in line with their own.

leaders and the elite cadres that surround them. We have, institutionally, very few tools aimed at understanding national populations or specific subcultures, a point General Michael Flynn made in his public rebuke of intelligence practices in Afghanistan in January 2010.⁹ The emphasis on elites has produced cognitive gaps in our analysis—perhaps illustrated anew by the surprise over the political tumult that erupted across North Africa and the Middle East in early 2011. Johnston observes:

[An] analyst, while accounting successfully for an adversary's capability, may misjudge that adversary's intention, not because of what is cognitively available, but because of what is cognitively absent. The failure to determine an adversary's intention may simply be the result of missing information or, just as likely, it may be the result of missing hypotheses or mental models about an adversary's potential behavior.¹⁰

Noting that the lack of cultural data in mental models is a problem not only for analysts but also for the policymakers they support, Johnston exhorts:

Specific cultural knowledge is a skill and the foundation for forecasting the behavior and decisionmaking of foreign actors. Acquiring cultural knowledge should be taken as seriously as learning any other facet of one's analytic capabilities. Moreover, it is incumbent on analysts to educate their own leadership and policymakers about the value and utility of cultural knowledge for intelligence analysis.¹¹

Johnston's advice may sound rather obvious, but given the scope and complexity of the phenomenon we call "culture," attempting its research and determining—with no prior training in this field—which aspects have policy relevance can be an intimidating task even for the most talented political, economic, or military analyst. Interviews with analysts have often revealed a sense of being overwhelmed by the scope of cultural data that are relevant to their accounts—and of dismay at the length and depth of the historical knowledge necessary to capture a grand strategic profile of any region or group. One reaction is to subconsciously search for reasons why cultural data are not necessary—a position that ana-

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lysts schooled in the international relations paradigms of realism and neorealism are already trained to take.

Analysts also face institutional obstacles to in-depth cultural study. The organizations they work for are required to produce large volumes of often tactical pieces on a daily basis. For some analytic assignments, this pace can be relentless. IC institutions simply do not have the manpower to pursue the type of cultural research employed by professional anthropologists: living in the region for extended periods in order to conduct ethnography (participant observation) and to refine fluency in the local language. Many analysts move from one account to another during their careers and must conduct cultural research via short-term stays in theater, brief stints of language training, and information that can be accessed from their desk or in library holdings.

Given this particular organizational backdrop, our aims have been modest but effective, we hope, in moving cultural

research and analysis forward within the community. Our research tool is designed to broaden the IC's grasp of the factors that drive outcomes, specifically cultural factors, and to help IC analysts be creative in their collection of cultural data. We make no attempt to deliver the end point or last word in cultural research. What we offer is an accessible research tool that can produce systematic, sophisticated surveys of cultural variables, a grasp of which can greatly help US policymakers achieve desired outcomes and avoid surprises.

Research Philosophy

Our experience in marrying cultural data and analysis to the daily demands of defense and intelligence analysis has led to a few conclusions about best practice. The most overriding of these is that sweeping cultural profiles of a region or a national group are of limited value in the intelligence industry for a number of reasons. As has been effectively argued by Christopher Twomey, security studies that attempt to draw predictive power from the

amorphous and often internally contradictory substance we call "national culture" often suffer follies of overgeneralization and static analysis, and they reach, as a consequence, questionable conclusions about the sources of security policy.¹² Patrick Porter heaps heavy criticism on many of the West's nascent efforts at cultural analysis for making this mistake. He accuses military and intelligence analysts of drawing static portraits of Eastern cultures rather than recognizing them as moving, flexing, human creations—and, in so doing, introducing dangerous sources of error.¹³

To reference "culture" in the singular for any particular polity is typically an error; there is rarely just one internal variety. Walter Russell Mead identifies four distinct narratives within US strategic culture and posits that our various foreign policies are formed from the "collisions and debates" those narratives inspire.¹⁴ The idea of composite cultures is not restricted to analysis of the US, of course. Authors writing on Germany, China, India, and Iran, to name a few, all note the internal conflict of competing cultural narratives about national security within these countries.¹⁵ The existence of

^a Porter's warnings are valid but may be a bit overstated. Today's Department of Defense is not entirely uninitiated in doctrines of cultural change. Leading-edge training methods emphasize "practice theory"—an approach to culture which treats the change dynamic as central. Practice theory explains culture as a product of interaction between agent and structure and trains analysts to expect change rather than stasis.

multiple cultures is present not only at the national level; it is true right down to the ordinary individual. As Kevin Avruch quips, “for any individual, culture always comes in the plural.”¹⁶ The cultural influences at play on a single actor could derive from a background that features Northern European, Catholic, engineering school, and family-specific influences.

Most academic work examining the impact of culture on security policy mirrors the biases of the IC by privileging elite-level culture (usually at the organizational level) over other types. The typical justification of this approach is that while public opinion may play a peripheral role, “it is arguably the elite—owing to its role as gatekeeper, its expert knowledge and its privileged access to means of communication—that ultimately decides which way security policy goes.”¹⁷ But this logic breaks down when one is assessing the impact of culture within the context of counterinsurgency and stability operations, for instance. Given the pivotal role of local popular opinion in this type of military engagement, understanding public culture, the cultures of significant substate groups, and how these affect security policy becomes paramount.

The research method presented here asks analysts to step outside the biases of the

Most academic work examining the impact of culture on security policy mirrors the biases of the IC by privileging elite-level culture (usually at the organizational level) over other types.

institutional and academic work already done on their topic and assess afresh which actors and cultural influences are most relevant for the policy issue they are researching. In some cases this may be a vastly understudied section of the population, one which has received little attention within official channels, and one whose research will require unorthodox (for the institution) survey and collection methods.

Culture at any level—organizational, tribal, ethnic, regional, or national—is a dynamic human creation and subject to change, but this should not discourage analysts from its study. Any tool devised to track cultural influences must employ questions that challenge previous assumptions, unearth fresh data, and highlight possible areas of change, but as Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber remind Marines who may be intimidated by the complexity and movement of the cultures they are studying:

Although people are, by nature, variable and unpredictable, they still need to work with others in social and cultural groups. These groups—and their associated beliefs and structures—are organized

*according to logical, understandable principles that every person living in the culture must understand, at least intuitively, in order to get along with each other. With some basic study, [others] can also recognize and understand these principles and apply that understanding to their operations.*¹⁸

It is with our specific audience and these basic assumptions about culture in mind that we constructed the Cultural Mapping method. It is presented here in the step-by-step process we have provided recently to groups of analysts.

Cultural Mapping Exercise

Step 1: Identify an Issue of Intelligence Interest

The first injunction to analysts is to narrow the scope of cultural inquiry by isolating a particular policy question of interest. The narrower the issue, the more targeted the cultural research, and the more likely it will yield actionable data. The issue selected may reflect a frequently asked question that needs examining from a new angle, or a question that policymakers are not asking—perhaps due to ethnocentric blinders, habit, or limited

knowledge of the region—but should be.

Step 2: Select an Actor

Analysts are urged in this step to isolate a particular population for study. All “players” within this issue arena are identified for consideration, stretching to include some not typically examined. A sampling of possible actors might include prosperous urban elites, an ethnic subgroup, a particular government institution, a dissident group, a village council, housewives across a region, a youth bulge, or the cadre around a leadership figure. From among these subgroups, or actors, one is selected for focused study. This actor may be the one expected to play the most pivotal role in a particular outcome on the issue selected or one that is dangerously understudied and may present a wild card for the future.

The actor in question need not have a discernible “group culture.” The important question here is not “what is this actor’s culture?” but rather “what cultural influences will weigh in on decisionmaking on this issue for members of this group?”

The mapping exercise is designed as a looping process. The actor who seems most relevant initially may fade into the background as research progresses and the salience of other actors becomes apparent. Conversely, the initial actor may remain of interest but emerge as a far more complex entity once research magnifies

group properties. Analysts are invited to loop back to this stage after an initial round of research in order to disaggregate, refine, or switch actor sets in a way most profitable for intelligence analysis.

Continued refinement occurs to the central policy question as well. Analysts may find that they were as captive to ethnocentric blinders as the clients they serve when crafting the initial intelligence question. Looped-back refinements on this front are to be expected.

Step 3: Amass a Range of Cultural Influences

Assuming Avruch’s logic that all individuals and groups possess culture in the plural, analysts are asked to map out the various cultural influences which may guide the behavior of members of this group—again, *within the context of the issue they are assessing*. These influences range from the local, such as clan, tribal, or organizational cultures, to wider cultural influences, such as regional, ethnic, religious, national, gendered, socioeconomic, or generational. Analysts need not confine themselves to fleshing out “typical” cultural influence sets but rather think expansively and creatively about the specific group they are studying.

New forms of social media have norms embedded and learned by new users; a leadership cadre hailing from a similar educational institution may espouse a common view of how

the world works; and foreign youth who work part time at America’s franchises may be internalizing a strong dose of capitalist work ethic. We encourage analysts to consider all plausible influences initially, pursuing this as an exploratory stage. Decisions about which influences are most relevant will come later.

Step 4: Explore the Cultural Data from Four Perspectives

In order to supply structure to the cultural exploration encouraged in Step 3, we suggest the following four categories for assessing cultural data: *Identity*, *Norms*, *Values*, and *Perceptual Lens*. This is not an exhaustive list of important cultural factors but is a useful starting point in examining culture from four policy relevant perspectives. The categories are distinctive enough from one another to inspire different sets of questions and elastic enough to capture a wide range of data:

Identity: The character traits the group assigns to itself, the reputation it pursues, and individual roles and statuses it designates to members.

Norms: Accepted and expected modes of behavior.

Values: Material or ideational goods that are honored or that confer increased status to members.

Perceptual Lens: The filter through which this group determines “facts” about others.

Analysts receive an in-depth list of questions for each category.^a The magnitude of cultural data unearthed in answering the questions in these four categories may be managed by keeping a litmus test for policy relevance in mind. An initial short list of questions might examine the issue selected in Step 1 in the ways below.

Identity.

- Which factors surrounding this issue would cause this actor's identity to be threatened? Alternatively, which might provide the US common ground for co-option?
- Is group cohesion strong along identity lines in response to this issue? What would cause the group to fracture or to unite behind a common front?
- What individual roles and statuses might group members seek to protect?

Norms.

- Does this issue place social institutions or common practices under threat?
- Which practices are deeply internalized and likely to inspire resistance?
- Which practices are compatible with US interests on this issue?

Unearthing and isolating factors that might be captured as identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens is a messy business.

- Would our proposed changes in this policy area offer group members a way out of increasingly unpopular normative practices? Which members?

Values.

- What is considered "honorable" behavior in this issue area?
- Which local values may be in conflict with our approach to this issue?
- Which values might be co-opted in moving US interests forward?
- Where might value differences between target groups present an opportunity to exploit cleavages?

Perceptual Lens.

- What are the preconceived notions of this group concerning the behavior and character of the United States?
- What are group's beliefs about the future?
- What hurdles must we overcome in messaging to this group on this issue?

This tidy and rather simple list of questions may provide the false impression that the

answers are readily apparent and attainable. The reality is that unearthing and isolating factors that might be captured as identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens is a messy business. It involves doing heavy amounts of open-source reading, using the research skills honed in graduate school (rather than the typical day-to-day practices of the intelligence business), and wading through a lot of data of questionable relevance.

Most analysts need to take themselves off-line for a period in order to accomplish this task with any effectiveness. This sort of research does not mix well with the often frenetic pace of producing current intelligence. Some offices have been particularly proactive in this regard and have offered their analysts short sabbaticals in order to get them away from their desks. These intelligence officers remove themselves to a separate location—in most instances to an institution with significant holdings on their area of interest—to conduct research. Other offices have assigned analysts into research or methodology teams where they can focus on a long-term research endeavor with the necessary consistency.

^a The questions are contained in an appendix available in digital versions of this article.

Most analysts need to take themselves off-line for a period in order to accomplish this task with any effectiveness.

After immersing themselves in what cultural data is available through official channels, open-source searches, and (ideally) visits to the region, analysts begin to identify cognitive gaps in previous modes of analysis. In addition to benefitting from new data accumulated on their account, they become far more attuned to what they don't know—what information the institution is not collecting. Identifying key knowledge gaps means coming up with creative solutions for going after the target data. Time constraints limit the ability of intelligence analysts to employ extended ethnography as a tool, and institutional restraints can limit the ability to employ methods pursued by academic or other institutions. The following is a collection of cultural research strategies proffered by a variety of analysts representing the full range of experience, with some residing in academic venues and others in policymaking forums.

Historical Narratives

Nearly all analysts begin with the assumption that one must conduct a thorough background investigation to become familiar with a regime's history, geography, internal social codes, and general interactions with other states. If not conducted with strategic efficiency, this task can be overwhelming.

One way to gauge those aspects of history relevant to the issue being tracked is to pay attention to historic references made when the policy issue is addressed, whether in political rhetoric, private conversation, lessons in school, or expressions from the artistic community. Which narratives do politicians draw on to legitimize their behavior on this issue and to pacify the public? Which narratives work? Which do not?

Physical manifestations such as architecture, street names, statues, and memorials demonstrate which aspects of a nation's history it chooses to preserve and celebrate. Finding and understanding the selection of heroes, for example, lends itself to understanding national values.¹⁹ Of particular interest are those symbols that people voluntarily display in their homes.²⁰

Understanding historic narratives can be critical to making sense of the strategic choices of foreign populations. The 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia supplies an example. US analysts vastly underestimated the duration and expense of the 1999 engagement, in part because they undervalued the role of historic narratives of victory and defeat. Serbia's national holiday is not a celebration of a past battlefield vic-

tory but of a glorious defeat in 1389 at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. Serbs celebrate the valor of the war's hero, Prince Lazar, who received a heavenly visitation on the eve of battle and was told that unless he surrendered he faced certain defeat the next day. Given the choice, Lazar declared that it was better to die in battle than to live in shame.²¹ He did precisely that—and became cemented in Serbian legend.

This tale permeates Serbian society. It is taught to youngsters in school and is represented in homes and offices in the renowned painting "Kosovo Girl." Most analysts working this issue were familiar with these aspects of Serbian culture but lacked a method for tracking and weighing them systematically and thus acquiring the footing necessary to articulate persuasively to policymakers the potential impact on Serbian behavior: that is, that Serbia would find victory by standing up to an overpowering military force when the world expected it to fold.

Understanding the weight of this narrative for Serbs in defining honorable conduct during war would probably have disabused planners of the idea that the bombing campaign would be over quickly. Instead of projecting a three-day campaign, we might have helped policymakers plan for a cam-

paigned closer to the almost 80 days it eventually took.²²

Tapping into the Population

Useful interaction with the population under survey can range from rudimentary (daily records of anecdotal interaction) to highly institutionalized methods (sophisticated polling conducted nationwide).²³ One popular method for both institutions and individual researchers is targeted focus groups. Much has been written on this particular survey technique, but the advice of analysts in the field is that effective focus groups must be preceded by an in-depth study of the issue at hand so that the interviewer can select a sampling of *relevant* focus group participants and frame questions appropriately.²⁴

One selection device employed by ethnographers is to narrow interviews to “key informants” of local culture.²⁵ Key informants can range from subject matter experts to those who are cynical about their own culture and are therefore observant, reflective, and articulate.^{a26}

A variation on key informants is “key keepers” of culture. These people are defined by frequent contact and extended conversation with other members of the community. As a result, the key keepers tend to harbor the notions,

Useful interaction with the population under survey can range from rudimentary (daily records of anecdotal interaction) to highly institutionalized methods (sophisticated polling conducted nationwide).

language modes, and perceptual lens of the local community.²⁷ A key keeper may be institutional. In determining core values within Israeli society, Greg Giles looked first to shared, institutionalized socialization processes. He pinpointed the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since universal conscription requires that all Israeli citizens experience socialization and training through this institution. Giles points out that it is not just contact with the institution that matters, but institutional legitimacy. The IDF meets these criteria based on the high number of young people polled who said they would be willing to serve in the IDF even if it were an all-volunteer force.²⁸

An important window into norms and the color of a group’s perceptive lens is the “conventional wisdom”—the things “everybody knows.”²⁹ Compiling and analyzing oral traditions may take a number of different forms. The author of a recent popular survey of Iran attempted to do this by engaging in dialogue with persons from a sampling of all of the society’s castes and factions and starting each conversation with the same request: “Tell me your

story.”³⁰ The patterns and themes developed across conversations helped uncover generally accepted notions about self and others. Additional probing may reveal notions of identity—what is taken for granted as a natural role for the nation, what is expected, and what is controversial.³¹

One inventive young scholar from Monterey’s Naval Postgraduate School proposed an alternative to official polling—the systematic study of “RUMINT” (rumor intelligence).³² She surveyed and prioritized the issues on the minds of Iraqis by tracking the frequency of rumors that appeared in local print. One of her findings, a surprise for US forces at the time, was that a large swath of Iraqis believed the United States was *behind* the insurgency. Their belief stemmed not so much from an assumption that the United States was malicious but from the perception that it was impossible that a superpower with the might of America could not stop the insurgency if it wanted to. Therefore, the United States must be behind it. Her work produced a number of timely insights for US

^a Bernard claims that cynical informants have consistently been his best sources over the years.

Those not in-theater could use alternative approaches to tracking gossip networks.

officials concerning Iraqi attitudes and priorities.

Those not in-theater could use alternative approaches to tracking gossip networks. Dr. Deborah Wheeler, a specialist in Middle East studies, has focused her research on online discussions across her region—particularly among women who otherwise do not speak out. Chat rooms and editorials posted in pseudonymous blogs may be one way to evaluate the thinking of otherwise reticent populations.³³ Christine Fair, an analyst writing on Iran, suggests another alternative to firsthand interviews with citizens of a repressive regime:

*Utiliz[e] consulates of countries where Iranians seek US visas (India and Turkey) to collect and develop information during the visa interview process. Defense attachés may also engage their in-country counterparts in countries where military cooperation with Iran are ongoing to gain insights into Iran.*³⁴

Expatriates are a self-selected group, often coming from within a limited segment of society not representative of the broader base. Despite this sampling drawback, interviews with this group offer some value. Students from the region of inter-

est living abroad are often better at identifying beliefs and norms in their home lands than fellow citizens left behind because the students have experienced the contrast between their national beliefs and those of people in their host countries.³⁵

Secondhand interviews—interviewing those who frequently interact with members of the culture—are also very useful, especially in cases where the populace does not feel comfortable speaking openly about its thoughts and opinions.³⁶ In some cases it is politically incorrect to speak of one's historic culture, especially where security policy is concerned, so there is an absence of civil or political rhetoric on the topic. Rodney Jones notes the case of Japan, where Jesuit priests who lived there for extended periods were more likely than Japanese statesmen to speak freely of Japan's history and predilections.³⁷

Joe Bermudez, a longtime Korea analyst, notes that when information is hard to come by, as it is with North Korea, even interviews with travelers and a careful look at their photographs can prove beneficial. In North Korea's case, it helps unveil the genuine state of affairs for the state's population (regarding, for example, roads, electricity, phone ser-

vice, and health conditions) in contrast to state claims about its situation.³⁸

Content Analysis of Texts

When evaluating national-level cultural threads, texts taught in school deserve special attention. Classroom textbooks explain perceptions of a nation's own history, its view of others, acceptable methods of warfare, and common justifications for past behavior (norms). Societal values are taught to children explicitly, particularly in the early stages of education. Their texts may include hero legends, songs, rhymes, fables and oversimplified anecdotes from the nation's history.³⁹ Valuable cultural or political insights can be drawn from noting which figures are celebrated, which are despised, and why.⁴⁰ Education and other socialization processes also result in a body of shared literature considered "classic." What are the messages in this body of work? How widely are the classics read? How often are they referenced?⁴¹

Military texts are essential sources of information on the values, identity, and acceptable methods of achieving security within a regime. Twomey recommends a deep survey of all sorts of doctrinal texts—telegrams, military orders, descriptions of training regimens, diaries, memoirs, and communications between military leaders.⁴² This study would

reveal national aspirations over time (identity), accepted norms for achieving them, and perhaps more particular values such as views on the use of manpower and loss of life.⁴³

Tracking Political Rhetoric

The key to analyzing political rhetoric effectively is understanding, in local context, the role it plays in communicating with the population of interest. Russia analyst Fritz Ermarth notes that a first step in weighing the value of political rhetoric within a nation is to track its correlation with actual behavior in the past. Tracking over time and across politicians may yield useful generalizations about government speeches as indicators of sincere goals and security objectives.⁴⁴ On China, Twomey points out that the culture tends to weigh private comments more heavily than public statements and that inflammatory public statements need to be qualified accordingly.⁴⁵

Once understood, public rhetoric may represent a rich data field for assessing norm strength or identity trends. The work of Andrew Cortell and James Davis, as well as that of Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, suggests measuring a norm's strength by the frequency with which it is referenced by statesmen proposing a course of action or legitimizing one already taken.⁴⁶ On the iden-

Military texts are essential sources of information on the values, identity, and acceptable methods of achieving security within a regime.

tity front, Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot employ content analysis of leaders' speeches in order to explain the weapons acquisitions patterns of diverse states. Their research presents a strong correlation between four identity typologies and a "marked tendency toward nuclear acquisition."⁴⁷ The method Chafetz et al. suggest for coding role conception can easily be duplicated for other issues.

Extended Observation of Public Behavior

Public reactions to the moves made by state leadership may highlight areas of congruence or cleavage between the understanding of values and norms fostered by the populace and the behavior of state officers. Disaffection may come in the form of protest, local grumbling, or biting humor pointed at political officials, while congruence might manifest itself through strong turnout for state events and parades, voluntary displays of state insignia, or healthy membership in state-related organizations.⁴⁸ Congruence or cleavage between separate identity groups may be manifest in part by the degree to which the target group is willing to accumulate and incorporate traditions of food, dress, verbal expression, names given to children,

and entertainments originating elsewhere.⁴⁹

In order to understand identity distinctions within large regions, one might systematically observe social ceremonies and rituals. What is the purpose of the ceremony? Who attends?⁵⁰ Which norms violations are publicly punished? Which achievements publicly celebrated? One daily ritual that often sheds light on identity and value structure is the protocol of salutations, especially in conversations between members of the population meeting for the first time. How does one introduce oneself? Is it by way of profession, clan ties, or religious affiliation?⁵¹ Which aspects of personal identity are most valued?

Humor can serve as a useful test for one's grasp of the culture under study. What does this group find funny? Why? Which alternative group is consistently used as the object of ridicule? Which of the alternative group's characteristics are subjected to mockery? How does this illuminate the values of the group being tracked? What does it say about their perception of others?

Language is an indispensable source of cultural information. Not every analyst is going to have the opportunity to become

Entertainment media provides valuable insights for those seeking to understand the current state of a particular set of norms within a society.

fluent in the local tongue but will find that pursuing even novice-level language competence may yield cultural insights. Concepts that a population values are often assigned more words than those that are not. Recent research suggests that language has a profound impact on our perceptual lens. It registers the content of our memories—the aspects of reality that we record, and how we record them.⁵²

Evaluating the Output of the Media and the Artistic Community

Depending on the level of independence enjoyed by news, entertainment, and artistic producers within a population, these may yield significant insight into a group's identity and its core norms and values. Twomey notes the onerous level of work involved in a comprehensive review of these sources and commends two authors who have tackled it: Peter Hays Gries on China, and Ted Hopf, on Russia.⁵³ Even completely controlled media may still offer material for cultural analysis. State propaganda illuminates the identity, norms, and values that the state hopes to achieve, as well as the narrative it hopes will dominate popular perception.

In a free society, the bounds and content of political debates channeled through the press can identify not only cleavages in the strategic and political culture but also points of popular congruence.⁵⁴ Sometimes what is *not* addressed is as interesting as what is. Christopher Meyer and Adrian Zdrada isolated a pronounced identity aspect to Poland's willingness to ally with the United States in our runup to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 through content analysis of press debates on the issue. Their research revealed an absence of serious security discussions relating to Iraq and strong emphasis on establishing Polish identity as a reliable US partner. The identity basis of Poland's participation helps explain why the failure to unearth weapons of mass destruction in the Iraqi theater did not diminish the enthusiasm for the US alliance in Poland as it did in Great Britain.⁵⁵

Free media may also serve as a reliable watchdog for norms violations within the state. For example, the flurry of reporting in the United States on excesses in Guantanamo and at Abu Ghraib manifest norms violations that are considered serious and newsworthy in the United States but may not have been treated that way in other countries. As commercial orga-

nizations, media outlets must present a worldview comfortable to their audience. The worldview captured in newscasts validating (especially controversial) state actions may illuminate popular perspectives and narratives that more formal instruments for measuring opinion would miss.⁵⁶

Entertainment media provides valuable insights for those seeking to understand the current state of a particular set of norms within a society. The fabric of television sitcoms is the exaggerated presentation of social *faux pas* and situational conundrums.⁵⁷ Sitcoms are also a helpful reference for illustrating a culture's typical problem-solving devices and for illuminating changes underway in society by poking fun at norms that are in flux. TV dramas serve a different purpose—they most often focus on norms violations that are serious enough to be considered tragedy and represent a shared core of values across the society.

Step 5: Assemble Critical Cultural Factors

After analysts have worked to fill cognitive gaps and amassed a sizeable accumulation of cultural data, they are then presented with the painful task of setting much of it aside—honoring their data down to those cultural factors that are likely to play a role in the decision-making of *this group on this*

issue. The analyst's instructions are to evaluate each cultural factor according to:

- **Relevance** for the issue selected.
- **Robustness** of the factor.^{a58}
 - How well established is it?
 - How widely shared is it among members of this group?
 - To what extent is opinion or behavior that is inconsistent with this aspect of identity, norms, values, or perceptual lens rewarded or punished internally by other members of this group?
- Likelihood of this cultural factor to provoke a **Response** (cooperative or conflictual) when external actors engage this group on this issue.

The cultural factors that emerge from this rigorous culling process are the Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs) for this group on this issue and will be the concepts that are addressed in the finished intelligence product. In intelligence terms, each factor must be solidly connected to a "so-what." What impact is it likely to have on outcomes of interest to US poli-

The cultural factors that emerge from this rigorous culling process are the Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs).

cymakers? To what degree are we confident that behavior will reflect this cultural influence? How many types of research sources or methods validate this finding?

Step 6: Mapping

After an analyst has isolated the relevant set of CCFs, she is asked to map the primary source of each from among the various cultural influences identified in Step 3 (national, ethnic, tribal, professional, etc.). Are the identity components on the CCFs list confined primarily to one domain (i.e., tribal), or shared across other sources of cultural influence (i.e., ethnic and religious)? What about critical norms and values? What about critical aspects of the group's perceptual lens?

The purpose of this portion of the mapping exercise is to define—for the analyst as well as the eventual audience of her intelligence product—the influence boundaries of the CCFs. Are they spread across the cultural landscape or confined to one or two key cultural influences? Is there a clear, somewhat bounded, cultural force at

play on this issue (i.e., tribal, sectarian, professional/organizational), or are cultural influences widely dispersed and unlikely to provide anything close to a clear script for action?

Step 7: Writing the Paper

Based on the outcome of the mapping exercise, a finished Cultural Topography paper will define for the reader first, which aspects of identity, norms, values and perceptual lens are most important to understand when the United States engages this actor on this issue, and second, the probable influence boundaries of the CCFs identified. These CCFs provide the primary focus of the paper. The paper answers, in specific terms, the following questions:

- Which CCFs represent points of possible leverage and cooperation?
- Which CCF red lines are likely to spark resistance or even armed conflict between foreign elites and their broader populations or between foreign populations and US actors?

^a The work of Jeffrey Legro may serve as a useful reference point for this task. He has written extensively on measurement of norm strength and his work on norms probably has some transferability to identity, values and perceptual lens. He proposes that a norm be evaluated according to three criteria: how clearly it is recorded in the rules of society (specificity), how long it has existed within this society and its strength in standing up to normative competitors (durability), and how widely it is accepted and referenced in discourse (concordance).

A handful of papers based on the Cultural Topography methodology have been produced, but they have prompted reaction to suggest the method offers a way to add analytic value.

- Do most of the CCFs stem from one cultural tradition or source of influence (i.e., ethnic, religious, tribal)? If so, what else do we need to know about this cultural domain in order to acquire adequate context for understanding the CCFs in question?
- Are the members of the group under study drawing from multiple cultural traditions/influences when they respond to this issue? Will it cause them to fracture when pressure is exerted on the myriad aspects of this issue?
- To what extent do adversarial groups in the region share the same cultural mapping on this issue as the group under study, reflecting common sources of cultural influence? Where is this not the case? How does that inform forecasting on future cooperation or divergence between these groups?
- Within which tradition will our messages to this group on this issue be most persuasive?
- How likely are other groups across the region to respond in similar fashion when presented with this issue?

Initial Impact of Cultural Topography

Only a handful of papers based on the Cultural Topography methodology have been produced, but they have prompted sufficient reaction to indicate that the insights they offer get beyond the general body of information already grasped by most analysts and policymakers, and early reactions to such insights suggest that the methodology offers a way to add analytic value:

- In a meeting that was part of a US policy review on a specific country, an attendee not familiar with this methodology reported that several analysts, authors of a Cultural Topography paper on this country, “quickly proved themselves to be as smart or smarter on [country of focus] than anyone else in the room...on history, ethnic topography.” It is worth adding that the room was filled with experts who had spent significantly more years on the subject than had these analysts.
- While traveling abroad, a special envoy with significant expertise selected one of the Cultural Topography papers as

one of only two items—from a large pile of intelligence materials—he wanted sent back to his office for further study. Several senior commanders also expressed significant interest in this paper.

Additional reactions have been consistent with those noted above, but only the continued application and refinement of this tool will fully display whether its potential is great or limited. The methodology is being taught in at least one IC institution, and several new Cultural Topography papers are in motion now. The main challenge to pursuing and exploiting this approach within the IC is the pressure of daily production driven mostly by conventional collection and analysis. Cultural Topography holds no promise of advancing the understanding of cultural influences on foreign perceptions and actions unless researchers are given the time to find additional, often novel data and then to incorporate them into the tool.

(The appendix and endnotes are available in the digital version of this article.)

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Appendix A
Cultural Analysis
Concepts and Questions

Identity

- Is individual identity seen as comprising one's distinct, unique self, or is it bound up in a larger group (family, clan, tribe)?⁵⁹
- Does this group see itself as responsible for and capable of solving social problems? Are problems responded to with energy or left to fate?
- Which myths and national narratives compose the stories everyone knows? How do these speak about group identity?
- What is this group's origin story? Does it inform group members of their destiny?
- What would this group list as defining traits of its national, tribal, ethnic character?
- Is one aspect of identity being overplayed, not because it is foundational for most decisions but because it is being threatened or diminished?

Values

- For the linguist, which concepts/things are described in nuanced ways (meaning that many words have been assigned to them)? Which concepts are missing from the language? (For example, the concept of "fair play" is hard to find outside of English.)
- What generates hope in this population?
- Which is viewed more highly as a communicative tool—emotion or logic? Are conversational styles which emphasize logic viewed as trustworthy?
- Is conspicuous consumption valued as a status marker? If not, what incentives exist to work hard?
- To what extent do security concerns trump liberty concerns in this society? Which parts of liberty are deemed attractive?
- Is social mobility considered a good thing, or is it deemed disruptive to a highly organized system? Would this group fight to keep a hierarchical arrangement even if offered opportunities for egalitarianism?
- To what extent does loyalty trump economic advantage?
- Which is more value-laden for this group—"progress" or "tradition"?
- Is optimism rewarded as a character trait or is it considered naive, juvenile, and possibly dangerous?
- Which character qualities are consistently praised?
- What composes the "good life"?
- What sorts of myths, hero figures, segments of history, or identity markers does the material culture celebrate? What is revealed by the decorations in homes, modes of dress, food eaten (or not eaten), monuments respected (as opposed to those covered with graffiti), gifts given, etc.?

- In describing a proposed project, what will “impress” this audience? The project’s size? Its historical relevance? The technology used to produce it? How might new projects best be framed in order to win popular support?

NORMS

Political

- What is considered a legitimate pathway to power? How do “heroes” in film and other popular media obtain their power? Do they act as isolated individualists or in concert with others?
- “What gives a public the comfortable feeling that the way that decisions are reached and leaders are chosen is ‘right’?”⁶⁰
- How does the group view compromise?
- Where does “genuine” law come from? (Nature? God? A constitution? Current political institutions? Imagined, future institutions? Moral conscience? A personality from the past?)
- Is adherence to state-manufactured law admired or disdained? To what extent is state law equated with “right” and “wrong”?

Social

- Is social status in this society primarily ascribed (i.e., one is born into it) or achieved? If achieved, how so?⁶¹
- What are the primary markers of a person of high rank in this society? How would you recognize him/her? Does political power or intellectual prestige rank higher than economic surplus?
- What is the process for establishing trust? How does one know when it has been achieved?
- Do people perceive their own place and the dominant hierarchy as natural?
- To what extent are subordinates responsible for their own actions?⁶²
- What do proverbs say about social expectations and the perceived pathway to success?

Economic

- What are the group’s views on work? Which types are admired? Which are disdained? What are the economic implications?
- Which economic activities are considered immoral?
- Is it considered appropriate to “master” the natural environment and bend it to one’s will?
- To what extent is the economy intertwined with kin obligations?
- What are obstacles to private property ownership?
- How does this culture group stack up when evaluated against the traits some claim are necessary for successful market economies?⁶³ These can include:
 - Is there trust in the individual?
 - Are wealth and resources perceived as finite or infinite? Is the focus on “what exists” or “what does not yet exist”?
 - Is competition seen as healthy or unacceptably aggressive?
 - Is this society comfortable with a questioning mind?
 - Does the education system encourage investigative learning?

- Are the “lesser virtues”—punctuality, job performance, tidiness, courtesy, efficiency – admired?
 - Which are emphasized—small achievements accomplished by the end of the day (preferable for market economies) or grandiose projects (the unfinished megaworks of progress-resistant economies)?
- What is the “radius of trust” in this community? Is trust extended to family only? How far does it extend to strangers?⁶⁴
- What are prestige commodities within this community? Why? Might these serve as stronger incentives for cooperation than direct funding?
- Is risk taking admired or negatively sanctioned? How widely spread is the “harm” of individual failure (damages family honor, potentially ignites retribution cycle, etc.)?

Security

- What defines “victory” for this group in a kinetic conflict?
- What types of battlefield behavior would result in shame?
- What level of internal destruction is acceptable?
- How do accepted myths describe this group’s military history? What is its projected destiny?
- Are allies viewed as reliable, or historically treacherous? What is the resultant ethic regarding alliance loyalties?

Time/Change Orientation

- Does this group behave according to linear time? Is there a marked contrast between rural and urban regions? Do deadlines matter?⁶⁵
- What is the future orientation of this group? Does it see itself as capable of changing the near future? Is it deemed appropriate or laudable to make aggressive efforts to do so?
- Which time frames are referenced with strong positive emotion—past or future scenarios?
- Is there a significant gap between socioeconomic expectations and reality? (This often is a precursor of social shifts.)⁶⁶

Problem-Solving Devices

- What is the order of activities for solving a social problem (often called an action chain)? Does face-to-face confrontation happen first or last? Is violence used as a signal or is it an endgame?⁶⁷
- How do those outside of official channels of activity (i.e. women in seclusion, youth in elder-oriented cultures) play a part in problem-solving processes?
- Which is preferred—action or deep deliberation? Is this group comfortable with trial and error as a discovery method?
- Are individuals comfortable with making a wide range of personal choices? Are individual choice and accountability practiced social norms? Would the choices present in democratic and market systems be overwhelming?
- To what extent must community consensus be reached in order for a decision to go forward?

PERCEPTIVE LENS

Cognitive processes

- What sources of information yield ‘truth’? Scientific/factual processes? Dreams?⁶⁸ Inspired authority figures?

- Are most situations set into dichotomous frames? Are they made to be black and white? How comfortable are group members with situational complexity? How patient are they in working to understand it?

Of Self

- What are the basic expectations about the future? ("Poverty becomes a greater problem the moment wealth is perceived as a definite possibility.")⁶⁹ How might typical aspirations within this society be charted?
- How does this group characterize/perceive its own history? Which events are highlighted? Which are omitted?
- What does this group's history tell it about "dangerous" behaviors/circumstances for a society? (For example, Chinese—chaos, Americans—tyranny).

Of Others Generally

- How do members of this group assign intentions? What motives make the most sense to them? (If the best US intentions do not "make sense" to the host population, they will assign intentions that do. It is to our advantage to understand and then emphasize areas of cognitive congruence when embarking on joint ventures.)⁷⁰
- What is this group's view on human nature? Are people generally trustworthy? Are they prone to excess and beset by vices, or are they able to regulate themselves? How are these views used for legitimating less or more government?
- How does this group obtain its information about the outside world? Which sources are considered most reliable? How are those sources biased or deficient?
- Are outsiders perceived as fundamentally different or fairly similar to group members?

Of the US Specifically

- What are regarded by this group as US vulnerabilities?
- What does this group believe drives Americans?⁷¹ What do they value?
- Does this group see common ground with its American counterparts? In which areas?
- To what extent does this group believe American rhetoric matches intentions?

Cosmology (The way the world works...origin and structure of the universe)

- When explanations for events are not easily accessible, how does this group fill in the blanks?



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58. Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995); Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” *International Organization* 51 (1997): 31–63. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their Limits,” 451–97.

59. Thomas Hylland Ericksen, *Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2001), 54–55; Stewart and Bennett, *American Cultural Patterns*, 129–38.

60. Glen Fisher, *Mindset: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1997), 95.

61. For examples, see *ibid.*, 52, 64.

62. For discussion, see Ericksen, *Small Places, Large Issues*, 155.

63. Mariano Grondona, “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development” in *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

64. The basic theory: the wider the radius of trust, the easier to engage in economies of scale market economics. See Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital” in *Culture Matters*.

Endnotes (cont.)

65. A nice discussion of time orientations and why they matter can be found in Stewart and Bennett, *American Cultural Patterns*, 73–76.

66. For diverse examples see Fisher, *Mindset*, 52.

67. A nice discussion of this, with diverse examples, can be found in Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture* (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 157–59.

68. Stewart and Bennett provide an interesting insight on this point in *American Cultural Patterns*, 62–65.

69. Ericksen, *Small Places, Large Issues*, 251.

70. For good examples, see Fisher, *Mindset*, 52.

71. Americans tend to overemphasize similarity. See Stewart and Bennett, *American Cultural Patterns*, 11.



An Educated Consumer Is Our Best Customer

Dennis C. Wilder

This essay was a recipient of the top prize in the 2010 Galileo Intelligence Community Award competition. The competition, held annually since 2004, is intended to provide active members of the Intelligence Community opportunities to put forward innovative ideas.—Editor

“
The quality of service a consumer receives from the IC depends heavily on the expertise and experience that the policymaker or legislator brings to their interaction with the IC.
”

It may seem odd to title a paper on Intelligence Community (IC) innovation in the 21st century with the commercial slogan made famous by discount clothier Sy Syms. But this slogan holds the key to solving some of the challenges vexing IC leaders that span issues from policymaker expectations to intelligence budgets to public perceptions of the IC. At the core of this paper is the contention that we have neglected the education of our customers—defined as appointed and elected officials and the American public—to our own detriment. The quality of service consumers receive from the IC depends heavily on the expertise and experience that policymakers or legislators bring to their interaction with the IC. Our chronic failure to communicate across the policy-intelligence divide has led to pent-up frustrations on both sides and, too often, charges of intelligence failure. This proposal provides a series of recommendations for the ODNI on redesigning the pol-

icy-intelligence interface and implementing a strategic communications strategy that leverages new social media so that the American people and the policy community will better understand and appreciate the centrality of the Intelligence Community to national security.

Taking Our Customers' Knowledge of Us for Granted

Policymakers who are steeped in the ways of the Intelligence Community (IC) know how to get superior service and support. Former Acting Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, from his years of experience, explained the savvy policy consumer of intelligence this way:

Policymakers who knew how to use intelligence generally had a realistic view of what it could and could not do. They understood, for example, that intelligence is almost

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Too often policymakers with no or little exposure to the IC, especially in the case of the novice policymakers, find themselves in a frustrating maze.

*always more helpful in detecting trends than in predicting specific events. They knew how to ask questions that forced intelligence specialists to separate what they actually knew from what they thought. They were not intimidated by intelligence that ran counter to the prevailing policy but saw it as a useful job to thinking about their courses of action.*¹

My observations during more than four years of service on the National Security Council have led me to conclude that policymakers with no or little exposure to the IC, especially in the case of novice policymakers, too often find themselves in a frustrating maze that involves trial and error and dead ends in their attempts to get the right kind of intelligence support. This inexperience can, and has, led to serious policymaker disappointment with IC products not because the IC did not have the correct information or analytic insights to offer, but because the con-

sumer did not have the sophisticated understanding of IC capabilities and limitations that would allow them to ask the right questions, of the right people and at the right moment to get the best information and analysis. Frequently, this has led to charges of intelligence failures because the policymakers had unrealistic expectations of what the IC could do.

What we have is a failure to communicate across the IC-policy community divide. Gregory Treverton, a senior RAND scholar of the intelligence-policy interface had a particularly useful explanation of why IC experts typically fail to meet the expectations of eager, new policymakers out to change the course of history.

*Intelligence analysts are reflective by nature; they want to understand.... Policy officials, by contrast, tend to be active; they want to do, not just to think. They came to Washington to signify; they want to make a difference.... If policy officers are to signify, they have to do so quickly; the average tenure of an assistant secretary is not much more than a year.*²

The First Customer Will Always Come First

Who are the IC's customers? Our most important customer is and will remain the president. He is well served through his direct relationship with the director of national intelligence and he, each day, receives the finest intelligence publication in the world, the *President's Daily Briefing* (PDB). The history of the PDB is one of flexibility and remarkable adaptation of support to fit each president's needs and information acquisition styles.³

I would argue, however, that historically we have not done justice to the rest of our customers, from policymakers below the president to the members of the US Congress to the American public, in large measure because we have neglected educational outreach and strategic communications. Without such outreach, and in a decade when massive deficits burden the national budget and the competition for resources in the federal government will intensify, we are in danger of repeating the disaster that befell us at the

¹ John McLaughlin "Serving the National Policymaker," in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 72.

² Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terrorism* (Rand Corporation, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170–71.

³ For an excellent example of the kind of close attention that has been paid to getting analysis right for presidents, see John Helgerson, *CIA Briefings for Presidential Candidates*, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996).

end of the Cold War with the advent of the peace dividend—debilitating budget cuts, dangerously slashed human intelligence capabilities, and even debate about the necessity of the US Intelligence Community, the most expensive intelligence enterprise on the planet.

In the decade after 9/11, the IC has demonstrated the centrality of intelligence to policy, but that position may not be secure as the memory of 9/11 fades and as we enter an era of belt tightening. The new reality that the US foreign policy establishment, and by extension the IC, faces is spelled out in a thought-provoking book by Michael Mandelbaum in which he warns that because of domestic obligations this country faces, particularly caring for the ever increasing ranks of its older citizens, “The defining fact of foreign policy in the second decade of the 21st century and beyond will be ‘less.’”⁴ Thus, we are living in an era that none of us has ever experienced because, unlike most countries, our economic constraints have not affected US foreign policy decision-making for the past seven decades.

⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era*, (New York:Public Affairs, 2010).

How do we encourage deeper policymaker literacy about the IC?

Informed Policymakers

How do we encourage deeper policymaker literacy about the IC? Brookings Institution in 2009 published a thoughtful study by Ken Lieberthal—a former special assistant to a president, senior director on the NSC, and a long-time student of intelligence—analyzing the strengths and shortcomings of the IC in the wake of the 2004–2005 intelligence reforms that provides some clues. Lieberthal reported from his interviews with then active and former policymakers and intelligence professionals that most policymakers are undereducated in the use of intelligence and have no systematic understanding of the IC or of the products they receive from the IC. Moreover, he contended that most policymakers are ill equipped to ask the right questions and therefore ask for briefings on topics that often elicit “a relatively standard bureaucratic process that pulls together pertinent information and lays it out without serious attention being given to priorities, underlying uncertainties, and real insights.”⁵

⁵ See Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal, *The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy: Getting Analysis Right*, (Brookings Institution, Foreign Policy Paper Series, Number 17, September 2009), 56.

Such products, the author argued, are useful to a policymaker needing to get up to speed on a topic, but they tend not to force IC analysts to think through the implications of their data, debate the relative significance of different facts, and make explicit their levels of confidence in the responses they produce. *In short, because our consumers are not well schooled in what we can provide, we often fall short of helping them make deeply informed policy recommendations to the president and his Cabinet.*

What can be done to create intelligence-literate policy customers? First, we need to understand that educating the customer is an extremely difficult task that we have never done well. We have avoided tackling the issue because it can seem condescending and can lead to charges of attempts to politicize the relationship. Beginning with the legendary Sherman Kent, we have analyzed exhaustively every aspect of the IC side of the relationship with the policymaker, and we have set up high firewalls not to be crossed between the policymaker and the IC producers.⁶ We have as a result, after each perceived intelligence failure, studied carefully what the IC did that led to that intelligence mistake and then carefully schooled our officers to

I believe some of our problems only can be ameliorated by radically revising our interaction with new administrations from the moment that presidential candidates are selected.

help them discern what constitutes success and failure in intelligence analysis.

But I am unaware of any effort to systematically study the policymaker's role in either intelligence successes or intelligence debacles. Most often, if policies work out, policymakers will assume that it was their hard work that made the difference and, unfortunately, if there is a policy debacle there is a strong tendency to blame the community.

We know what we could have done better on the Iraq WMD issue because we have written excellent studies of our shortcomings, and we have appropriately implemented systematic changes to our analytic trade-craft. *I am, however, unable to find any parallel effort, either within government or in academia, to systematically educate current and future policymakers to maximize the utility of intelligence and to ask the right questions to avoid policy failures because of inadequately tapping of the capabilities of the IC.* James

Steinberg, currently deputy secretary of state, lamented this lack of attention to the issue in 2008 saying, "Given the enormous consequences of the evident breakdown apparent both in the September 11 and Iraq events, it is vital that practitioners on both sides try to understand the challenges inherent in the policy-intelligence interaction and how to overcome the gulf and suspicion that haunts this critical relationship."⁷

Designing a New Relationship with the White House

I believe some of our problems only can be ameliorated by radically revising our interaction with new administrations from the moment that presidential candidates are selected by their political parties and are given their first national security briefing. This is the point at which the relationship with the next president and his core national security team—in effect, his national security players in waiting—forms and needs to be shaped with briefings not only on top national security concerns, but on how

we would propose to help the team prepare to use intelligence more efficiently and effectively than any past administration through a deliberate and thoughtful education process.

Obviously, this new process of education is far more complex than what I just outlined and so let me present some of the foundational work that needs to be done in advance of such an opportunity. Now in our third year of the Obama administration and with a new Congress, we have new faces involved in security policy. If the past is any indicator, too many of these new officials will have come into office, eagerly been read into their top secret codeword clearances, and started reading daily intelligence with only the most superficial understanding of what it is they are reading. Many will immediately be disappointed because they had convinced themselves that, once they got their clearances, they would see the "real secrets." If they are lucky enough to have a personal briefer, this will help but too often the briefers themselves are young and only steeped in the intelligence analysis side of this question.

Creating Intelligence Connoisseurs

What is required is the equivalent of the course now taught for analysts on the art of intelligence analysis, but this would

⁶ For an example, see the incisive article written by CIA analyst Jack Davis on the history of the debates over how to serve the policymaker, "The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949," in *Studies in Intelligence* 1992, Issue 5.

⁷ James B. Steinberg, "The Policymaker's Perspective: Transparency and Partnership" in George and Bruce, *Analyzing Intelligence*, 83.

be for policymakers and members of Congress—let's call it, *Applied Intelligence for the Savvy Policymaker*. With today's technology we are capable of deploying such a course in various appealing media formats to include interactive online presentations. This course would not just be given by intelligence professionals but co-taught with former policymakers willing to share the lessons they have learned in working with the IC. Ideally, new policymakers in the future would want to take this course because it would be known to provide them a sophisticated understanding of the IC under the ODNI. Demand for the course would be high if it were known that the president and his cabinet had endorsed it.

Any attempt to design this course for new policymakers and members of Congress that is exclusively done in-house is vulnerable to charges of IC attempts at propaganda and proselytizing. Also, we have simply not developed a deep enough understanding of the topic ourselves to provide a rich and systematic briefing at this point. Thus, the director of national intelligence should ask prominent former officials from both major parties to lead a task force to develop such a course. Former officials such as Congressman Lee Hamilton, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre and National Security Advisor Steve Hadley,

To provide the intellectual rigor needed to undergird a course for new policymakers and Congress, the DNI also should seek out a partnership with prominent think tanks and relevant academic institutions.

Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace, DCIA Michael Hayden, DCI George Tenet, and Acting DCI John McLaughlin spring to mind but there are, of course, many others with the requisite expertise.

Partnering with the Private Sector

To provide the intellectual rigor needed to undergird a course for new policymakers and Congress, the DNI also should seek out a partnership with prominent think tanks and relevant academic institutions that span the political spectrum to design case study materials from past policy successes and failures analyzing how policymakers either got the best or inadequate support from the IC.

This process would require extensive interviews with those who were intimately involved in the intelligence support and policymaking during the period studied. Such an effort would be open to suspicion if it was done in house and the academics would need access to the classified record. *To avoid ran-*

cor, the case studies might avoid recent politically charged controversies such as the issue of intelligence support to decision making on Iraq WMD but could be just as useful if done on such issues as IC support to policymakers on the Soviet Union or intelligence support during the Kosovo conflict.⁸

Once case studies are drafted, it would be in the best interest of the IC to present them to a conference of academics and policymakers, current and former, at a symposium for a reality check and fine-tuning. Such a symposium might be appropriately convened at one of the presidential libraries and perhaps carried on CSPAN television, providing the added benefit of educating the general public on this new initiative.

Net Gens and Unauthorized Disclosures

One final important aspect of this tutorial would be a frank discussion of the damage

⁸ IC assessment of the Soviet Union is attractive as a topic because it has already been extensively studied from the IC side. For example, see Douglas J. MacEachin, *CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges*, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1996).

The general public's understanding of the IC and its mission and capabilities is equally worrisome.

caused by unauthorized public disclosure. We should take heed of the implications of the recent arrest and arraignment of the 22-year-old member of the US military on charges of unauthorized disclosure of the classified information revealed through Wikileaks. He is a member of Net Gen, the generation of children, teens, and young adults aged 11 to 31 who have grown up immersed in digital technology. He allegedly downloaded a staggering 260,000 documents because he hoped their release would lead to a "worldwide discussion, debate, and reform" of the tactics in the war on terror.⁹ The younger generation, whether policymakers or members of the IC, come into government with much more open view of information and information sharing and need help understanding our unique issues.¹⁰ Thus, the course should include a discussion of the enormous damage to US security and the financial costs to the American taxpayer when unauthorized disclosures result in damage to sensitive intelligence collection capabilities. To

be effective, such a course should be open with policymakers and members of Congress in discussing the specific, recent examples of unauthorized leaks and the damage they have inflicted.

An Informed Public

The general public's understanding of the IC and its mission and capabilities is equally worrisome. All of us have experienced the uneasy feeling as we watched our profession personified by Hollywood as either the omnipotent Jack Bauer or the bumbling Maxwell Smart. At times we are portrayed as flagrantly violating the US Constitution and abusing the human rights of US citizens and foreigners alike. At other times, we are portrayed as laughingly incompetent or, worse yet, creating wars and crises because we act in secret without oversight. Few and far between are the accurate portrayals of the critical mission of the IC as the "Silent Service," going where others cannot go, risking our lives to protect Americans from harm, and providing the needed raw and finished intelligence products to inform and elevate policy deliberations.

Middling Public Approval Ratings

It is therefore not surprising that public opinion polling con-

sistently shows that elements of the IC typically glean only about a 50-percent approval rating from the general public. This contrasts starkly with the various armed services and the FBI, which routinely poll at least 15 percentage points higher than the CIA in public opinion surveys.¹¹ Surveys do not even try to measure the public approval for the ODNI since there is very little public recognition of the name and almost no general understanding of its role. In the aftermath of 9/11, it seems counterintuitive and surprising that we have gained little in public approval ratings despite our large role in the battle with terrorists and the fact that intelligence has played a vital role in making sure that another 9/11 has not happened. Many IC officials have pointed to the large number of excellent resumes received each year by the IC to demonstrate that our public image is strong, but this indicator may say as much about the state of the job market and the glamorized Hollywood vision of the IC as it says about public attitudes.

Why does our public image pale in comparison to that of the armed services? To be fair, a part of our problem is simply

⁹ Kevin Poulsen, Kim Zetter, "I can't believe what I am confession to you: The Wikileaks Chats," *Wired Magazine online*, 6 June 2010.

¹⁰ For an excellent study of the challenges we face in the information age see *Where Tomorrow Will Take Us: The New Environment for Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 2010).

¹¹ See for example, "Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor: The People and Their Government," Pew Research Center for the People and the Press <http://people-press.org/2010/04/18/distrust-discontent-anger-and-partisan-rancor/> (accessed 9 May 2011).

that we must operate under the cloak of secrecy and are therefore perceived as a bad fit for an open democracy. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently put it when speaking about the CIA, "The truth is, across the political spectrum, it has had relatively few supporters other than presidents who find they like its clandestine powers. It's just an itch in our system that's hard to scratch."¹² *Secretary Gates may be a bit too fatalistic about our lot, and I believe it is this kind of presumption that holds us back from exploring new ways to convince Americans that we are not an anomaly but a necessity in American democracy.* To me, part of the problem is again that we have not worked hard enough at strategic communications with the general public. Too often, we allow others to define us (mostly negatively) by making it sound as if the sum total of our role can be summarized by referring to such controversies as Abu Ghraib and water boarding.

Reengineering Our Public Profile

Although some argue that the IC by its very nature should not have a public profile, that philosophy may be outdated in the age of new social media. *Frankly speaking, we only need to look at the outmoded design*

¹² David Ignatius, "Gates: The Pentagon's Accountability Cop," *The Washington Post*, 9 September 2010.

Part of the problem is that we have not worked hard enough at strategic communications with the general public.

of www.dni.gov website in comparison to the websites of the Department of Defense or even the Defense Intelligence Agency to see that we are not communicating as well as we could with the public. Here are a few other ideas on developing stronger public insight into the IC:

- *Internet Chats with IC experts.* Many executive branch agencies, including the White House, offer the public the opportunity for periodic on-line chats with administration officials on topics of wide interest. This is also being done with regularity by major academic think tanks. There is no reason that the ODNI and other IC leaders could not do the same under carefully controlled circumstances. National intelligence officers (NIOs) and other top-notch experts could provide on-line chat opportunities on important topics of the day to the general public. For example, the NIO for South Asia might field questions from the public on the implications of the floods in Pakistan or the NIOs for economics and East Asia might discuss the implications of China's recent emergence as the world's second largest economy. On-line chatting of this sort allows for the public to submit questions in advance so that they can be screened for any politically

sensitive or inappropriate questions.

- *Outreach to Local Officials and Emerging Leaders.* It is striking when meeting with officials at the state and city level around this nation how little contact most have with the IC, beyond the FBI. Similarly, most politicians only have an association with the IC if they serve in Washington. Although there is a natural IC reluctance to hold town-hall meetings with the general public on intelligence, by invitation seminars for local officials and emerging politicians would expose them to our issues long before they became Washington policymakers. This kind of seminar is a proven formula that IC elements have used for recruiting sessions with students at universities and colleges.
- *An Official Guidebook to Intelligence.* The CIA *World Factbook* is a wonderful resource to the general public that is heavily used on line. Although the DNI publishes the "A Consumer's Guide" to intelligence, the document is primarily intended for senior intelligence consumers in the US government and is not particularly user friendly for the general public. Creation of a general guidebook might be best accomplished by commissioning a prominent, profes-

There is one major aspect of intelligence policy that needs a clear rethinking...the bright line we have drawn over the years between intelligence and policy.

sional writer outside of the IC to write an unclassified guide that captures more fully what the uninitiated would want to know.¹³

- *Greater Publicity to Our Role in Supporting the Military.* Part of the public's high respect for the armed forces comes from their long traditions of service to the nation. Most Americans can hum the tune of the Marine Corps Hymn. The tradition of intelligence support to the military began with General George Washington, but the public perception is that the IC is only about 60 years old. While I am not suggesting uniforms and salutes, I am suggesting that we look harder at those things we might do to make ourselves more associated with proven, military traditions. One such effort is a recent *Studies* special edition, *CIA at War*, which commemorates the work of CIA men and women in conflict zones around the world since the Agency's creation.

Perceived Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable

A final reason I would cite on why strategic communications to the public is important going

forward is this simple fact—there will be successful terror strikes on US soil in our future, and they may even involve the use of weapons of mass destruction. *We need only look at the major outcry against the IC that occurred after the failed terrorist attempt to blow up a commercial airliner last December to see a glimpse of the kind of blame game that is likely to engulf the IC when the next successful foreign terrorist attack occurs.* As two prominent British observers of our profession sagely put it, "Intelligence failure is a matter of expectations, and seeking to adjust expectation of what intelligence can and cannot do is surely essential to informed democratic debate. Yet if and when a catastrophic terrorist attack succeeds, public confidence in the intelligence and security services will inevitably be tested."¹⁴ We cannot afford to wait passively for that test to come before we try to shape public expectations and understanding of what we do.

Confronting a Taboo

As we begin a new century there is one major aspect of intelligence policy that needs a clear rethinking in consulta-

tion with the Executive Branch and the US Congress. This is the bright line we have drawn over the years between intelligence and policy. Sherman Kent was adamant in his belief that intelligence analysis is a service arm to policymakers and that it should not be a formulator of objectives, a drafter of policy, or a maker of plans. But increasingly today, policymakers and legislators find that the intelligence analysts' adherence to this article of faith robs the policymaker of the ideas and suggestions for policy that a highly informed analyst can provide. They often complain that briefings that provide just the facts are simply not relevant and helpful enough. They can get the facts off of the Internet at a greater speed than we can deliver them, but what they crave from us is analytic insight and our thoughts on how US foreign policy can be advanced.

I believe former DNI Dennis Blair took a large step toward toning down the bright line when in a media roundtable in March 2009 he told the press that he had mandated that every piece of analysis on important issues not only have a threat analysis section but also an opportunities analysis section. He described opportunity analysis as helping policymakers "find the levers...which will enable us to advance our interests and our common interests."¹⁵ Despite his pronouncement, opportunities analysis remains uncomfortable and controversial in many IC

¹³ The DNI guide is located at http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Consumers_Guide_2009.pdf.

¹⁴ Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, "Intelligence in the 21st Century," *Intelligence and Security* 24, No. 1 (February 2009), 24.

components. Analytic managers are far too concerned that providing some suggestion on policy options will taint analysis and destroy its purity. Yet in most of the advanced intelligence services around the globe no such bright line is drawn. And, I would argue, this bright line robs the policymaker of some of the most useful byproducts of analytic depth and sophistication.

We have consistently not prepared our customers to use intelligence wisely, and thus we are afraid of what they will do with even guarded policy inputs. Were we better at in-depth communication with our customers, we could jointly set parameters on opportunity analysis that would protect the IC from accusations of politicization or meddling in policy. In this regard, I am reminded of Secretary of State Colin Powell's famous adage that demonstrates his sophisticated understanding of the role of intelligence:

I will hold you [the intelligence expert] accountable for what you tell me is a fact; and I will hold you accountable for what you tell me is not going to hap-

pen because you have the fact on that, or you don't know what's going to happen, or you know what your body of ignorance is and you told me what that is. Now when you tell me what's most likely to happen, then I, as the policymaker, have to make a judgment as to whether I act on that, and I won't hold you accountable for it because that is a judgment; and judgments of this kind are made by policymakers, not by intelligence experts.¹⁵

I recognize that many will argue that, if we cross the divide, we will lose our analytic objectivity and integrity. I think that this was more of a problem when we were just beginning after World War II to create the craft of intelligence analysis. That craft is now well developed, and we have a keen sense of how to keep our integrity. *My worry is that, if we continue to defend a rigid line of detachment from policy, we will lose our reason for existence—the opportunity to elevate the policy debate.* Policymakers have often stated that, when the IC becomes a part of a policy-intelligence task force working a particular problem,

the intelligence provided becomes much better targeted to assist the policymaker. This is in part because, when we stay outside the policy circles, we have less understanding of what is really needed. Whereas when we are in the circle, we are better able to target our resources and analysis to the exacting needs of the moment.

This brings me to my final recommendation and that is the need for a *Center for the Study of the Intelligence Innovation* administered by the ODNI. As noted above, we can do a great deal by reaching out to former officials, the academic community and think tanks for help on educating our consumers. But ultimately we should have a permanent staff of professionals who study this centrally important question on a continuing basis. The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at CIA provides a good model for this activity and is adapting to widen its focus beyond CIA. CSI recently has begun assuming the IC's Lessons Learned and history functions and is thus taking a greater community role. Policymaker needs are dynamic and change quickly because of the flow of world events and rapid technological advances. If we are to remain relevant, we cannot neglect serious study of the policy-intelligence interface.

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¹⁵ Media roundtable with DNI Dennis Blair. 26 March 2009. Available at: http://www.dni.gov/interview/20090326_interview.pdf. For another challenge to the taboo, see Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott, "The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers," *Studies in Intelligence* 54, No. 4 (December 2010).

¹⁶ Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee," 13 September 2004.

The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and Trajectories in the United Kingdom

Christopher R. Moran

“
Clarity has come to
intelligence history much
like the restoration of an
aged fresco.”

This article is an overview of the history of the academic study of intelligence in the United Kingdom since 1945, a time marked by three distinctive periods of historiography. Each, labelled here as Absence, Emergence, and Efflorescence, has contained unique themes and approaches to intelligence history as it has been practiced in Britain.^a

Clarity has come to intelligence history much like the restoration of an aged fresco in which hidden details are gradually revealed through repeated cleansings until a full-bodied picture emerges. Attempts to establish the history of British intelligence have ranged greatly in style and quality, from the lurid works served up by the media and by the purveyors of conspiracy theory (appropriately described by Nicholas Hiley as “lightweight meals that sit so heavily on the stomach”),¹ to the tomes, written by official historians and born of patient work in archives and historical scholarship.

Writers on intelligence have been a fissiparous bunch, their focus and approach shaped to a large extent by forces and events in the real world. In the 1960s and 1970s, as public fascination with and fear about espionage grew exponentially following a string of high-profile fiascoes (including the U-2 spy plane incident in May 1960, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, the John Vassall spy case in 1962, and the Profumo Affair in 1963), many authors made their names by looking at scandal.

*For the likes of Andrew Boyle— whose book *The Climate of Treason: Five who Spied for Russia* led to the public unmasking in 1979 of Anthony Blunt as a former Soviet agent—writing intelligence history was both a professional and a political activity, designed to shake the Establishment by shining a harsh and bright light on its unethical*

^a This article is an adaptation of a chapter written by the author for *Spooked: Britain, Empire and Intelligence since 1945* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholar Publishers, 2009). Prepared with the permission of the publisher.

The endnotes are available in the digital version of the article in cia.gov.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Secret service work was wreathed in a miasma of secrecy; its practitioners were spectral figures, known only to their exclusive fraternal initiates.

practices.² In the mid- to late 1970s and then into the 1980s, as governments lifted the lid on Allied codebreaking successes during the Second World War, so historians paid much closer attention to the role of intelligence. Similarly, in the 1990s, as the British intelligence services themselves began to edge toward the light—they were first listed in the statute books, for example, and began declassifying hitherto secret records—so the nascent discipline of intelligence studies entrenched itself in academia.

In the 21st century, the history of Britain's intelligence services has enjoyed a revival in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid, and London, as well as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thanks to the spooks of today, the spies of the past are no longer the supporting cast in some larger drama of international relations but are front and center on the historical stage.

Intelligence history, while presently booming, is fast approaching another tipping point. With the official histories of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) hitting bookshops in 2009, 2010, and 2013 respectively, much of the original fresco will have been restored. For the intelligence historian, therefore, plotting the

future of the past has never been more important.

Absence

For a long time, intelligence history was the Cinderella of disciplines of history, starved of recognition and marginalized by its more successful scholarly sisters. In 1984, Christopher Andrew and David Dilks famously described intelligence as the “missing dimension” in historical inquiry, conspicuous in its absence from the literature of both modern government and international relations.³ Filling this significant lacuna was a task for which few serious historians had the stomach. Throughout much of the 20th century, the UK intelligence community was the “invisible man” of government, a state within a state, and an entity about which questions were never asked, even in Parliament.

Secret service work was wreathed in a miasma of secrecy; its practitioners—like members of a collegiate society—were spectral figures, known only to their exclusive fraternal initiates. “It is the essence of a Secret Service,” declared Sir Austen Chamberlain (then foreign secretary) in December 1924, “that it must be secret, and if you once begin

disclosure it is perfectly obvious to me as to honorable members opposite that there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it.”⁴

Governments, irrespective of their political persuasion, refused to avow the very existence of the intelligence agencies. As Sir Frank Newsam (then Home Office permanent undersecretary) wrote in October 1952: “I was brought up in the tradition that the existence of the Security Service should never be mentioned save in the highest circles, and, for a very long time, I never knew its address and have only recently entered its portals.”⁵ It was often said that the British attitude toward intelligence mirrored societal attitudes toward marital sex; that is, everyone knew that it went on, but to “speak, write or ask questions about it” was not done.⁶

Much to the chagrin of independent historians, the taboo of secrecy surrounding intelligence was undergirded by the indefinite closure of service records. No matter how old or how sensitive, all documents that referred to intelligence found themselves in a historical never-never land, withheld indefinitely from release to the Public Record Office (PRO), now The National Archives (TNA).⁷ Section 3 (4) of the Public Records Act (1958, 1967), otherwise known as the “blanket” exemption, gave the

lord chancellor discretionary power to hold back any file related to intelligence or the intelligence services. In 1982, the Wilson Committee on Modern Public Records highlighted absurd examples of closed material, including postal intercept files from the 18th century and intelligence bulletins from the Battle of Waterloo. The dearth of primary source material discouraged even the most intrepid historian, to whom accessible documentation was the lifeblood of good scholarship.

Keeping the intelligence services walled off from public view was generally defended on the grounds of operational security. The agencies claimed, with some justification, that intelligence gathering would be jeopardized if its sources or methods were disclosed. In the field of human intelligence (HUMINT), for example, the identification of an individual as a secret agent is very often a matter of life or death.

Indeed, since the danger of retribution against a spy is not necessarily restricted to a single generation, one should not assume that the passage of time concurrently diminishes the hazards of disclosure. Without a promise of absolute secrecy, moreover, it was feared that agent recruitment would diminish and service morale plummet. "Secrecy is the breath of life to the clandestine war-

With historians deprived of documents and governments determined to choke off public debate, the "history" of Britain's intelligence services was written largely by investigative journalists and "exposé merchants."

rior," intoned RAdm. A. H. Taylor in June 1945: "It is necessary for his own morale as well as for his security that he should know it will be faithfully observed."⁸

Whitehall's commitment to keeping intelligence matters secret was so unyielding that officials often went to remarkable lengths to prevent disclosures from occurring. Nothing illustrates this better than the *Spycatcher* affair of 1986–88, when then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher tried unsuccessfully to suppress the memoir of Peter Wright, an embittered former assistant director of MI5. Ghost written by Paul Greengrass (who would later direct the Jason Bourne films), *Spycatcher* alleged that the late Sir Roger Hollis, a past director general of the service, had been a Soviet mole, and it accused MI5 of plotting against, snooping on, and defaming then Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the mid-1970s.⁹

Wright's allegations were neither novel nor discernibly damaging to national security. In March 1981, Fleet Street's greatest scoop-merchant, Chapman Pincher, published *Their Trade is Treachery*, which forced Thatcher to admit in Parliament that Hollis had been investigated some years

earlier as a possible Russian spy.¹⁰ Unlike Pincher, however, Wright was an insider who had taken a lifelong oath of silence and whose account was less easily "deniable." In 1987, therefore, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) banned *Spycatcher* in the UK, prohibited newspaper reportage with a series of gag orders, and sought a court injunction to halt the book's publication in Australia.

The insistence on a blanket ban was ludicrous. *Spycatcher* had already been published in the United States and ranked first on *The New York Times* best sellers list; thousands of copies had crossed the Atlantic and were washing up in second-hand bookstores.¹¹ The affair descended into complete farce when Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong was dispatched to an Australian court to present the government's case.

Famously, Armstrong endured a torrid time, harried by a brash young advocate and ridiculed by the world's media for refusing to accept that SIS existed. Armstrong's credibility was fatally undermined when, under cross-examination, he was forced to concede, in a priceless admission, that he had been "economical with the truth." Since open sales of *Spy-*

"Toffs to a man, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Philby, Blunt and John Cairncross had all advanced because they had attended the right schools and the right gentlemen's clubs." (Guy Burgess on left, Kim Philby on the right.)



Images © Bettmann/Corbis

catcher overseas had rendered moot the question of secrecy, attempts to squelch publication ultimately failed and brought mockery upon intelligence taboos.

With historians deprived of documents and governments determined to choke off public debate, the "history" of Britain's intelligence services was written largely by investigative journalists and "exposé merchants," relying on inside information obtained from well-connected friends in Whitehall. With an impish pleasure in wreaking havoc, authors such as Pincher, Nigel West, and Andrew Boyle focused on subjects perfectly calculated to rile the Establishment, including the Wilson Plot, the Cambridge Five, and the purported duplicity of Roger Hollis. (Now in his nineties, Pincher remains con-

vinced that Hollis was a Soviet agent.)¹²

Sometimes referred to pejoratively as the "airport bookstall" school of intelligence historiography,¹³ this genre of spy literature first came to prominence in the 1960s, a period known as the "era of exposure" for the intelligence and security agencies.¹⁴ In the United States, the CIA's ill-fated attempt to overthrow Cuban dictator Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs made front-page news, as did the shoot-downs of the U-2 and the RB-47 in 1960. Later in the decade, as the public became increasingly disillusioned with the war in Vietnam, and as stories emerged that US-sponsored covert action was propping up corrupt regimes in Central and South America, the CIA was

seen in certain quarters as symbolic of a nation losing its way.

In Britain, the early 1960s were punctuated by a series of real-life spy scandals, beginning with the exposure of George Blake as a Soviet spy in 1961 and culminating with the revelation in 1963 that the secretary of state for war, John Profumo, had shared his prostitute girlfriend, Christine Keeler, with a Russian spymaster. By the late 1960s, things got worse. In 1967, the *Daily Express* revealed that the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) routinely intercepted thousands of private cables, setting in motion a chain of events that brought personal obloquy upon Harold Wilson and very nearly spelled the end for the D-Notice Committee, the joint government/media body whose purpose was to prevent the public disclosure of information that would adversely affect the defense of the realm. A year later, Kim Philby, the ruthless SIS traitor and "Third Man" who had defected to the Soviet Union in January 1963, published his KGB-blessed memoir, *My Silent War*, which remorselessly revealed the details of SIS personnel and relationships and his own role as a Russian spy for over 30 years.

Philby and his band of turn-coats became a "magnetic specter"¹⁵ to a generation of sensation-seeking writers. Just about every "airport bookstall"

author with basic literary ability—and some without—tried to make a quick buck by peddling tall tales of treachery, betrayal, murder, and whatnot. In pursuit of the “Fourth Man” (eventually revealed as Anthony Blunt), accounts tended to focus on the cloistered quadrangles of Cambridge in the 1930s and on the secret societies, such as the Apostles, that became Marxist cells for the disaffected moneyed elite. The spate of books that were produced on Philby were in the main deeply critical of the spy, suggesting that he had handed over thousands of state secrets and caused hundreds of deaths.

In what many regard as an unforgivable apologia that may have cost him a knighthood and a Nobel Prize, the novelist Graham Greene was a lone voice in depicting Philby as a misunderstood idealist, or “passionate pilgrim,” who sacrificed everything for the cause of the oppressed proletariat.¹⁶ Greene—a close friend of Philby, following Greene’s time in SIS during the Second World War—compared the spy to a persecuted Catholic in Elizabethan England.

By many accounts, the real sin of the Cambridge Five was not betraying their country, but betraying their class.¹⁷ The motivation for disclosure was to expose the Establishment for being so blinded by class prejudice that it failed to spot treach-

In the UK, the emergence of intelligence was more specifically linked to a series of accessibly written, authoritative, and revealing histories of wartime deception published by respected intelligence veterans in the early 1970s.

ery within its ranks. Toffs to a man, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Philby, Blunt and John Cairncross had all advanced because they had attended the right schools and the right gentlemen’s clubs. Similarly, many accounts of the Profumo Affair were not espionage yarns per se, but commentaries on Britain’s moral landscape, critiquing those who had become sexually liberated and Bohemian long before it was fashionable.

By the late 1970s, the spread of “mole mania,” coupled with the felicitous cresting of the James Bond phenomenon, arguably had created an unquenchable public thirst for sensational tales of espionage, a trend that continues today. As Oliver Hoare argues, “Racy histories of secret services...have often been the norm.”¹⁸ In academic circles, “airport bookstall” accounts were frequently met with ridicule or outright hostility, and served only to devalue the credibility of intelligence as a respectable field of inquiry. In the years to come, it is possible scholars will rehabilitate the “airport bookstall” school as a form of “protohistory” which, despite its flaws, facilitated the public emergence of Britain’s intelligence agencies and the writings of the

first professional intelligence historians.

Emergence

By the late 1980s, intelligence history had started to come of age, demonstrating how attention to the form and function of espionage could challenge existing orthodoxies about international relations and modern governance. Its ascent was in part the corollary of seismic events in the United States. In 1975, the Senate’s famous Church Committee hearings exposed some of the CIA’s most dubious, if not outright illegal activities, including the surveillance of domestic dissidents and the covert subversion of foreign governments. Church’s festival of revelation was transformative for the US intelligence community and “provided scholars, in the Western world, at least, with hitherto absent incentives and reasons to study intelligence.”¹⁹

Revealing World War II History

In the UK, the emergence of intelligence was more specifically linked to a series of accessibly written, authoritative, and revealing histories of wartime deception published by respected intelligence veterans in the early 1970s. In 1972, the

Published after 1945, the official histories of the Second World War were carefully doctored to maintain state security and thus contained no mention of Bletchley Park.

Oxford don, John Masterman, published *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–45*, an account of the highly successful XX Committee and its turning of German spies into double agents during World War II.²⁰ With outstanding social connections (then Prime Minister Edward Heath was a former student), Masterman was persona grata to members of the Establishment who shared the author's desire to champion the achievements of the system and to head off erroneous "outsider" histories.

Two years later, Group Captain Frederick Winterbotham, a former intelligence officer at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, was allowed to publish the first English-language work dedicated to the Ultra secret—"the greatest secret of World War Two after the atom bomb"²¹—and the influence of Enigma decryption on the course of the war.²² Although hagiographic and unreliable in places (Winterbotham was accused of lacking "the most elementary technical knowledge" of cryptography, as well as downgrading the Polish and French contributions in breaking German ciphers),²³ *The Ultra Secret* represented a significant milestone in the pursuit of intelligence history. Ultra ranked as one of the best-

kept secrets of all time. In July 1945, amid concerns that its revelation might preclude post-war rapprochement with Germany (whose leaders might claim that they were not "well and fairly beaten," à la 1918), the JIC had considered it "imperative that the fact that such intelligence was available should NEVER be disclosed."²⁴

Published after 1945, the official histories of the Second World War were carefully doctored to maintain state security and thus contained no mention of Bletchley Park. Despite his reputation as something of a loose cannon, a man wanting in constraint and fickle in his loyalties to the rules of censorship, Winston Churchill was silent on the subject in his multivolume memoir of the conflict. As David Reynolds argues, for such a great aficionado of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Churchill made a "considerable sacrifice," a point not lost on Bletchley Park veterans who, should their wartime prime minister have spilled the beans, may have followed suit.²⁵

Winterbotham's account opened up a brand new chapter in the public's understanding of WW II and provoked a groundswell of academic interest in the role of intelligence, counter-intelligence, and deception. Knowing the Allies had been in

possession of event-influencing information, military historians who had been enamored of a particular general or admiral lost faith, igniting a firestorm of historical revisionism.

Opening Archives

With the Ultra secret in the public domain, Whitehall, perhaps unexpectedly, began to reassess its approach to intelligence archives. Although spread over many years so "as to generate the minimum public interest,"²⁶ from the mid-1970s HMG started to declassify its Great War SIGINT record, the Room 40 O.B. archive. In 1977, the first batch of Enigma decrypts and other Ultra-related material was released to the National Archives. Two years later, ministers took a bolder step in authorizing the publication of the first volume of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley's official history, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, researched and written with the help of several able hands who, like Hinsley, had served at Bletchley Park during the war.²⁷

The brainchild of former Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend, Hinsley's multivolume tome had been conceived as a "counterblast" against the deluge of salacious outsider accounts.²⁸ Depending upon who was spinning the tale, British intelligence was increasingly seen as a safe haven for disillusioned toffs more accustomed to dis-

gorging secrets to the enemy than defending the realm. In his widely read “Karla Trilogy” (1974–79), for example, John le Carré explored a world of betrayal, treason, and murder, peopled by those who become what they behold. Fair but forthright, unfailingly well written, and meticulously researched (Hinsley and his team had been granted unrestricted access to official papers), *British Intelligence in the Second World War* won wide-ranging praise from academia’s most knowledgeable and discerning commentators. CIA officer-turned-scholar Walter Pforzheimer called it “the single greatest work on intelligence ever produced,” and it set the benchmark by which all other works on the subject are judged.²⁹

Hacking into Other Sources

Hinsley’s history firmly contested the para-historian’s attempt to annex intelligence to the domain of “airport book-stall” literature and piqued the curiosity of an emerging generation of professional researchers. In the 1980s and early 1990s, scholars became less inclined to scoff and increasingly skilled at what one scholar has termed “archival intelligence hacking.”³⁰ Hacker in chief was Christopher Andrew, Hinsley’s heir apparent, but the roll also included David Stafford, Julian Lewis and Bradley Smith. Drawing upon private papers as well as

Hinsley’s [below] multivolume British Intelligence in the Second World War had been conceived as a “counterblast” against the deluge of salacious outsider accounts.




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so-called “adjacent” records, such as Foreign Office and Treasury files, the aforementioned demonstrated that there was sufficient declassified material to “fill in both the general outline of the missing intelligence dimension and much of its operational detail.”³¹

Private collections were particularly bountiful, as long as an author was prepared to weed through, canvass, and weight each folio of inchoate documents; statesmen of the first rank, including Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, had routinely taken copies of confidential documents home with them—copies which, unbeknownst to the Cabinet Office, were often retained among

those officials’ personal papers. For example, in Eden’s stockpile, formally deposited in the Birmingham University Library in 1990, was the first page of Sir Edward Bridges’ Top Secret report into the disappearance of SIS frogman Lionel “Buster” Crabb (not officially declassified until 2006).

Authors with a penchant for lateral thinking also started to prize UK records out of the archives and libraries of foreign states. With its sunshine laws and landmark Freedom of Information Act, signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 4 July 1966, America was increasingly seen as an Aladdin’s cave—or wonderland—where any number of

In recent years, the discipline of intelligence studies has gone from strength to strength, becoming a magnet for postgraduate students and postdoctoral researchers around the world.

jewels could be found.³² The archive of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime counterpart of SIS and forerunner of the CIA, was said to contain “not just isolated documents,” but quite often “entire files of British material.”³³ In his biography of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies (“C” during and after World War Two), the globe-trotting writer Anthony Cave Brown showed that Special Operations Executive (SOE) materials were available for public inspection in the papers of C’s American equivalent, William J. Donovan, which were housed at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.³⁴

The desire to open up the “missing dimension” enveloped Christopher Andrew in writing what became a massively detailed history of the British intelligence services. Published in 1985 and stretching to over 700 pages, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* demonstrated the value of sustained and creative archival research.³⁵ In 1986, Andrew cofounded *Intelligence and National Security*, the first (and now preeminent) academic journal in the field. The premise of its first issue was that intelligence represented a “proper” subject of study for scholars in

political history and kindred disciplines.

Others soon shared this sentiment. As Keith Jeffrey has argued, a “conclusive indicator” of the subject’s newfound legitimacy was the acceptance of articles by traditional periodical outlets.³⁶ In 1986, for example, both *The Journal of Contemporary History* and *The English Historical Review* published articles on intelligence for the first time.³⁷ The proliferation of conferences was also instrumental in ushering in a growing scholarly appreciation for espionage-related topics.

This is not to say, however, that the first generation of seri-

ous scholarship was problem-free and beyond critical self-examination. As stated by John Lewis Gaddis, the “British School of Intelligence Studies” (as it became known) lent itself to “buffism,” preoccupied with a love of particular and esoteric terminology.³⁸ Many works—framed within the parameters of organizational theory and institutional practice—elided context and expended little effort in showing how the intelligence services made a difference. In consequence, they were beyond the ken of the average student.

Published fitfully between 1979 and 1990, the five volumes produced by Hinsley and his assistants were a monument to the triumph, but also to the inherent problems of intelli-



In December 1991 Stella Rimington became the first spy chief to be publicly named; the first to pose openly for cameras; and the first to publish a brochure. Image © Capital Pic/Corbis Sygma

gence history in its earliest manifestation. As Ralph Erskine noted of Volume 3, “Hinsley makes too few judgments, and his book is definitely not bedside reading. Order of battle appreciations loom all too large.”³⁹ The pursuit of intelligence history, therefore, demanded not only the centrifugal instinct to locate minutiae in the archives, but also a centripetal inclination to contextualize those details for a readership that might not be cognizant of the basic contours and outlines.

Efflorescence

In recent years, the discipline of intelligence studies has gone from strength to strength, becoming a magnet for post-graduate students and postdoc-

toral researchers around the world, and producing an impressive and varied literature. The steady stream of scholarship that has accrued over the past two decades has coincided with an ever-growing public awareness about intelligence. Following the high drama of 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the intelligence and security services entered a new phase in their history. As borders opened and free elections ousted communist regimes across Eastern Europe, the UK intelligence community confidently anticipated a period of relative geopolitical calm and, in turn, placed greater emphasis on accountability and transparency.

This new era of optimism and openness had a physical metonymy: the Berlin Wall.⁴⁰

In the same year SIS and GCHQ entered the UK's statute books (1994), SIS moved into a gleaming new building at Vauxhall Cross (left). GCHQ moved into its new facility, unsurprisingly called the “Donut” by many, in 2003. The prominence of the structures bespoke the emergence of both institutions into public and academic eyes. Images © Corbis.



During the Cold War, as made famous by John le Carré's novel *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (1963), the Wall was the literal and symbolic epicenter of the great game of espionage; by the early 1990s it had been torn down. The lifting of the veil in the UK began in 1989, when MI5 was placed, for the first time, on a legislative footing. The Security Service Act (1989) came into being partly as a response to complaints about unauthorized government surveillance. Four years earlier, MI5 had faced a barrage of media scrutiny when a former officer, Cathy Massiter, provided evidence before the European Court of Human Rights that the service had been illegally bugging the telephones of pressure groups, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), as well as political “high fliers,” including Patricia Hewitt and Harriet Harman, then leading members of the National Council for Civil Liberties.

In the 18 months following her appointment as director general of MI5 in December 1991, Stella Rimington became the first spy chief to be publicly named; the first to pose openly for cameras; and the first to publish a brochure, entitled *MI5: The Security Service* (1993), describing the organization's activities.⁴¹ Perhaps even more surprisingly, on 7 May 1992, then Prime Minister John Major acknowledged in Parlia-

Since 2001, few subjects have commanded so much attention and controversy as intelligence.

ment that Sir Colin McColl was the incumbent head of SIS.⁴² Hitherto, McColl and his predecessors had been ritually referred to as “C,” the fabled code name that originated with Captain Sir Mansfield Cumming, the first director of the service.

In 1994, SIS and GCHQ joined the MI5 on the statute book, while the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) was established to oversee the “policy, administration and expenditure” of the three agencies.⁴³ It should be said that the British glasnost was not in isolation; the collapse of communism prompted most Central and Eastern European secret services, previously little more than Soviet surrogates, to enshrine their responsibilities and powers in statute.

Underpinning this new spirit of openness was a perception that intelligence as a whole was becoming less important. For statesmen and practitioners alike, the passing of Marxism-Leninism from the Soviet Union, the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states, and the purported universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government all pointed to a “New World Order” in which intelligence would take a backseat.

By the early 2000s, however, this belief had been shown to be naïve. The post-Cold War era had not brought an end to conflict or instability, nor had it confirmed “the end of history,” in which secular free-market democracy reigned unchallenged. The intelligence services, having lost the stabilizing force of a common enemy, found themselves required to adapt to a host of new threats, from the development of corruption, cartels, and mafias in transitioning countries, to the global spread of terrorism, organized crime, drug smuggling, and human trafficking.

Terrorism and Iraq

Since 2001, few subjects have commanded so much attention and controversy as intelligence. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid, and in London, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, debates about weapons of mass destruction (WMD), domestic surveillance, and secret detention and rendition have all brought unwelcome notoriety and exposure to the intelligence services. In a world of media plenty, the importance, but also the limitations and abuses of intelligence, have never been more visible. In the face of threats from militant jihadists, public expectations of intelligence have soared to an all-time high, as have calls for greater transparency about

what is being done to combat this menace.⁴⁴

The British government has played an instrumental, if not always positive, role in dragging its intelligence community into the sunlight. In the summer of 2003, members of the administration of then Prime Minister Tony Blair, in particular Downing Street’s then Director of Communications and Strategy Alastair Campbell, came under heavy fire amid allegations that intelligence on Iraqi WMD had been deliberately twisted—or “sexed up”—in its representation to the public in order to present an exaggerated case for military action. The row centered on the publication of two highly contentious dossiers, which, using intelligence-derived information (including both HUMINT gathered by SIS and—for the first time—JIC assessments), claimed that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program and could “deploy [chemical and biological] weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so.”⁴⁵

Asking the JIC to produce material for public consumption was an act without parallel in British politics. Blair, writes Christopher Andrew, “finally laid to rest the traditional taboo that British governments do not mention their intelligence services.”⁴⁶ As the months passed without any sign of the weapons about

which Blair and his security apparatchiks had ominously warned, breaking this taboo proved disastrous. Ministers were accused of “spinning” intelligence to sell the war on a false premise, and the intelligence services, historically unswayed by the interests of any political party or class, were criticized for compromising their independence and succumbing to political influence.

As Richard Aldrich argues, “the opening up of intelligence has followed the law of unintended consequences.”⁴⁷ Intending only to disclose selected snippets of information, the government instead put intelligence into a goldfish bowl, encouraging the ceaseless scrutiny of an increasingly inquisitorial Parliament and a decreasingly deferential media. Symbolizing the slide towards greater openness, the Hutton Inquiry, which reported on 28 January 2004, posted online virtually all of its evidence, including sensitive documents written only weeks before.

In a community-wide bid to restore public confidence, each intelligence service now places job advertisements in the national press, offers career presentations at academic recruitment fairs, and maintains a website delineating objectives and staffing. Generally speaking, MI5 is more open than its sister service, SIS. In a recent step towards greater

In a community-wide bid to restore public confidence, each intelligence service now places job advertisements in the national press, offers career presentations at academic recruitment fairs, and maintains a website.

transparency, on 6 January 2009 Jonathan Evans became the first serving director general in MI5’s 100-year history to meet the press.

New Openings

Historiography has benefited immeasurably from the two-decade waning of intelligence taboos. Declassification of documentary evidence, especially older material, has gone hand in hand with the more general opening up of intelligence agencies. The process began with the Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government in 1993, which saw the first release of historical records generated by the secret services and afforded independent historians the opportunity to assist in the formulation of retention and release policies.⁴⁸

By the end of the second millennium, hundreds of files relating to SOE, MI5, and Ultra had been transferred to TNA, though few related to the period beyond 1945. Since then, a tsunami of declassified material has occurred. To date, MI5 has declassified approximately 4,000 “pieces” of historically significant information (in official usage, a piece may represent a whole file or a particular portion of it), including war-time material on German spies and double agents, and early

Cold War files on Soviet intelligence operations.⁴⁹ SIS, despite retaining its own archive, has released a number of documents held in the files of other departments and approved the declassification of all surviving SOE records in its custody. Now, rather than retain entire documents, departments producing classified material increasingly extract or “white-out” sensitive passages (a redaction technique CIA has used since the 1970s—though it blacks out passages).

The opening of new repositories in Eastern Europe has also given historians a revealing glimpse at intelligence activities and the mindset on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Materials bearing on the work of the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) have revealed a web of foreign espionage in Britain during the Cold War. By referring to a vast array of German sources in his book *The Stasi Files*, Anthony Glees suggested that some 100 Britons operated—wittingly or not—as agents of influence, including prominent CND members and, most controversially, Lord Roper, former director of studies at Chatham House.⁵⁰

It should be said, of course, that former Eastern bloc read-

In Britain, where spin doctors have a particular resonance in this field, the sincerity of declassification efforts has been the subject of much debate.

ing rooms do present problems. Although the communist system was *akribisch*—that is, obsessive about documenting itself—officials often talked “newspeak rather than brass tacks even behind closed doors.” Files relating to agents and informants, moreover, are notoriously patchy.⁵¹ In a memorably bitter review, Paul Maddrell attacked *The Stasi Files* for inflating its subject matter and accused Glee of committing a cardinal sin for any historian, failing to authenticate the reliability of his evidence.⁵²

In Britain, where spin doctors have a particular resonance in this field, the sincerity of declassification efforts has been the subject of much debate. For British intelligence scholar Ken Robertson they have been tantamount to carefully coordinated publicity stunts by a government intent on “policing its past,” providing officials with the opportunity to rhapsodize about transparency while it exerts control over the pace and content of disclosure. Newly released files, it is said, only disclose what governments deem safe to put on public view.⁵³

Following Robertson’s example, Peter Gill argues that Whitehall has become increasingly skilled at what he calls “burying,” a strategy of bom-

barding the public with a mass of largely insignificant information.⁵⁴ The first tranche of SOE material, which included hefty batches of files on sabotage devices (e.g., incendiary cigarettes and exploding rats), and papers setting out plans to assassinate Adolf Hitler, was presented to the public as one of the biggest “wind-falls” of the end of the Cold War. Such material is all well and good, auguring, as it did, a more open future. It would be well to bear in mind, however, that such programs of document release might also serve as the perfect matador’s cape—waved ostentatiously to draw the eye away from more critical areas.

Richard Aldrich is another scholar who has warned against taking the Waldegrave Initiative at face value. Before entering the public domain, he reminds us, official records are meticulously “preselected, cleaned and processed” by the Whitehall machine. With no external assurance that what is released is “necessarily an analogue of reality,” what is to stop the researcher from becoming an official historian, albeit once removed?⁵⁵ Documents written by actual spies require perhaps the most careful handling. As Bernard Porter writes, “all spies and secret agents are liars, trained in techniques of

deception and dissimulation, who are just as likely to fake the historical record as anything else.”⁵⁶

Some researchers therefore have turned to oral history—“growing their own records”—in order to corroborate the accuracy of their archival findings.⁵⁷ This, too, of course, has inherent flaws—the inevitable diminished memory, especially when a subject worked in secrecy. Such testimony is often polluted by what has been absorbed from subsequent experience and discourse, or, in the case of the once powerful, corrupted by a self-conscious desire to entomb a good reputation. As Philip Davies convincingly argues, the most effective intelligence scholar should not use witness testimony to the exclusion of all other material but should “triangulate” research through a triad of archival, secondary, and oral sources.⁵⁸

Communities of Research

Although the scope of historical writing on intelligence today is so wide that it is difficult to pigeonhole scholars into research communities or sub-schools, Wesley Wark’s treatise *Espionage: Past, Present, Future?* notes that certain “projects” are presently being pursued and suggests a few categories.⁵⁹

Frameworks. The first might be called the “Research Proj-

ect,” the main task of which is to establish the historical framework of intelligence, rediscovering and interpreting its growth, performance, and relevance. Centered on the “episodic treatment of intelligence in peace and war” during the period from the creation of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 to the end of the Cold War,⁶⁰ the “Research Project” involves a prolonged immersion in archival sources and favors the case study methodology. Many texts are understandably prone to narrative and description. Without such work, however, intelligence history would remain conjectural, even conspiratorial and misconceived, and laden with epistemic blind spots.

Theory. A second project works to answer the question, “What is intelligence?” The effort to define intelligence rubs shoulders with political science, gives rise to what is often referred to as “intelligence theory,”⁶¹ and is, as Michael Warner explains, far more complicated than painting a caricature of “some shadowy figure...skulking in a dark alley.” Moreover, how we define intelligence has significant implications for practitioners and scholars alike, shaping the work and remit of oversight committees, as well as influencing declassification policies by elucidating what are and are not activities that governments are required to keep secret.⁶²

Until recently—in the much-quoted words of Walter Laqueur—“all attempts to develop ambitious theories of intelligence have failed.”

Until recently—in the much-quoted words of Walter Laqueur—“all attempts to develop ambitious theories of intelligence have failed.”⁶³ Officialdom stuck to a very rigid definition of intelligence as “information about things foreign”—capabilities, intentions, or activities. In academic writing, meanwhile, the term was defined de novo by each scholar who discussed it. Today we tend to think about intelligence in terms of a three-part schema.⁶⁴ The first, usually labelled “the intelligence cycle,” is a series of steps that begins with a request for information, which is then collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the client. Secondly, it is seen as a “product,” used by decisionmakers at several levels. Thirdly, it is seen as an “institution,” encompassing the roles of related pursuits such as covert action, deception, and clandestine diplomacy.

Warner’s definition—“Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities”—is as apt as it is succinct.⁶⁵ This said, in the 21st century it is arguably getting harder to build a properly encompassing taxonomy of intelligence. The increased production and consumption of surreptitiously acquired information by private groups, such as water suppliers, electricity companies, and airlines chal-

lenges the assertion that intelligence is organized by the state for the state.⁶⁶

The recent emphasis on open source intelligence (OSINT) has further muddled the water, “blurr[ing] distinctions between intelligence and information and the barrier between secret and non-secret.”⁶⁷ Although OSINT under one name or another has been around for centuries, with the rise of the Internet and global communications, the ability to search material at the click of a button has given it much greater prominence and added new components, for example, the blogosphere and social media.

The Interdisciplinary. A commitment to interdisciplinary synergies has become one of the hallmarks of intelligence historiography. The involvement of historians and political scientists, as well as partners in English, sociology, and law has made it a distinctive research cluster. Certain intelligence scholars would consider themselves as “hybrid” or “hyphenated” historians, taking their research and perspectives beyond the academy. Although those who write for nonacademic audiences are still sometimes disparaged, for many in the community, the development of a synthetic literature that connects intelligence his-

The need to relate historical analysis to contemporary problems has led to the establishment of dedicated research centers.

tory and public policy is essential.⁶⁸

History, proponents claim, can be quarried for lessons and can inform current and future practitioners. The most vocal spokesman for the “Public Policy Project” has been Christopher Andrew. From salutary warnings about the dangers of failing to heed the lessons of history, Andrew has moved to the assertion that today’s political culture suffers from “Historical Attention Span Deficit Disorder,” a widespread belief that the past is “irrelevant to present and future policy and intelligence analysis.”⁶⁹ For example, had decisionmakers prior to the Iraq War been

familiar with failed British attempts to estimate Soviet nuclear capability during the Cold War, they would have realized that approximating WMD stocks is fraught with difficulty and potential intellectual blinkering.

The need to relate historical analysis to contemporary problems has led to the establishment of dedicated research centers, such as the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) and the Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (BUCSIS), that foster links with practitioners and offer degree program? in both historical and policy-oriented contexts.⁷⁰ Designed as “career-relevant” degrees, MA programs are invariably filled by those in quest of, or engaged in, security-related jobs. Academics at Brunel and Buckingham double as consultants, providing custom-made academic packages to both professional and corporate clients.

It is pleasing to note that the United States has similar centers to prepare students for careers in intelligence and provide educational tools to the intelligence community. A cluster exists, not surprisingly, among the several universities in the Washington, DC area. Exemplary outside the capital

is the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Mississippi.

The “Official History.” The most common way to connect history with policy is, of course, to write full-scale histories, which analyze all stages of the intelligence cycle and seek to identify trends and themes from past to present. With their access to resources of state, including former agents and personnel, the best people to undertake such a task may be official historians: “Just as intelligence chiefs have to be able to tell policymakers what they do not want to know, so official historians have to be free, on occasion, to tell intelligence agencies uncomfortable truths.”⁷¹

In 2009, MI5 marked its centenary with the publication of an authorized history, written by Christopher Andrew. In 2010, Keith Jeffrey’s officially sanctioned history of SIS hit bookshops. It covered the history of the service from its beginnings in 1909 to the early Cold War. Yet not everyone has warmed to such works. As Len Scott and Peter Jackson explain, “For some academics the Ivory Tower should remain a sanctuary and provide a panorama on the world outside.”⁷² Is it not profoundly unfair, critics ask, that Professors Andrew and Jeffrey have been able to feast their eyes on materials denied to the remainder of their



“Hacker in chief,” Christopher Andrew. Image courtesy C. Andrew.

profession? For Anthony Glees, the risk of whitewashing is all too great: "I don't think governments should write their own history. Academics should not become ambassadors or politicians, or work for the secret service."⁷³

Christopher Andrew, having twice coauthored officially sponsored histories of the KGB (with the aid of Soviet defectors, Oleg Gordievsky and Vasili Mitrokhin), has been labelled by cynical voices as a "court historian." This is too strong. Andrew and Jeffrey, who throughout their careers have railed against the official position that there could be no middle ground between total secrecy and total disclosure, have to preserve their academic standing at all costs. Sanitizing the historical record now, knowing that documents in question will in due course enter the public domain, would be making whips for their own flogging.

The Countervailing View. A small group of intelligence historians in the UK is engaged in dissecting the seamier side of espionage. The so-called "Civil Liberties Project" (also known as the "para-political" school) conjoins two scholarly agendas.⁷⁴ The first is a program for researching intelligence history by way of nonofficial sources, including obituaries, editorials, satirical magazines (such as *Private*

It should be clear, by now, that this is an exciting time for UK students of intelligence, a subject no longer obscured by secrecy or bedecked with flights of the imagination.

Eye), and other cultural miscellanea.

The second is a strategy for writing intelligence history from the "bottom up," moving beyond the intensively cultivated field of high politics to explore the private experience of spies and their most intimate details, such as sexuality, social class, and political orientation. Among the most vociferous proponents of the "Civil Liberties Project" are Robin Ramsay and Stephen Dorril. Their investigations deftly survey the heartless aspects of the secret state, upending established orthodoxy by rendering Western and Eastern European intelligence services as equally contemptuous and equally corrupt.

MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations was in itself an exposition of the basic tenets of "para-political" approaches. In the preface, Dorril writes: "In order to unravel the activities of SIS, one has to dig deep and sift carefully, in the manner of an archaeologist, but also acculturate, like some intrepid anthropologist, to a strange and secretive society whose intricate social and professional networks are familiar to their members but quite baffling to the outsider."⁷⁵ What emerges from Dorril's 900-page tome is that SIS, determined to keep

Britain at the top table in an age of postimperial decline, became a law unto itself, implicated in the surveillance and infiltration of dissident groups; the secret funding of propaganda and smearing opponents; and the formulation of "disruptive action," including assassination plots, against such leaders as Mohammed Mossadeq, Slobodan Milosevic, and Muammar Qaddafi.

Few mainstream authors support the "para-political" belief that what the intelligence services do is nefarious and disproportionate to the threat posed by the nation's enemies. Peter Hennessy, in his excellent study of the Cold War secret state and contingency planning in the event of Soviet attack, makes an impressive case for the view that the UK intelligence community, far from being a rogue elephant, comprised a noble band of skillful patriots, and was instrumental in defending the realm and keeping Britain out of nuclear war.⁷⁶ In time, he proposes, as new evidence is marshalled on communist subversion and the dirty work of the KGB, the dominant historiographical assumption will probably be that British counterintelligence was grossly inadequate.

British historiography of intelligence—having grown out of traditional British political history, which frankly precludes an interest in the non-Western world—has neglected the role of intelligence services in imperial contexts.

New Directions

It should be clear, by now, that this is an exciting time for UK students of intelligence, a subject no longer obscured by secrecy or bedecked with flights of the imagination. All the omens point to a healthy future. Fourteen British universities presently offer undergraduate or postgraduate courses explicitly on intelligence and security; at least a further dozen offer modules on terrorism and political violence.⁷⁷ As the Cold War continues to recede into history, more archival openings are anticipated. Indeed, as Donald Cameron Watt once pointed out, historians of intelligence will always be better off than scholars working on the Greco-Roman period or the Middle Ages.⁷⁸

For the foreseeable future, intelligence will remain a cornerstone of democratic government, tasked to counter the enduring threat from al-Qa'ida and associated networks, but also used increasingly in peace-keeping, crisis management and contingency planning. For those researching contemporary matters, therefore, it is a case of "having to run to keep up."⁷⁹

But can the same necessarily be said for intelligence histori-

ans? Leaving aside fears about whitewashing and sycophancy, the recently published official histories of MI5 and SIS are truly exhaustive in their coverage; that is the official historian's privilege. When the official history of the JIC is released, little of the general outline will be left unsaid. With this, the original *raison d'être* of intelligence history—namely, to rescue from oblivion the gaps in knowledge—will appear tired and slow. As is the way of things, intelligence historians will have become settlers rather than pioneers, required to think reflexively about the nature of their enterprise. Arguably, less time will be spent *doing* intelligence history, and more *reflecting* on how it is done and where it needs to go.

A handful of areas seem deserving of more attention, however. So far, British historiography of intelligence—having grown out of traditional British political history, which frankly precludes an interest in the non-Western world—has neglected the role of intelligence services in imperial contexts, especially during the period of decolonization. Contrary to popular belief, the geographical scope of MI5's work has never been restricted to the metropole. The protection of

British interests worldwide (diplomatic properties and staff; businesses and investments; and citizens living abroad) has long fallen within the remit of its functions. Both Philip Murphy and Calder Walton have made initial forays into this topic, demonstrating how the intelligence services attempted to gather information about indigenous groups, to police political opponents, and to extinguish "colonial fires," albeit with diminishing success in the 1950s.⁸⁰

Although spy fiction is a subject well traversed in literary and film studies (exploring the formulaic nature of the genre, plot conventions, and the like), there has been conspicuously little attention by historians to the genre, specifically the important question of how its products relate to and reflect the real world of intelligence.⁸¹

The debunking of intrigue narratives has become a compulsory practice. However, as Wark implored over 10 years ago, the relationship between social reality and popular cultural construction should be addressed.⁸² Rightly or wrongly, spy fiction has to a large extent shaped public perceptions of intelligence. Many retired SIS officers, including John le Carré, often admit to joining British intelligence as young men partly because they had been brought up on a fictional diet of swashbuckling yarns.

According to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party routinely watched James Bond films in the vain hope that its scientists could replicate “Q Branch” technology.⁸³ In the mid-1960s, mindful of a “spy fiction gap,” the KGB attempted to win the thriller war by commissioning Bulgarian author Andrei Gulyashki to write a series of spy novels in which the “cerebral powers” and “analytical mind” of a self-styled major named Zakhov were pitted against James Bond’s “ruthless, intuitive violence.”⁸⁴ Needless to say, Bond is ultimately slain at the hand of his superior, morally clean Soviet adversary.

Despite the recent appearance of *GCHQ: The Uncensored History of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, by Richard Aldrich, what one might call the “SIGINT Project” has scarcely begun.⁸⁵ In part, this is because the fast-paced world of covert action has been instantly more arresting to historians, and to their publishers, than has been the mundane setting of moth-eaten desk men combining transcripts of telephone conversations and burrowing in mountains of diplomatic correspondence.

It is also the case that much of the pertinent material has not yet been released. For many in the profession, therefore, the

Despite the recent appearance of GCHQ: The Uncensored History of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, by Richard Aldrich, what one might call the “SIGINT Project” has scarcely begun.

focus on HUMINT has been more a matter of necessity than professional preference. Yet Christopher Andrew has been especially critical of intelligence historians for failing to take account of SIGINT’s contribution in the Cold War. Its continued absence, he argues, reflects widespread “cognitive dissonance” within the discipline—that is, reluctance among scholars to embrace a subject that would fundamentally challenge historiographical orthodoxy, not to mention their own career-hardened patterns of thought.⁸⁶

The current crop of intelligence historians, suggests Andrew, are not the first to display cognitive dissonance with respect to SIGINT. In 1945, Sir Edward Travis, operational head of Bletchley Park and, later, director of GCHQ, was certain that scholars would soon discover the Ultra secret: “The comparing of the German and British documents is bound to arouse suspicion in [their] minds that we succeeded in reading the enemy ciphers.”⁸⁷ The clues, it was assumed, were too obvious for historians to miss.

It was widely known that British cryptographers, under the direction of intelligence offi-

cer Reginald “Blinker” Hall, had cracked German codes during the Great War; indeed, Room 40’s successful interception of the Zimmermann telegram, which accelerated the United States’ entry into the war, had achieved extensive notoriety and fanfare in the press.⁸⁸ Held from November 1945 to July 1946, the Congressional Inquiry into Pearl Harbor had publicly discussed the accomplishments of “Magic,” the cryptonym for American efforts to break Japanese military and diplomatic communications during World War Two.

Despite allowing for the enormous benefit of hindsight, the fact that no historian, for over a quarter of century, considered the possibility that the British had enjoyed similar success against Hitler’s ciphers is remarkable. Just as baffling, when intelligence officer turned author Donald McLachlan disclosed Bletchley Park’s secret codename—“Station X”—in his 1968 publication, *Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action 1939–45*, it took another 6 years before historians finally connected the dots and started to consider with confidence the contribution of British cryptography to the Allied war effort.⁸⁹

It is very important, however, that we also cast our net beyond the relationship between British intelligence and its partner agencies in Washington.

One of the biggest challenges facing intelligence historians is to resist the urge to study the British intelligence community in geographic isolation. For its sins, much of the existing literature is parochial and Panglossian; that is, accepting of the unique and incomparable make-up of British institutions, and reluctant to analyze thematic issues in a broader transnational context.⁹⁰

Embedding the history of the British intelligence services in a comparative history of the 20th century intelligence revolution should reveal similarities and differences between particular national systems and thereby allow us to draw con-

clusions about general trends and dynamics. *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, by Richard Aldrich, is an exemplar of comparative history, seamlessly shifting between two intelligence cultures and their institutions. By placing intelligence in a hemispheric perspective, Aldrich reveals not only the cohesion and unities of the Anglo-American "Special Relationship," but also the moments of "rancour and suspicion" that have threatened to derail its continuance. Nuanced, archivally rich, and theoretically informed—an unusual trifecta—*Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror*; by Adam Svendsen, is

another recent example of historical writing that successfully manages to employ a comparative methodology.⁹¹

It is very important, however, that we also cast our net beyond the relationship between British intelligence and its partner agencies in Washington. During the Cold War, in a bid to monitor the Soviet Union and its satellites, the UK intelligence community often liaised with a range of non-Anglo-Saxon allies, including the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE). The task of unpacking these relationships still awaits its historian.

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The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War

John P. Finnegan

“
By the end of the Korean War, the Far East Command had fielded a large Army-controlled clandestine collection apparatus, closely linked with similarly large operations in the fields of partisan and psychological warfare.
”

This article was originally published in a classified issue of Studies (44, no. 2) in 2000.
—ed.

The traumatic experience of the Korean conflict was a watershed in the evolution of Army intelligence. Within six months, the Army found itself facing two major intelligence disasters: it was caught unprepared by the initial North Korean invasion of June 1950 and by the massive Chinese intervention in November of that year. In response, the Army hastily improvised a clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) organization, building on a small existing intelligence unit, the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). By the end of the Korean War, the Far East Command (FECOM) had fielded a large Army-controlled clandestine collection apparatus, closely linked with similarly large operations in the fields of partisan and psychological warfare. More important, the Army had begun to take steps to create a permanent and professional HUMINT service that could carry out positive intelligence collection operations.

Lack of Intelligence

The sudden outbreak of the Korean war on 25 June 1950 came as a shock to US leaders. In hindsight, this is not surprising. Since the onset of the Cold War, the nation's intelligence assets had been targeted almost exclusively against the Soviet Union. In addition, intelligence responsibilities in the Far East were badly fragmented. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM), the major theater headquarters in the area, no longer had any jurisdiction over the Korean peninsula: authority over the area had devolved to the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC) after the last American occupation forces left in mid-1949. Because the KMAC had no positive collection capability, Korea was an intelligence vacuum.^{a1}

^a For more on intelligence during this period, see Clayton Laurie, "A New President, a Better CIA, and an Old War," in *Studies in Intelligence* 54, No. 4 (December 2010) and CIA release of documents from the period in www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collections-publications/index.html.

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In the field of intelligence, as in almost everything else, five years of peacetime occupation duty had left American forces in Japan less than well equipped to meet an outside challenge.

Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, did maintain a residual intelligence organization in Korea, the KLO. The reports generated by this small office, however, received little attention in a preoccupied Tokyo. Similar reports submitted by an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) team that also remained in Korea were likewise disregarded. Intelligence emanating from the small CIA presence in Korea received an equally cool reception from FECOM. Intelligence that came the way of these elements was procured largely through liaison with Republic of Korea (ROK) sources. As such, it was deemed unreliable, and the information received was often conflicting. Intelligence officers back in Tokyo had heard "wolf" cried too often to believe that anything was actually going to happen. Lack of intelligence resources and hard data was paralleled by a lack of intelligence perception. Because the North Korean destabilization campaign against the South had failed, it was too easily assumed that the North would turn to political initiatives.²

The advance of T-34 tanks across the 38th parallel shattered the illusions of FECOM policymakers. The rapid collapse of ROK forces meant that only outside military help could prevent a communist takeover

At the direction of the president and acting under the authority of the UN, FECOM quickly moved to intervene. But it found that in the field of intelligence, as in almost everything else, five years of peacetime occupation duty had left American forces in Japan less than well equipped to meet an outside challenge.³

On paper, FECOM controlled substantial intelligence assets. Willoughby had more than 2,500 intelligence personnel at his disposal, but these elements were organized to support an army of occupation. The largest single intelligence component within FECOM was the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, targeted against Japanese subversive elements. It reported to MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, not as head of FECOM. The four Army divisions in Japan had no organic CIC detachments.⁴

A large Military Intelligence Service Company of Japanese interpreters supported the 441st CIC Detachment, but there were only two Korean linguists at G-2's disposal. FECOM's Technical Intelligence Section had been discontinued in 1949. The PHOTINT capability of the command had shriveled. Cryptologic resources were equally lacking. The Army

Security Agency, Pacific (ASA-PAC) had two companies and two detachments in the Far East, but these were trained and equipped for fixed-site operations and could not easily be shifted to the field. ASA was not able to deploy a tactical unit in Korea until October, when a company was shipped from the United States.⁵

A Need for HUMINT

The adverse combat situation confronted by FECOM and the Eighth Army in Korea during the summer of 1950 created a critical need for hard intelligence. With other assets unavailable, this could only be provided by HUMINT. An organization was quickly built around the nucleus of the KLO, using personnel from the 441st CIC Detachment. To carry out its mission, the KLO hastily recruited Korean peasants, gave them sketchy training, and airdropped them behind enemy lines with instructions to return with intelligence reports. In addition, it set up Tactical Liaison Offices (TLOs) at division level to recruit Koreans as line-crossers to gather clandestine HUMINT.^a Although it operated in support of Eighth Army and its tactical commanders, the whole structure remained firmly under Willoughby's control.⁶

Agent casualties were high, and the quality of intelligence produced unsatisfactory. But, in the early stages of the war, it

was all the UN forces had. Nonetheless, the KLO tried to improve the collection situation as early as August 1950. One basic problem was that both agent insertion techniques used by the KLO—parachute drops and line-crossing—were intrinsically hazardous, and even parachute agents had to exfiltrate through enemy lines to bring back their reports. The KLO came up with the idea of using small boats both to land its agents behind enemy lines and to retrieve them, thus bypassing the dangers of the fighting front. The cooperation of the ROK Navy was necessary for this effort, however, and this was difficult to obtain.^a The whole idea was temporarily abandoned in September, when the needs of the forthcoming amphibious operation at Inchon absorbed all available shipping.⁷

^a Of the early parachute agents, Marshall noted that "Frequently the Commanding General's plane was used to carry these men into nowhere." The TLO, as one officer put it, was basically a "glorified reconnaissance unit" designed to obtain order of battle information by using agents to conduct shallow penetration missions. To ensure it remained under GHQ FECOM control, the TLO was also assigned a notional strategic intelligence mission. Agents were a mixed bag whose numbers included high school-age children, women, the aged, and deserters from both the North and South Korean armies.

^a Marshall grimly noted that in these operations, "Only the loss rate fulfilled expectations." Returning agents ran the risk of being mistaken for enemy infiltrators and shot by troops from their own side.

By the time of the Inchon landing, the intelligence picture in FECOM was improving.

Some Improvement

By the time of the Inchon landing, the intelligence picture in FECOM was improving. The theater had received additional intelligence assets, and focus on the Korean problem at the national level was producing results. The rapid collapse of the North Korean Army appeared to make further efforts at establishing a permanent intelligence organization unnecessary. But the very success of UN forces exacted a price: intelligence elements repeatedly had to move to keep up with the pace of the advance, and this disorganized the intelligence structure and impaired its operational capabilities.

The Chinese Threat

The coming of November brought a new threat, the possibility of intervention by the People's Republic of China. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had publicly announced that China would enter the war if US forces crossed the 38th parallel. Although the United States had decided to ignore this threat as a bluff, American intelligence was aware that 400,000 troops of China's best formation, the Fourth Field Army, were being concentrated just across the Yalu River in

Manchuria. Some of these forces crossed over into Korea in October and early November. Sharp clashes with UN troops ensued, and Army intelligence discovered the Chinese presence by finding that US and ROK forces had taken Chinese prisoners.⁸

The meaning of all this remained enigmatic. The Chinese soon disengaged, and the Chinese prisoners of war, when interrogated, claimed they were members of "Special Military Units" which at first were assumed to be only token cadres from the Fourth Field Army. While Army intelligence realized the Chinese did have the military capability for a full-scale intervention, it doubted they would pursue such a course. If the Chinese had failed to intervene in August, when the Eighth Army was trapped in the Pusan perimeter and intervention could have been decisive, it seemed irrational for them to intervene when North Korea had been broken. It appeared more plausible to assume the Chinese presence in Korea was in the nature of a face-saving gesture.⁹

The hard fact was that FECOM again found itself reduced to speculation about enemy intentions because it still lacked the intelligence resources needed to resolve the

At this critical juncture, FECOM turned once more to clandestine HUMINT to meet its pressing need for intelligence.

problem. Manchuria was off-limits to photographic reconnaissance because of diplomatic considerations, limited aerial surveillance of Korea was unproductive, and other sophisticated collection mechanisms were targeted exclusively against the Korean problem and lacked the linguistic and technical capability to switch quickly.¹⁰

With his armies on the threshold of victory—the vanguards of the Eighth Army were across the Chongchon River in western Korea, those of X Corps nearing the Yalu in the East—MacArthur was in no mood to be deprived of triumph by the mere specter of a Chinese Army. He decided to subject the question of just what Chinese intentions might be to an acid test. On 24 November 1950, he ordered his widely dispersed forces to attack into the unknown.¹¹

KLO Handicaps

The UN offensive ran head-on into 30 Chinese divisions that had secretly crossed over from Manchuria. The attack became a fighting retreat. The Eighth Army fell back from the Chongchon with heavy losses; X Corps began the difficult process of cutting its way back through the mountains to the port of Hungnam. By mid-December, as UN forces contin-

ued their retreat, the Chinese once more disengaged. Pursued by an overwhelming force, the Eighth Army found itself completely ignorant of how this force was disposed or where it might be attacking next.^{a12}

At this critical juncture, FECOM turned once more to clandestine HUMINT to meet its pressing need for intelligence. But the KLO organization (now officially titled the Far East Command Liaison Group, Korea) was in no condition to meet the requirements. There were no agent assets in the areas in which the Chinese were advancing. The KLO did have the capability of inserting parachute agents in “blind drops,” using Air Force C-47s, but the AVIARY program, as it was called, operated under severe disabilities. The standard of agent training was low, and the KLO had no radios suitable for agent work and no agents trained in radio operation. In a desperate attempt to clarify the tactical situation, the KLO was reduced to dropping 12 two-man agent teams

^a Upon assuming command of the Eighth Army, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway recalls that all he had in the way of intelligence about the enemy north of his lines was a map showing “A big red goose egg...with ‘174,000’ scrawled in the middle of it.” The situation did not quickly improve; in February 1951, Ridgway reported that, “We have a curtain beyond the range of our immediate combat intelligence activities which I find extremely difficult to pierce.”

equipped with smoke grenades north of UN lines to establish the location of the Chinese forces. Only a few teams ever managed to signal Air Force spotter planes, all with negative results.¹³

The 442d CIC Detachment

In these darkest days of the war, FECOM responded to the intelligence challenge by setting up a new unit to conduct an expanded program of clandestine HUMINT. The 442d CIC Detachment was activated on 20 December 1950 in Seoul with 50 assigned personnel to take over operational control of the KLO central office and the division level TLOs. On paper, the 442d was a normal CIC unit, organized under a standard cellular Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE 30-500) and commanded by a regular army officer, Col. C.A. Dickey. In reality, it was a highly unusual organization assigned a positive clandestine collection mission that went far beyond the CIC’s normal responsibilities.¹⁴

The 442d had a turbulent beginning. Two days after the unit was officially activated in Seoul, the deteriorating military situation forced it to establish a rear headquarters in the city of Taegu. The rest of the headquarters soon followed to escape the second Communist occupation of the South Korean capital. But the rapid revival of the Eighth Army’s fortunes

under its new commander, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, put an end to further UN retreats. Working from a secure base, the 442d was able to upgrade the FECOM clandestine HUMINT program between January 1951 and the first armistice negotiations in June, making significant accomplishments in the areas of agent insertion, communications, and training.¹⁵

Until early 1951, agents had been inserted by line-crossing and by parachute drop. At the TLO level, hundreds of Korean peasants were sent to gather limited information about enemy dispositions in front of the UN lines. The KLO had its own line-crossers; it also paratropped smaller numbers of Korean agents on long-range collection missions, using Air Force AVIARY C-47s controlled by Eighth Army's Special Activities Mission. Both techniques resulted in heavy losses of agents.^a To remedy this situation, the 442d began to supplement its ground and parachute insertion methods by using

^a Parachute operations were particularly costly: a former AVIARY operations officer estimated that only 20 percent of agents dispatched managed to make it back to UN lines. (However, he thought it possible that an unknown number of the agents who failed to return were stranded North Koreans who had used AVIARY as an airline ticket home.) Until agents could be furnished radios, these operations also involved long delays in procuring intelligence: because of the distances involved, paratropped agents commonly took two to three months to complete their missions.

At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment's headquarters element implemented a much larger program of amphibious espionage and was given the codename SALAMANDER.

boats to land agents behind enemy lines, a course first suggested in the summer of 1950.¹⁶

SALAMANDER

Confronted by an unacceptable loss rate among their line-crossers, the TLO teams of the 3d and 25th Infantry Divisions began transporting agents by small boats around the enemy's flank on the west coast of Korea. At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment's headquarters element implemented a much larger program of amphibious espionage and was given the codename SALAMANDER. This involved the use of Korean-manned fishing boats to insert long-range agents deep within enemy territory. SALAMANDER operations were initially conducted from the numerous islands off the Korean west coast that were to the rear of the enemy's lines. These islands were rendered more or less secure from hostile attack by the UN naval blockade, and many were already in the hands of anti-Communist North Korean partisans.¹⁷

The first SALAMANDER operations were mounted from the island of Paengyong Do, just below the 38th parallel. They soon moved to a more advanced base at Cho Do, strategically

located just five miles off the North Korean coast. The position gave the 442d's agents access to the whole west coast of Korea up to the Yalu River. To complement this west coast operation, the 442d later initiated plans to establish an east coast SALAMANDER base on the bleak and inhospitable island of Yodo. This move would provide intelligence coverage of another enemy flank, as well as allow agents to provide extensive lateral coverage of North Korean positions, because they could land on one coast and exfiltrate from the other. Because the native fishing boats used by the operation were both small and unseaworthy, the 442d quickly took steps to secure fast American craft.¹⁸

Better Communications

Agent communications were also improved. Until the end of December 1950, radios had been unavailable, and the 442d's agent handlers were forced to wait until an agent actually returned to base before they could procure any intelligence. The situation gradually improved in 1951. Radio teams equipped with SCR-300 walkie-talkies were provided for both AVIARY and SALAMANDER operations.

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agents to furnish Army intelligence with information on a real-time basis. But this was not a panacea. Voice radio had its limitations; its short range meant that relays had to be used—SALAMANDER agents passed their messages through the Cho Do base—or that aircraft had to hover in the immediate area of the agent radio teams, risking compromise of the mission. An additional complication was that some of the Air Force crews who provided communications support to AVIARY operations were inexperienced because they flew the mission for an average of only two weeks. Many agent radio teams were lost. Continuous wave (CW) radios, with their longer range, would have helped, but agents had not yet been trained in Morse code.^{a19}

On the other hand, at least agents were now provided with some minimal training. In March 1951, the 442d set up a training school at Pusan that provided 20 agents at a time with a basic two-week course of instruction. (The facility moved to Taegu in June.) After com-

went to the TLO teams and the 442d's central office. Unsurprisingly, American intelligence personnel rated the new breed of agents as "far superior" to their predecessors. For example, reports noted that the new agents "appear to be enthusiastic" and "have a basic idea of the mission."

Better training seems to have been partially offset by increased enemy security measures. Line-crossing continued to be a hazardous operation, and agent capture rates increased, although a surprisingly large number of detained agents were able to escape and make it back to UN lines. At any rate, the new recruitment and training program made it easier to obtain replacements.²⁰

Improved Capabilities

The growing efficiency of FECOM's clandestine HUMINT operations was paralleled in other intelligence fields, as language and other problems were resolved. The overall improvement of intelligence capabilities took place during a period when the Eighth Army's fortunes were on the upswing. As early as mid-January 1951, UN forces had been able to mount a limited counterattack. In March, Seoul was recaptured. While MacArthur was relieved for insubordination in April and

replaced by General Ridgway, UN forces continued to push the enemy back across the 38th parallel. On 23 June 1951, the Soviet UN Ambassador announced that North Korea was now interested in peace talks, and Ridgway offered armistice negotiations to the enemy commander.²¹

Peace was not at hand, however. Although peace talks began and the UN forces halted their advance, there was no ceasefire. Negotiations dragged on for two years, accompanied by a static war of attrition in which hills changed hands from time to time in bloody skirmishes while the main battle-line remained stable. No longer forced to respond to the intelligence crises of the moment, FECOM began to build up an elaborate semipermanent clandestine HUMINT structure to meet the needs of a new kind of war.

The Liaison Detachment

The new effort was conducted under a revised organizational structure. The 442d CIC Detachment was inactivated on 26 July 1951, and its personnel and assets transferred to a new organization, the 8240th Army Unit. (In addition to its Korea-based assets, the 8240th consisted of a headquarters element in Tokyo and a logistic element in Sapporo, Japan.) The former KLO/TLO organization now became known as the Far East Command Liaison

^a Twenty UHF-VHF air-sea rescue sets had been acquired in mid-December but had arrived without operating manuals and proved to be of insufficient range to be useful. Once voice radios became available, airborne radio control support was provided by the C-46s of the 438th Troop Carrier Command staging out of Japan.

Detachment, Korea. The Liaison Detachment, commanded by Col. William I. Russell, had an authorized strength of 104. Because of a shortage of intelligence specialists, and the Army's decision to return gradually all CIC personnel to their normal assignments, it took some time to gather the necessary numbers. Colonel Russell started out with only the 50-odd people he had inherited from the 442d.²²

The tight personnel situation led to a new development in agent training—agent nets—that were set up by the summer of 1951. These consisted of permanent agent organizations behind enemy lines, linked to headquarters by radio control and supplied and reinforced by SALAMANDER and AVIARY operations. These nets were now entrusted with training, thus allowing the school at Taegu to be shut down. Under the new arrangements, each net recruited its own agents (many from the large refugee camps on the island of Koje-do), put them through a two-week training course, and sent them to the frontline TLO teams for assignment in the field. Agents who successfully completed five line-crossing missions were given two weeks of additional training and then went into the SALAMANDER or AVIARY programs.

The new approach was not completely successful. In practice, only 25 percent of agents managed to complete as many

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as four line-crossing missions for the TLOs. Centralized training was revived in October, when three nets were consolidated and a new school set up in Seoul. Ultimately, a compromise between the two approaches was reached: the nets provided basic agent training and the school became responsible for advanced radio and parachute training.²³

New Sources of Agents

In addition, the Liaison Detachment found new sources from which to procure agents. A Korean religious group with many adherents in the North, the Chando Kyo, was tapped to provide an agent network. Chinese POWs who rallied to the UN side were dispatched on order of battle missions. Finally, the Liaison Detachment acquired 124 agents formerly employed by the ROK Army's Headquarters Intelligence Division (HID). These agents had been operating from bases on the Korean east coast, both at Yodo, where there were already Liaison Detachment operatives, and on islands in Wonsan Harbor. Because the HID had run out of funds, the US Army picked up the tab and the people.²⁴

The Liaison Detachment also further improved agent commu-

nications. By the summer of 1951, it was at last possible to set up a 10-week Morse code course for agents, which permitted the nets to use long-range CW radios. By September, an elaborate communications system was in place. A network of safehouses forward of UN lines received intelligence reports from agents via voice radio. The reports were then relayed back to the various TLOs by means of Morse code. The safe houses employed SSR-5-R CW radios; the TLOs were equipped with the standard Army AN/GRC-9's. Message traffic was then passed on by the TLOs to Liaison Detachment headquarters. The main SALAMANDER base at Cho Do communicated with headquarters and its west coast agents by similar means.²⁵

By the fall of 1951, the Liaison Detachment began to reevaluate its procedures for inserting long-range penetration agents. The SALAMANDER operation, which used boats to land and retrieve agents, had been very successful. By contrast, the AVIARY program, which dropped parachute agents deep within enemy territory and then required them to make it back to UN lines on their own, produced less satisfactory results. Although AVIARY operations were intensively pursued—111

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ing a single month—the rate of return was discouragingly low. At one point in October, the Liaison Detachment contemplated reducing its airborne operations by 50 percent. Instead, it decided to adopt a new technique. Agents would be dropped in teams close behind enemy lines, wearing enemy uniforms and carrying small arms. In this way, they could impersonate enemy patrols and, if necessary, shoot their way back to UN lines. Use of this tactic, along with better screening of agents and more specific intelligence assignments, greatly reduced losses and gave AVIARY a renewed viability.²⁶

CCRAK and the Liaison Detachment

The Army's clandestine HUMINT effort in Korea had now become part of a wider secret war, waged on an extensive but uncoordinated basis. In parallel with the Liaison Detachment's operations, the Eighth US Army was supporting a growing partisan effort on the Korean west coast that was based on the same islands that served as SALAMANDER bases. These islands also provided bases for various clandestine operations undertaken by the US Air Force, which used them to gather intelligence and to support the escape and eva-

was another player in the secret war.²⁷

To better coordinate these fragmented efforts, a new theater-level structure was created on 10 December 1951, called the Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). CCRAK was an umbrella organization set up to impose centralized control on the secret activities of the armed services, the CIA, and the ROK allies. At the same time CCRAK was formed, the Army decided to place all its covert and clandestine efforts under a single headquarters. The Eighth Army's 8086th Army Unit, which had been running the partisan effort, was dissolved. The Liaison Detachment took over its functions and assets.²⁸

The Liaison Detachment thus became a miniature Army version of the World War II OSS, with responsibilities for secret intelligence and special operations, the first time these two functions had been combined in a single Army organization. The arrangement had a certain logic to it. In accordance with existing doctrine, it moved control of partisan warfare from the field army to the theater level. The reorganization also provided the Liaison Detachment with a partisan force that could protect its island bases and provide it with supplemen-

tary intelligence reports. And the Liaison Detachment was finally in a position to prevent partisan operations from inadvertently jeopardizing intelligence activities.²⁹

More Manpower

This increase in the Liaison Detachment's responsibilities brought with it an increase in personnel. By February 1952, the Detachment had 150 assigned or attached personnel on board; by the time a cease-fire was finally concluded in the summer of 1953, the Detachment had a strength of 450. (Even then, there were complaints that the Detachment still had too few intelligence personnel to fulfill mission requirements.) While Army strength in Korea remained stable from 1951 on, the proportion of resources devoted to intelligence and covert activities was much expanded. Because UN policy ruled out additional territorial gains on the battlefield, the secret war was the only combat arena in which efforts could be intensified.³⁰

A good part of the growth permitted by this strength increase went into expanding the clandestine HUMINT effort. By 1953, a large, formidable organization had been fielded. The Liaison Detachment's Intelligence Division controlled five separate Intelligence Commands. Each had its own geographic area of responsibility

(although one command conducted operations on both coasts of Korea and across the frontlines), but the commands were also allowed to penetrate North Korea, Manchuria, and China proper to the extent their resources permitted. The five commands directed the activities of 17 separate agent nets, all with radio links to the appropriate command headquarters.

No fewer than 2,100 agents reported to the Liaison Detachment. Badger Net alone had 450 agents. Three hundred of these were in North Korea, either in permanent cells or as temporary inserts; the rest were at headquarters, in training, or in reserve.³¹

Intelligence Production

The nature of the game meant that the structure was not perfect. The necessity of setting up a clandestine organization in a denied area under wartime conditions had forced compromises both in administration and in the caliber of recruited agents. (In light of the fact that it was not until 1953 that TLO agents received the same pay as day laborers working for the Eighth Army, the latter deficiency is particularly unsurprising.) Some nets produced only inconclusive results, and no evidence exists that any were able to supply high-level intelligence on enemy plans.

Nevertheless, by the end of the war the Liaison Detach-

The Korean agents bore most of the costs and risks, and their losses had been high, especially in the first stages of the effort.

ment had become the chief producer of HUMINT for the whole CCRAK organization, furnishing up to 1,000 intelligence reports a month, most graded by consumers as being of significant importance. This represented a five-fold increase over the detachment's output in 1951. The Liaison Detachment's contribution to CCRAK was as great as that of the Air Force's clandestine service, ROK Army G-2, and the CIA's collection element combined.³²

Paying a Price

This elaborate clandestine HUMINT apparatus was not built without a certain price. The Korean agents bore most of the costs and risks, and their losses had been high, especially in the first stages of the effort. But Liaison Detachment personnel also met their deaths trying to insert agents. An Air Force C-46 went down over North Korea one night in February 1952, carrying three Detachment personnel, seven Air Force crewmen, and six Korean agents and an interpreter.

In April 1953, the ill-omened Fizzle Net, operating from Yodo on the east coast under the 4th Intelligence Command, ceased to exist when the American lieutenant serving as project

officer was ambushed and killed with his agent party in a landing attempt that went awry.³³

Partisan Warfare

The expansion of the partisan operation that the Liaison Detachment had taken over from the Eighth Army at the end of 1951 was even more striking. The private army of guerrillas inherited by the Liaison Detachment originated in the various groups of anti-communist refugees from North Korea who had fled to the islands off the western coast of Korea in the winter of 1950-1951. The Eighth Army had taken these groups in hand in early 1951 and used them to form a partisan force. So-called donkey units of partisans were assembled around a hastily trained indigenous cadre and used as a raiding force against the mainland. The islands from which they operated were strategically located behind enemy lines and were protected from enemy attack by the UN naval blockade and ROK garrisons. Because the partisans required only a few American personnel as advisers, they represented an effective, inexpensive force multiplier for the Eighth Army.³⁴

But when the final cease-fire was concluded in June 1953, the last radio message to reach the Liaison Division from Green Dragon was a curse.

key units on the Korean west coast had been grouped into two regiments named Leopard and Wolfpack. In addition, a company assigned the designation Kirkland had been organized on Yodo Island off the east coast of Korea. At this point, the increased activity and visibility of the partisans began to provoke a violent North Korean reaction. Some of the more vulnerable islands on the west coast came under enemy attack. This posed a threat to the partisans and to the SALAMANDER HUMINT operations of the Liaison Detachment. The end result was that the guerrillas had come under Liaison Detachment control.³⁵

During the course of 1952, the Liaison Detachment expanded the initially small Kirkland force on Yodo to regimental strength. The Leopard and Wolfpack organizations on the west coast were also built up. Operating from their island safehavens and assisted by a sprinkling of American advisers and US logistic support, the partisans waged a lively little war of their own. That year, the partisans optimistically claimed to have inflicted 51,000 casualties on enemy forces. Partisan casualties, however, were not light: the partisans had to defend their own island bases in addition to mounting offen-

changed hands two or three times. More than 2,000 partisans became casualties in 1952, and more than half of these were killed or listed as missing in action.³⁶

PAIR

The Army viewed this kind of amphibious warfare as a success. In the Korean War's wider context, however, the partisans were more of a nuisance to the enemy than a real threat. They were never able to establish any bases on the mainland or conduct operations larger than raids. Moreover, landing operations were hampered by the harsh Korean winters and, on the west coast, by the enormous tidal fluctuations that regularly turned beaches into vast and impassable mudflats.

Meanwhile, even more ambitious schemes were under way. In April 1952, FECOM produced a Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1952. This proposed adding an airborne dimension to the existing partisan amphibious operations. FECOM decreed that "all commands will qualify paratroops." Accordingly, paratroop trainees were taken from the existing Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland formations and grouped in a unit that officially became the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment (PAIR) in November

1952. At the same time, the Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland units were redesignated respectively as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Partisan Infantry Regiments.³⁷

The first contingent of the 1st PAIR's new airborne troops was committed to action in early 1953. On the night of 23 January, a flight of three Air Force C-119s guided by a B-26 Pathfinder aircraft airdropped a special 97-man "Green Dragon" unit behind enemy lines to set up an operational base for guerrilla activities. The fate of this first (and, as it turned out, only) major employment of partisans in an airborne role was not a happy one. After a long delay, the party made radio contact with headquarters and reported taking heavy casualties. Reinforcements and supplies were promptly flown in to sustain the Green Dragon force. But when the final cease-fire was concluded in June 1953, the last radio message to reach the Liaison Division from Green Dragon was a curse. The operation had been compromised and was under enemy control.³⁸

The whole episode became just another part of the generally melancholy story of airborne special operations during the Korean War. The 8240th Army Unit and its Air Force counterpart repeatedly launched behind-the-lines sabotage missions. Hundreds of Koreans floated down on night drops into the black hole of

North Korea and were never heard from again. In 1952, the 8240th had paraded "Mustang Ranger" teams of partisans behind enemy lines on half-a-dozen occasions to attack enemy railroad lines. The teams varied in size from five to 20 men. They all met the same fate. After the "Green Dragon" operation had commenced, additional large sabotage teams drawn from the ranks of the 1st PAIR were sent in. None survived.³⁹

In 1951 and 1952, the Far East Air Force had dropped some 200 sabotage agents of its own on 19 separate missions directed against North Korean facilities. The agents accomplished practically nothing, and only one party ever returned safely to UN lines. Despite these unpromising precedents, the Liaison Detachment's Guerilla Division had laid plans in the spring of 1953 to use the 1st PAIR's "Southwind" element in yet another attempt at mounting sabotage operations. It proposed to parachute in 48 two-man teams to blow up North Korean railroads. Perhaps fortunately for all concerned, the mission was never implemented.⁴⁰

The failure of the Green Dragon operation did not become apparent until the fighting had ended. Thus, during the first part of 1953, the Liaison Detachment was encouraged to lay down plans for an ambitious and greatly expanded program of guerrilla

The KLO and its successor organizations, the 442d CIC Detachment and the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, occupy a unique place in the history of Army intelligence.

warfare. In addition to building up the 1st PAIR, the Detachment expanded two of its original regiments to provide additional forces for seaborne raids and assaults. The over-strength 1st Partisan Infantry Regiment was split up, allowing the formation of a new 6th Partisan Infantry Regiment. In similar fashion, the 2d Partisan Infantry Regiment contributed personnel to form a new 5th Partisan Infantry Regiment. The regiment based on the Korean east coast, the 3d Partisan Infantry, was too small to break up in this way, but its members were given airborne training. (There was no 4th Partisan Infantry Regiment, because Koreans allegedly associated the number four with bad luck.)⁴¹

A Small Army

As a result of these preparations, the Liaison Detachment had fielded what amounted to its own Korean Army by the time of the July 1953 ceasefire. The six-regiment force had a strength of more than 17,000 troops. The small American cadre assigned to the partisans included 55 personnel from the Army's newly organized 10th Special Forces Group.

This guerrilla army possessed 300 trucks and trailers; was

equipped with its own freighters, crash boats, and fishing vessels; and consumed 7,500 tons of supplies a month. Rice accounted for the bulk of the supply allotment; each partisan was issued 100 pounds a month, some for personal consumption, the rest for barter. The partisans also had their own chaplains, band, and travelling entertainment troupe. The Liaison Detachment even published a house magazine for them, *The Parachute*.⁴²

All this was something of a triumph for American-style organization. There were, however, some liabilities. Understandably, there was a certain rivalry between the American-controlled partisans and the regular ROK forces. Also, the partisan operation had swollen to such a size that some now questioned its effectiveness. While partisan raiders had served as a useful adjunct to UN forces, their value when used in large conventional units was open to dispute, especially because of the nature of their training and equipment.

The question was never fully resolved. A ceasefire occurred before the new partisan structure could be committed to battle, the guerrillas were forced to evacuate their island bases, which lay north of the Demilitarized Zone now demarcating

North and South Korea, and most of the partisan units were disbanded.^{a43}

Psywar Activity

In 1953, the Detachment also expanded its responsibilities to include psychological warfare, or “psywar.” This might seem to be an odd area of involvement for what began as an intelligence organization, but there were precedents. The OSS had conducted psychological warfare operations in World War II, and Army doctrine closely linked covert operations and psychological warfare. By mid-1953, the Liaison Detachment

was providing classroom training to Koreans in psychological warfare and preparing propaganda leaflets for distribution in the enemy rear. In addition, it was using propaganda to sustain the morale of its own partisans.⁴⁴

Evaluation

The KLO and its successor organizations, the 442d CIC Detachment and the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, occupy a unique place in the history of Army intelligence. The KLO started out as a small residual FECOM intelligence presence in Korea, increased in scope as a result of the North Korean invasion, and then was redesignated and further expanded during the darkest days of the war. Ultimately, it was redesignated once more and given responsibility for the whole Army covert and clandestine effort in Korea. Its particular pattern of organization,

however, would not provide an operational model for Army intelligence in the future. The Liaison Detachment’s structure was revamped almost as soon as the fighting in Korea ended.

Essentially, the Liaison Detachment was a creature of the Korean war. Its efforts produced a certain long-term impact: the Army was made aware of the potentialities for conducting positive human intelligence collection in peace as well as war. Moreover, certain Special Forces operations in Vietnam would later parallel, but not replicate, Liaison Detachment activities in Korea. Generally, however, the organization’s accomplishments and the lessons learned from them went down a historical memory hole and passed into oblivion along with other aspects of America’s “forgotten war” in Korea.⁴⁵

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^a Evanhoe felt that exacerbating this rivalry was the “large influx of South Korean citizens into partisan ranks whose only reason for volunteering was to escape being drafted into the South Korean Army,” as well as the fact that “Many of those recruited were pimps, thieves, and other undesirables who were hiding from South Korean authorities and wanted to use duty with the partisans to escape.”

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Grappling with Covert Action after the Cold War

Clinton's Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief, by Richard Sale. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 491 pp., index.

Matthew P.

Former President Bill Clinton's foreign policy reputation has suffered from charges that he was disengaged, ambivalent, and hesitant to use military force. In *Clinton's Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief*, journalist Richard Sale attempts to refute those charges by arguing that nonpublic initiatives, especially the use of covert action, show that Clinton was more proactive and resolute in dealing with foreign policy crises than his critics have allowed. Though the book does not succeed in making this case—at least in this reader's judgment—Sale does add to public understanding of some of the lesser-known foreign policy options available and how the first president to take office after the Cold War used them.

Sale struggles, sometimes contradicting himself, to show Bill Clinton growing steadily in knowledge and fortitude through his terms of office into a man of action. In describing the period after the infamous October 1993 Black Hawk episode in Somalia, Sale writes, "Something in Clinton had hardened, and he emerged from the crisis a different man." (88) By spring 1994, "Clinton's aggressiveness had blazed like a torch...[and] his advisors caught glimpses of some fresh, inner steel." (114) Yet, Sale continues to depict Clinton as vacillating, exhibiting a caution on Bosnia, for example, that "nearly crippled him." (137) But four pages later, in discussing Clinton's actions in July 1995, Sale alludes to "new inner toughness," (144) and by August, a "new unleashed aggressiveness." (152)

Sale provides no solid evidence for all these supposed increases in toughness. By the beginning of Clinton's second term in January 1997, the United States had failed to stop Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's forces from overrunning Srebrenica, and two timid regime change initiatives had failed in Iraq. At that point, Clinton still followed the lead of cautious allies on Iraq. With respect to countering terrorism, the administration had no real plan, even though Sale claims that by the summer of 1998, Clinton "was like a great sea bird, a storm petrel, swooping low over the waves alert for any prey." (302) The record shows otherwise: Clinton exerted little or no pressure on the Taliban or the government of Pakistan. Not until mid-1999 does the book show Clinton in full form, rallying allies to escalate a bombing campaign against Milosevic. But this was hardly a brazen stand, since everyone from France to Human Rights Watch to the Quakers supported military action.¹

Sale also is given to interpreting evidence selectively in Clinton's favor. For example, when Clinton used third countries to supply arms to Bosnia—a tactic that avoided a covert action finding and its attendant congressional oversight—the move can be seen as laudably resourceful if one is sympathetic to the subject or as subversively abusive of power if not. During the 1995 Dayton negotiations, the Clinton administration agreed to keep Milosevic in power to retain a negotiating partner who could speak for the Serbs. Sale finds this bold:

¹ On the various human rights groups supporting military action, see Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 434–35. Power's book, especially the pages that address the Clinton presidency (pages 293–502) generally support the conventional wisdom concerning Clinton's handling of foreign policy.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

"To keep the peace process alive, Clinton would use Milosevic, squeeze him like a rind, then toss him away." (158) A more critical perspective might have been that the compromise laid at Clinton's feet the entire record of Milosevic's human rights atrocities from then on.

The discussion of renditions of terrorists to third countries during that period also reflects a favorable bias. Even though Clinton's White House counsel warned that such renditions violated international law, Sale depicts them as brave, in contrast to the criticism of renditions often made of the subsequent administration. Similarly, Sale blames most of Clinton's first-term foreign policy trials on his predecessor, George H.W. Bush, but he gives no indication that Clinton similarly burdened his successor by not curbing Iran's influence in the region or by delaying action against al-Qa'ida. If any single sentence in the book highlights Sale's tendency to see toughness where it might not be, it is the following quote from Clinton: "If anybody f—s with us, we'll respond. And we're going to get the UN to finally show up and take over." (88)

Whether the book salvages Clinton's foreign policy reputation or not, it does a service by exploring the important subject of covert action in the post-Cold War era. The original 1947 mandate for covert action—a US foreign policy activity in which Washington's hand remains hidden—specified that it was to be used for countering communism. Until 1991, the goal of most covert actions—even if they were not in response to a direct communist threat—was to counter communist influence or Soviet-backed governments. The fact that the United States continued a robust covert action agenda against a complex matrix of threats after the demise of the Soviet Union makes for a fascinating field of inquiry. As Sale suggests, the process by which the US government decides to undertake a covert action program is interesting in and of itself, drawing input from some-

times competing and sometimes cooperating (although not always amicably) elements of the government, including various members of the Intelligence Community.

The relationship between intelligence and policy in the covert action context deserves study, and at times in this book Sale hints at exploring it more fully. "It is a common myth that intelligence helps shape policy," Sale writes, "but the opposite is true. Policy, or the lack of it, usually shapes and fashions intelligence." (43) Sale's book also shows CIA in a role that this reviewer believes is its most under-appreciated, that of serving as a shadow State Department, clandestinely engaging with foreign governments and security services on a range of unacknowledged projects and serving as a back channel to foreign leaders. This function, even if not explored in great detail, appears in the background in much of the book.

Overall *Clinton's Secret Wars* would have been better if Sale had not tried to right a perceived wrong in prior assessments of Clinton's foreign policy and had instead taken a more straightforward look at the use of covert action in the post-Cold War environment. This could have been done with only minor tweaks, namely, excising the effusive language about the president's ever-intensifying focus and his perpetually rejuvenating inner steel, observations that repeatedly detract from the more interesting material on creative foreign policy options available to him. Though his successors used these policy alternatives against similar targets, it was Clinton and his team that refined and debated them for the first time after the Cold War. By taking the reader on a tour through eight years of an administration grappling with such questions in a changed world, Sale has made a significant contribution other than the one he seems most to have intended.



Takes on Intelligence and the Vietnam War

Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975, by John Prados. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 665 pp.

Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned, by Rufus Phillips. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 398 pp.

This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive, by James S. Robbins. (New York: Encounter Books, 2010), 364 pp.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

On hearing different and opposing assessments regarding US progress in Vietnam by two members of the same fact-finding team in the fall of 1963, President John F. Kennedy quipped, “The two of you did visit the same country, didn’t you?” Readers of these three books seeking a better understanding of the CIA’s role in Southeast Asia and the lessons of that conflict for today may well ask a similar question. Nearly 40 years after the end of the US involvement, after the publication of a score of histories describing CIA activities during that time, and after the declassification of thousands of documents, opinions regarding Agency failures and accomplishments remain far apart, as do the authors’ interpretations of how the experiences of Vietnam apply to the conflicts of today.

Independent historian and self-described “engaged leftist intellectual” John Prados needs little introduction to scholars of intelligence history or of the Vietnam War, as he has written some 17 books on these subjects.¹ His latest work, published by the University Press of Kansas, will undoubtedly have a wide readership and garner acclaim from those who share his interpretations of the war and of the CIA. A large study, with a comprehensive bibli-

ographic essay citing a wide range of archival and published sources, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War* is a recipient of the Henry Adams Prize from the Society for Historians in the Federal Government and has received numerous accolades from academic reviewers. The history, intended as a broad overview of the conflict, deals extensively with high politics and the antiwar movement, but it also frequently refers to the CIA’s role at home and abroad.

Prados tends to view the CIA as an organization whose activities in Southeast Asia and at home generally contributed more to the problems of the day than to their solutions. Such critical assessments emerge throughout this work when the CIA is mentioned, starting with the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) in 1954 and extending through passing treatments of covert operations, the order-of-battle controversy, Agency activities in Laos, the Phoenix program and rural pacification, and involvement with South Vietnamese leaders. From this work, however, a reader new to CIA history would get the erroneous impression that the Agency engaged in all manner of nefarious activities in Vietnam, failed in most every Southeast Asia-related mission, and spent the

¹ Prados is affiliated with the George Washington University’s National Security Archive, and he frequently blogs about the CIA on the archive website, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.

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better part of its resources on illegal surveillance and collection activities against those involved in the antiwar movement at home—the latter a rare and relatively brief deviation from the Agency's traditional foreign intelligence mission, which did score numerous Cold War successes in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Prados has chosen to give little or no attention to publicly available CIA-commissioned histories of the period, and unfortunately his book went to press before the release in 2009 of several in-depth, formerly classified, CIA-sponsored histories written by Thomas L. Ahern, and before the release of documents on the Agency's proprietary airline, Air America.² Other available works, such as the National Intelligence Council's published collection of estimates produced during the Vietnam War, Ahern's published history on the CIA and rural pacification, and Harold Ford's *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers* are cited but not extensively used in this volume.³

Unused and uncited are a number of well-documented and rich treatments of Agency programs that give fuller and more positive perspectives—although not without criticism—on its efforts during the period, and at the same time more accurately reflect the environment in which the Agency operated at home and abroad. For example, MHCHAOS, mentioned in passing by Prados, gets full treatment in *Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence*, declassified in 2006.⁴ *Studies in Intelligence* also has published many now-declassified articles dealing with Southeast Asia, especially technical collection and reconnaissance programs. Other pertinent publications, such as the CIA chief historian David

Robarge's monograph on the A-12 Archangel supersonic aircraft would have provided more on that technological feat.⁵ Sadly, the portrayal of the CIA in Prados's work tends to reflect the antiwar, anti-Establishment view so often heard since the 1970s, when the Agency first faced lurid and media-sensationalized allegations of wrongdoing and intense congressional hearings.

In recent years, a new generation of Vietnam War scholars, many born after the conflict and whose perspectives come from scholarly research rather than direct participation in the war's events at home or in Southeast Asia, have challenged many accepted interpretations touched on in Prados's work, such as his discussion of the Phoenix program, and suggest that revisions in his thinking might be in order. But Prados dismisses those other scholars and the debate they have initiated. He writes, "this is not revisionism, it is neo-orthodoxy." (328) One would conclude from such statements that the author made up his mind about US and CIA involvement in Southeast Asia long ago and that no amount of new material will change his views. As he writes, "Ultimately I side with those who consider Vietnam an unwinnable war. I came to that view early, but extensive research and deep analysis confirm that impression." (xv) For the intelligence officer, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War* does more to reveal the author's perception of the CIA than its role in the war. For the latter, Agency-released histories provide the fullest picture.

Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned, by Rufus Phillips, certainly ranks as an account that all intelligence officers should read and consider.

² The Air America material and Ahern's six studies, with one exception lightly redacted, are available in CIA's Freedom of Information Act Reading Room in its special collections section: http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections.asp. Ahern's volume on rural pacification was published as *Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2009).

³ Harold Ford, *CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962–1968* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998). This publication is available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-episodes-1962-1968/index.html>.

⁴ Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith, *Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993). A scanned copy of this publication is available online at <http://www.foia.cia.gov/helms.asp>.

⁵ David Robarge, *Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997). This publication is available online at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-12/index.html>.

Phillips's detailed memoir, which describes his service with the CIA and USAID in Vietnam and Laos between 1954 and 1968, draws on archival research, interviews, official volumes from the Department of State and CIA—including Ahern's pacification volume—plus many other pertinent scholarly publications to form a very readable account. The book makes use of many of the same sources as Prados's work, but it differs greatly in tone and in its views of the CIA's efforts, although it is still critical at times. The discursive endnotes and biographical sketches bring the reader up to date on the people who played key roles many decades ago, and an extensive bibliographical essay suggests further reading.

A US Army officer on detached service with the CIA, Phillips arrived in Southeast Asia as a member of the Agency's small SMM in July 1954. Established after a request by President Dwight Eisenhower to DCI Allen Dulles to advise and stabilize the Emperor Bao Dai's government under Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, the SMM undertook what must have seemed a Herculean task. The legendary Edward G. Lansdale, a US Air Force officer assigned to the CIA and fresh from the successful repression of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, directed the effort. In the fall of 1954, he set out to do in South Vietnam what he had done in the Philippines—stabilize, boost, and strengthen the government, while removing communist-inspired threats to the new regime.

Phillips points out early on, and frequently reiterates, that Lansdale and those small numbers concerned with the "other war" (defined as rural development and winning the support of the largely peasant southern population) worked outside the US diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence bureaucracy in cooperation with their South Vietnamese counterparts in a relationship based on common knowledge, mutual respect, and shared goals. The SMM assisted these local efforts and never sought to dominate what was a job the Vietnamese had to do for themselves—as President Kennedy would say in an interview with correspondent Walter Cronkite in the fall of 1963. SMM personnel, in Phillips's view, from Lansdale on down, were sincere and selfless

American patriots who possessed great knowledge of Asian cultures and history, superlative interpersonal skills, and a clear ability to work with, and not around, the South Vietnamese in a common fight against communism.

Perhaps most important, Phillips, like Lansdale—and unlike most American military and political leaders—recognized that the war against Ho Chi Minh represented first and foremost a political and ideological war and not a contest of arms. Victory or defeat hinged on gaining or losing adherents to the cause in both Southeast Asia and the United States. Bullets, bombs, and troops could not triumph alone, in any amount or over any length of time. Only by providing peasants with rural security, lifting them from poverty, and educating them on the merits of democracy and the evils of communism, could South Vietnam survive and the US obtain its goals. While Lansdale worked with the new regime on higher-level state stabilization matters in Saigon, Phillips worked with the peasants in the Mekong Delta, central coast, and central highlands. Phillips found the peasants amenable and loyal to Diem's government once rural development projects began and the peasants realized alternatives to the communists existed—the only other presence in the countryside prior to 1954 was the despised French. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), in Phillips's view, also exerted a positive influence once its units moved into the villages. Contrary to most traditional accounts, Phillips notes that the people came over to support the government, ARVN troops integrated well into the villages, and peace and stability came to the countryside.

It is here though that Phillips saw the first indications of things going seriously wrong. The SMM closed in November 1956, its mission accomplished. US efforts then went big, years before US efforts went even bigger during 1964–65. As Phillips writes, bureaucracy took over. The CIA established a station as part of a larger, ever growing State Department Country Team. The US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG)—like its 1962 successor, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam—removed the ARVN from the villages and reconstructed the force as a conven-

tional Western-style army to counter an expected North Vietnamese invasion. The ultimate US–South Vietnamese defeat, Phillips claims, really occurred then, although he still held out hope as late as 1972 that the overall situation could be saved. Yet the cooperative connection to the South Vietnamese, both within their government and among the peasantry, was lost, never to return.

Following this early service, Phillips worked in similar programs for the CIA in Laos before returning to Agency Headquarters in Washington. Fed up with bureaucracy, especially after experiencing the independence of field work, he resigned from the Agency. When he returned to Vietnam with USAID in the early 1960s and became involved in the Strategic Hamlet Program, he noted with growing alarm the strained and distant relationship between most Americans assigned to rural areas and the South Vietnamese. Efforts to shift focus back to the classic counterinsurgency, to reintroduce Lansdale, and to influence President Kennedy's policies all failed, even though Phillips made direct appeals to Kennedy in the fall of 1963. These White House meetings were contentious, as military and civilian advisers, including Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, took issue with Phillips's assessments and showed early signs of favoring a US military commitment.

Although Phillips stayed involved for several more years, the Americanization of the war after 1965 pushed rural development into the background with dire results. Phillips writes favorably of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which began in 1967 and increased in intensity after the communist Tet offensive of 1968. To him, CORDS represented the embodiment of what he had worked towards since the mid-1950s. With rural pacification and security, nation building, and anti-Viet Cong activities all under one program, progress came swiftly. "By 1972," Phillips writes, "most of South Vietnam, particularly in the Delta area, was not only pacified but peaceful. So was most of central Vietnam." Phillips continues, "the North Vietnamese would later admit they suffered a severe reversal in the South Vietnam-

ese countryside in the years after 1968, acknowledging that many of their bases had been wiped out in South Vietnam and that numbers of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops had been compelled to retreat to sanctuaries in Cambodia." (301) These firsthand observations confirm much of what newer Vietnam scholarship now shows, although improvements came too little and too late to affect the outcome of a war the American public had abandoned.

As a thoughtful participant in the events described, Phillips offers some practical lessons for those involved in today's counterinsurgencies. Foremost, Phillips stresses that Americans must know who they are as a people, and leaders must know (and be realistic) about what they are trying to attain abroad. US leaders must also know their allies and adversaries.

More important, however, Phillips maintains that if our nation is to be involved in such conflicts, we must know the "x factor"—the political and psychological nature of the struggle for hearts and minds—and the feelings of the people for whom we are fighting. We need to communicate with them on a human level, understand what motivates them, and view the conflict through their history, society, and culture. We need to know our enemies, their capabilities and motivations, as well as the level of their willingness to continue their resistance and up to what level of cost. Decisionmakers must be able to explain and connect policies and events abroad to the American public. Finally, Phillips repeatedly emphasizes that we must know whether we are fighting a conventional war or a political/ideological war—or a combination of both—so that we can bring the most suitable weapons to bear. These would include, of course, knowledgeable intelligence officers and military personnel willing to work long, hard years at the grassroots level.

James S. Robbins's *This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive* clearly fits into the revisionist school of Vietnam War history that Prados dismisses. *This Time We Win* is not a history of the CIA in Southeast Asia, although the "Intelligence Failure" chapter accurately

speaks of the Agency, its analysis of the war in 1967, and the warning it provided before the 1968 Tet offensive. Robbins positively portrays CIA activities in a way not usually seen in most published histories.

The main value of this book for intelligence officers lies in its descriptions of how public perceptions—for better or worse—affect a nation's foreign policy and the course of its military conflicts. Focusing on public, political, and media perceptions of the Tet Offensive during its initial phase in January and February 1968, Robbins claims that most Americans saw the event negatively and today remember Tet for all the wrong reasons. The perception of loss, he argues, became a self-fulfilling prophecy, even though history shows that what happened in the offensive was a military defeat for the North. In short, the US lost in Vietnam not because of any military defeats but because US leaders, in effect, chose to lose and repeatedly avoided opportunities for victory.

Historians have long accepted that the communists suffered a major military defeat during the short but ferocious Tet offensive in 1968. At the same time, historians accept that the communists scored a major political and psychological victory as American public opinion turned against the war their leaders had consistently said they were winning. Using a wide variety of government records, published histories, interviews, and television and print news accounts, Robbins shows that Tet may have shocked the public, but it came as no surprise to US intelligence officials, soldiers, or politicians in the Johnson administration. All had anticipated a last-ditch offensive in South Vietnam months in advance, prepared for it militarily, and rapidly defeated it once it occurred, inflicting a clear military defeat on the communists, who failed to achieve any of their goals.

Robbins goes on to describe a US administration that essentially snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. President Johnson failed to explain what had happened; what the administration knew and what it had been doing beforehand; and how Tet affected or did not affect long-term US goals. This lackluster response, reinforced by media reports focusing

on the spectacular, gave Tet the appearance of a major setback and served as proof that US policies had failed. The idea that Tet constituted an American catastrophe settled in the public's mind and never went away. Robbins concludes that "Tet was less a case of intelligence failure than a public relations fiasco." (123)

This all matters today, Robbins maintains, "because the Vietnam War is remembered by a large segment of the political class as pointless, immoral, and illegitimate, [and the] mere mention of Vietnam tends to delegitimize any conflict to which it is compared." (9) Because Vietnam has been so widely seen as an unwinnable war, comparisons of that conflict to the current battles in Afghanistan and Iraq are not intended to lend clarity, "but rather to couch the discussion in terms of inevitable defeat." (9)

Robbins warns that US adversaries today have drawn inspiration from the Tet offensive and hope to score similar victories. They see "America's national will as an Achilles heel" that negates its policies and power. Tet proved that a small, weak force could defeat the most powerful nation in human history by creating a big splash and the perception of power where none existed. This provided an immediate political victory that set up the North's future military triumph. Robbins concludes that the United States could just as easily lose today's conflicts if its people convince themselves that they cannot succeed.

All three books are excellent for their treatment of the history of the Vietnam War and the CIA's role in the conflict. They are less effective in their pointed analogies and comparisons of that war to the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. History is rarely so neat as to provide direct and applicable comparisons—as if times, actors, policies, and circumstances do not change. In the authors' attempts to connect what happened in Vietnam to what is happening now, one is led to wonder if writing history was their goal or if they merely intended to harness history to reinforce, or undermine, present-day policies and political agendas.

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Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

General

Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present, by Timothy Walton

Extreme Risk Management: Revolutionary Approaches to Evaluating and Measuring Risk, by Christina Ray

The Technical Collection of Intelligence, by Robert M. Clark

Historical

Betrayal: Clinton, Castro and The Cuban Five, by Matt Lawrence and Thomas Van Hare

Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad, by Tony Geraghty

Double Death: The True Story of Pryce Lewis, the Civil War's Most Daring Spy, by Gavin Mortimer

Empire and Espionage: Spies and the Zulu War, by Stephen Wade

Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case, by Walter Schneir

The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb 1939–1949, by Jim Baggott

The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb, by Allen M. Hornblum

The Kremlin's Geordie Spy: The Man They Swapped for Gary Powers, by Vin Arthey

Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960, by Richard H. Cummings

Secrets of the Cold War: US Army Europe's Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities against the Soviets, by Leland C. McCaslin

Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939–1945, by Alan Ogden

Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage, by Douglas Waller

Memoirs

All Them Cornfields and Ballet in the Evening, by John Miller

The C.I. Desk: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence As Seen from My Cubicle, by Christopher Lynch

Holding Hands with Heroes, by Jack Kassinger

Intelligence Abroad

The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

General

Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present, by Timothy Walton. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 294 pp., bibliography, maps, index.

Former CIA analyst Timothy Walton begins his book with a discussion of the basic elements and tools of intelligence analysis, which in the end supports decision making. For example, after identifying various factors an analyst must be careful to consider—uncertainty, deception, surprise, estimates of the accuracy of judgments—he describes some of the important techniques that can be applied. These include the time-line or chronology, competitive hypotheses, and various matrix models. Finally, he stresses the value of presenting the decision maker with options when no single result is directly on point.

To illustrate how analysis has functioned in the past, he provides 40 historical “lessons” from biblical times to the present. While the reader might legitimately expect the lessons to demonstrate the techniques Walton presented in the introductory chapters, that is not what the lessons do. Instead, they are historical summaries that set the stage for analyses. For example, his account of Moses sending spies into Canaan only summarizes the conflicting reports he received and the resultant disagreement among the leaders. There is nothing about fact checking or other analyses that might have led to conclusions they might have reached. Likewise, in his discussion of Hitler’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union, Walton mentions Stalin’s requirements for intelligence and the indicators that an attack was imminent, but he does not analyze why Stalin steadfastly refused to believe them.

In the case of the run-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Walton provides a good summary of what happened and then acknowledges it as “the most famous and consequential example of failure in intelligence analysis.” (95) But he fails to describe the analyses performed by those involved that allowed for the surprise.

A similar approach applies in the case of the atomic bomb spies. He tells how the FBI learned of the espionage through defectors and the Venona messages, but he neglects to comment on how the Bureau approached the difficult analytical problems the decrypts posed. The case also points to a major weakness of the book. None of the facts presented are sourced, and this leads to careless errors. Thus Walton writes: “shortly before Gouzenko’s defection [5 September 1945] Elizabeth Bentley had volunteered information to the FBI field office in New Haven.” (116) In fact, Bentley went to the Bureau office in New York on 7 November 1945. In another instance, Walton claims that Gouzenko mentioned Harry Gold, Klaus Fuchs’s courier, but he did not. And Gold was not, as the book claims, the one who identified Fuchs; it was the other way around.⁶

In sum, while *Challenges in Intelligence Analysis* illustrates historical cases in which analysis was no doubt performed, the details of that analysis—how it was done, what one really needs to know—are omitted. The reader is left to resolve that.

Extreme Risk Management: Revolutionary Approaches to Evaluating and Measuring Risk, by Christina Ray. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2010), 287 pp., endnotes, charts, index.

Just days after 9/11, financial analyst Christina Ray read press allegations that Osama bin Laden collaborators with knowledge of the up-

coming attacks had been trading in the market in anticipation of the impact of the attack. She hypothesized that if the story were true, analy-

⁶ See Amy Knight, *How The Cold War Began: The Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt For Soviet Spies* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005); Allen Hornblum, *The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

sis of open source stock market transaction data would expose those involved. *Extreme Risk Management* does not reveal whether she tested her theory. Instead, it focuses on her subsequent work, which expanded the concept and explored the similarities she found in risk management techniques employed by the financial and intelligence communities. She argues that “the ability to reverse-engineer actionable market intelligence, or MARKINT,” (vii) might be useful as an investigative tool in counterterrorism work and describes a number of risk management models aimed at achieving that goal. In fact, Ray points out that “the CIA is now publicly advertising” for experienced financial analysts. (viii)

Extreme Risk Management is not a book for beginners. Most of its chapters are devoted to complex financial models and the risks associated with their use. But in chapter nine, “An Alternative Path to Actionable Intelligence,” she com-

pares risk methodologies employed by financial and intelligence analysts. Here she argues that financial models, which are mainly statistical, can be adapted to show, for example, how the “intelligence community might benefit from information derived from open-source market prices converted to knowledge using quantitative sense-making models...as a metric of sovereign state instability.” (151)

More generally, Ray concludes “financial warfare is arguably one of the types of unrestricted warfare for which the United States is least prepared and to which it is the most vulnerable.” (254) To meet this threat, she suggests applications for MARKINT by intelligence analysts dealing with cyberthreats, counterintelligence, terrorism, insurgency, and rogue state behavior. While the practical testing of such applications remains to be done, *Extreme Risk Management* provides the basic techniques for analysts in this new field of activity.

The Technical Collection of Intelligence, by Robert M. Clark. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 322 pp., end of chapter notes, photos, glossary, index.

Independent consultant and patent lawyer Robert Clark is a former industrial executive, Air Force intelligence officer, and CIA analyst with extensive experience in the field of technical intelligence. His previous books discussed intelligence analysis.⁷ In his latest work he turns to technical collection, which he defines as the “collection, processing, and exploitation of *nonliteral* information—that is, information in a form not used for human communication” as opposed to that acquired from human agents. (xvi)

The keys to technical collection are signatures—photographic, electromagnetic, chemical, biological, acoustic, and nuclear—collected by various acquisition systems. Clark is careful to distinguish between signatures and the patterns associated with them. For example, the images of the Cuban missile sites acquired by the U-2 in 1962 are signatures. Their significance results from analysis of the patterns observed by analysts.

Chapters cover the space-, air-, sea-, and ground-based collection platforms intelligence organizations employ today. With the help of impressive color illustrations, Clark explains what each platform does and how it works. He includes, for example, several types of radar techniques, passive RF (radio frequency) collection, and digital satellite imagery. Clark also highlights the differences between active and passive systems. The final chapter looks at managing technical collection. He does not get into detailed operating procedures, though he does present a list of key management tools for consideration. One of the most important and difficult tasks Clark discusses is the allocation of collection requirements to meet time-sensitive demands that often exceed the capabilities of available systems.

Technical Collection of Intelligence is a fine, fully-documented, understandable, and comprehensive, though not elementary, introduction to

⁷ See Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: Estimation & Prediction* (Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press, 1996), and *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003).

a complex intelligence activity. It is an important topic not treated in such depth elsewhere.

Historical

Betrayal: Clinton, Castro and the Cuban Five, by Matt Lawrence and Thomas Van Hare. (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), 217 pp., bibliography, no index.

On 24 February 1996, Cuban MiGs shot down two of three unarmed American light aircraft over international waters off the Cuban coast. The four pilots died. The third aircraft escaped and spread the word. The United States government responded with diplomatic gestures. Matt Lawrence and Thomas Van Hare think more should have been done. *Betrayal* explains why.

The authors, like the pilots flying near Cuba that day, were members of Brothers to the Rescue, a volunteer group that flew missions between Cuba and Florida searching for rafters, or *balseros*, trying to flee Castro. When the pilots spotted rafters, they radioed the US Coast Guard so they could be rescued. Between 1994 and the final mission in 2001, Brothers helped save over 17,000 lives, according to Lawrence and Van Hare.

The Castro government said the planes shot down in 1996 were in Cuban airspace, and it produced a “survivor” to prove it. The authors knew no one had survived. They also recognized the “survivor” as a fellow Brothers pilot and concluded he had penetrated the organization for Cuban intelligence.

While the story quickly dropped from public attention, many questions were left answered; for example, exactly where had the shoot-down occurred; had they actually flown into Cuban airspace (one plane did briefly); why did the Cubans risk US Air Force retaliation; what had the three survivors said about the mission; and had any formal investigations been done by US officials? *Betrayal* offers answers to these and other questions that emerged as the authors pursued their own investigation. In a chapter titled “Cuba’s Queen of Spies,” the authors assert that the

Pentagon did draft military responses for the president, but he chose not to implement them. Even if he had done so, the Cubans would have been prepared, and not only because of their “survivor” agent. Their principal agent in the United States, Ann Belén Montes, had been in the Pentagon group that had drawn up the options for White House consideration.

And there were other Cuban agents involved, according to this book. At least two were part of La Red Avispa (or Wasp) network, one of many such groups in the Cuban refugee community in Florida. (73ff) Five Wasps were eventually arrested, and the authors explain those agents’ roles. Perhaps the most controversial conclusion of the authors is that the US government knew the Cubans were going to attack the Brothers’ planes that day and for complex political reasons did nothing to warn the pilots or prevent the attacks. (189ff) The authors’ evidence is not rock solid, and the reader is left to make an independent judgment.

In discussing their findings, the authors do not neglect the personalities of the Brothers pilots and their families. They present a poignant picture of Cuban refugees working against Castro while his agents work to thwart them.

Lawrence and Van Hare do not provide specific sources for key points in the book, though in the “Key References and Bibliography” section, newspaper articles, books, and persons interviewed are listed for each chapter.

Betrayal is a sad story of a humanitarian effort eventually shut down by Castro and international politics.

Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad, by Tony Geraghty. (New York: Pegasus Books, 2010), 440 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.

Arabic linguist Tony Geraghty served in the British Army, flew Nimrods in the RAF, and was a war correspondent before turning to writing books. His histories of the SAS (Special Air Service), the IRA conflict, and BRIXMIS (The British Commanders-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany, which provided cover for a military intelligence unit in Cold War Europe) established him as a respected authority. In *Black Ops* he expands his outlook, first to discuss the broad historical origins of Special Forces (SF) activity, and then to focus on their use by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Israel.

To assume, however, that the book's subtitle implies that Geraghty will give equal coverage to each mentioned organization would be a mistake. After a 39-page introduction that nicely summarizes the entire book, five of the seven chapters are devoted to SF in the United States, one to Israel, and the last to the United Kingdom (the SAS and various lesser-known units). Throughout, Geraghty discusses the influence of British SF elements on their US and Israeli counterparts.

The coverage of US SF units begins with the Revolutionary War, but the focus is on their controversial development during WW II, with the OSS battling the War Department and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). There is detailed coverage of the contentious use of SF in the Vietnam War. Geraghty goes on to describe the origins of the Delta Force and the tragic outcome of its attempted Iranian hostage rescue mission. He suggests the Delta Force finally achieved acceptance in asymmetric warfare in Iraq.

The chapter on British SF describes the often stormy evolution of operations by multiple, competing units—SAS and special military intelligence elements—that battled the IRA, supported the Falklands War, and fought in the Iraqi wars. Much of the controversy was resolved in 2005 with the formation of the UK Special Forces Group (UKSF), which included the SAS, the Special Boat Service (SBS), the 18th Signal Regiment, and various special military units designed to provide quick reaction capability.

The Israeli Chapter covers the origins of “at least thirty” (178) SF units, including the Mossad, the Aman (military intelligence), the Sayeret Matkal (an army reconnaissance and commando unit), and the Sayeret Shaldag (the Special Air-Ground Designating Team, an air force commando unit). (185) Geraghty records their effectiveness in some well known instances—for example, the aftermath of the Olympic games hostage taking, the Entebbe rescue mission, and the Vanunu case. He also asserts that in operations of this sort, the Israelis possess an advantage in that they can presume they will have the support of Jews wherever Israeli forces operate.

Geraghty takes note of the irony that three of the countries discussed in the book—Israel, the United States, and Ireland—engaged in successful resistance to British rule which “depended, initially, on irregular military forces.” (177) *Black Ops* shows how SF units have since developed into a major force in the contemporary battle against terrorism. It is well documented and well worth reading.

Double Death: The True Story of Pryce Lewis, the Civil War's Most Daring Spy, by Gavin Mortimer. (New York: Walker & Company, 2010), 285 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.

The late NSA analyst and jazz musician Edwin Fishel was also an authority on Civil War intelligence. Years in the archives convinced him that most Civil War intelligence memoirs qualified as subprime literature, “so heavily fic-

tionalized that even the most believable parts are suspect.” The memoirs of Allan Pinkerton, he wrote, epitomized this condition. Pinkerton “paid almost as little respect to factuality as did the authors of complete fictions.”⁸ Author Gavin

Mortimer agrees with Fishel's assessment of Pinkerton. Although a man of many positive qualities, writes Mortimer, "Allan Pinkerton... told the truth only when it suited him; when it didn't, he lied." (14) *Double Death* gives many examples, but the most important one concerns Pryce Lewis, one of Pinkerton's principal intelligence agents.

The first part of *Double Death* is devoted to Lewis's early life, the circumstances that brought him to America from his home in Wales, his work in America as a traveling book salesman, and his recruitment into the Pinkerton Detective Agency in 1859. When Pinkerton went to Washington to serve General McClellan as an intelligence officer, Lewis became one of his agents. He operated first in the South undercover as a traveling English gentleman.

At the same time, Pinkerton's most valuable agent, Timothy Webster, was acting as a Confederate courier but secretly carrying mail to the North. In 1862 Webster came under suspicion while in Richmond. Before he could escape he fell ill and was confined to bed. When he failed to appear as expected, Pinkerton sent Lewis and another agent, John Scully, to Richmond to see what was wrong. After meeting with Webster, they too were suspected of being agents and were arrested. In his memoir, Pinkerton writes that to save themselves, Lewis and Scully confessed that Webster was a Union agent. Webster was hanged, twice. The first attempt failed when the noose unraveled. Before the second at-

tempt, Webster told his hangman, "I suffer a double death," hence the title of Mortimer's book. Lewis and Sully were repatriated, and their days as spies were over. This is the version of Webster's demise that Fishel recorded in his book.⁹

While researching the life of Lewis, Mortimer discovered two documents unknown to Fishel. One was a pamphlet written in 1906 by William Pinkerton, Allan's son, telling the true story of the testimony that led to Webster's death: "Scully made the confession implicating Webster... Lewis remained staunch, and did not confess." (236) No one knows why Allan Pinkerton lied. Lewis knew of the pamphlet, but so few others did that his reputation remained tainted. The second document was a copy of Lewis's memoir found in an archive in Canada. Letters indicated he had tried unsuccessfully to get it published. In the memoir, Lewis writes that he never betrayed Webster. The memoir also provides details of Lewis's life story, told in Mortimer's book for the first time.

Mortimer makes a weak case for designating Lewis the most daring spy in the Civil War. Webster is a better fit. In the end, what mattered to Lewis was his tarnished reputation. Burdened by his failure to cleanse it and by persistent financial problems, he committed suicide on 6 December 1911 in New York City. *Double Death* sets the record straight in an important Civil War intelligence case. Well written and soundly documented, it is a valuable contribution.

Empire and Espionage: Spies and the Zulu War, by Stephen Wade. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword, 2010), 183 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The Anglo-Zulu War began in January 1879, when troops from the British colony of Natal on the East Coast of Africa invaded neighboring Zululand. Africa was not a high priority for Imperial Britain, and its army units there had few experienced officers and men and suffered from inadequate training. The Brits were counting on rigid discipline and superior weaponry to deal with the "primitive peoples' attack mode." (37)

The British force of about 13,000 men—5,000 British soldiers and 8,000 Africans—advanced in three columns. Scouting parties were dispatched, but either they failed to gather intelligence about enemy positions and strength, or commanders disregarded their reports. In the event, the center column of 1,600 British and African troops was surprised and annihilated by a Zulu force 20,000 strong—one half of the Zulu

⁸ Edwin C. Fishel, *The Secret War for the Union* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 149–49.

Army—at Isandlwana. More than 1,300 British soldiers died. Zulu losses were estimated at 2,000 dead and 1,000 injured. Author Stephen Wade examines in detail the reasons for the defeat. He goes on to describe several subsequent battles. He emphasizes the use and misuse of scouts and spies, the personalities involved, the communications employed, and the role of the media in reporting the conflict to London.

The British ultimately did overwhelm the Zulus, and after capturing the Zulu leader accepted their surrender on 1 September 1879. According to Wade, the British army learned much from the war. He describes its impact on the future of military intelligence—although he acknowledges that some of the same mistakes were made again in the Boer War.

Empire and Espionage is the only book on this topic, and it is valuable for that reason alone. But it has a major defect. Throughout, names, events, and locations are mentioned but not otherwise identified. Thus, for example, we encounter Cetshwayo (the Zulu leader), Garnet Wolseley and Chelmsford (both British generals), and Bartle Frere (the governor of South Africa) without ever learning their roles or titles. Isandlwana, though frequently mentioned in the book's opening, is not identified as a major battle until page 36. Wade offers no explanation for this awkward treatment. Thus, a reader without knowledge of the Anglo-Zulu War will find the book bumpy going.

Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case, by Walter Schneir with Preface and Afterword by Miriam Schneir. (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2010), 203 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

In their 1965 book, *Invitation to an Inquest*, Walter and Miriam Schneir argued that key witnesses at the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg lied and that the FBI had fabricated evidence.¹⁰ Thus the Rosenbergs were not Soviet spies. They were innocent. In 1995, when the Venona decrypts proved the Rosenbergs had indeed been Soviet spies, the Schneirs, to their credit, revised their position in an article published in *The Nation*.¹¹ Julius had been a spy, they admitted, but not Ethel, her help in recruiting her brother David Greenglass notwithstanding. Then in 1999, the Schneirs read *The Haunted Wood*, by Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev,¹² and concluded it contained material that cast doubt on aspects of the government's case and might vindicate the defendants after all. *Final Verdict* reports the Schneirs' new position: Julius was only marginally involved in atomic espionage, and Ethel not at all.

Walter Schneir died before he could commit his new arguments to paper in narrative form, but his wife completed the task. She provides an eight-page timeline and a 41-page preface with background on her husband's research. In a 16-page afterword, based on material in the 2010 book *Spies*,¹³ she writes that her husband's conclusions hold up. The core of *Final Verdict*—four chapters (113 pages)—is attributed to her husband. It presents his analysis of the critical discrepancies he claims to have found, though in the end his conjectures are only supported by imaginative analysis and speculation. One of the few unequivocal statements comes from Schneir himself when he writes, referring to the Rosenbergs, "Of course they lied and lied when they contended they knew nothing about espionage. Ethel knew about it and Julius practiced it." (155) In the end, Schneir's verdict is that the Rosenbergs were prosecuted for a crime they really didn't commit and not for the one they did.

¹⁰ Walter and Miriam Schneir, *Invitation To An Inquest: A New Look At the Rosenberg-Sobell Case* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

¹¹ Walter and Miriam Schneir, "Cryptic Answers," *The Nation*, August 14/21, 1995.

¹² Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood* (New York: Random House, 1999). See William Nolte's review in *Studies in Intelligence* 50, No. 2 (June 2006).

¹³ John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). For Hayden Peake's review, see "The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf," *Studies in Intelligence* 54, No. 3 (September 2010).

Nothing the Schneirs present changes the substance of the case. The final verdict remains: “guilty!”

The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb 1939–1949, by Jim Baggott. (New York: Pegasus Books, 2010), 576 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Author Jim Baggott writes in his preface that his book contains “new materials [that] allow a single-volume popular history of the Anglo-American, German, and Soviet [atom bomb] programs to be assembled for the first time.” This claim is an exaggeration. The book does portray the roles played and the controversies experienced by all the well-known scientists involved, from Oppenheimer to Teller. And it accurately chronicles the sequence of events that led to the bombings in Japan that ended WW II. With regard to intelligence, it reviews the work of the NKGB agents in the United Kingdom and the United States who gave the Soviets the plans for the US bombs. Baggott also discusses

the impact those agents had on postwar relations among Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. But all this has been recounted by others. Baggott doesn’t identify anything new in his book. The sources are all secondary, and errors made elsewhere are repeated here. For example, MI5 Director General Roger Hollis did not, as claimed, appoint Kim Philby as the principal liaison officer on the Gouzenko case, and Sir William Stephenson was not code-named *Intrepid*. (384)

The First War of Physics is a good summary of an oft-told story, but nothing more.

The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb, by Allen M. Hornblum. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 446 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Defenders of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg have long argued that if Harry Gold had not confessed to being a Soviet agent, they would never have been exposed. Author John Wexley was one of many who went further by characterizing Gold’s trial testimony as “fantasy... unworthy of belief.”¹⁴ With scholarly elegance, Allen Hornblum acknowledges the accuracy of the first claim and then gently demolishes Wexley’s, noting that such charges followed Gold beyond the grave.

The Invisible Harry Gold is an explanation—not a defense—of Gold’s actions. In explaining them, Hornblum invokes the circumstances of the Depression, growing anti-Semitism in Europe, and the struggles of Jewish immigrants in the United States. Heinrich Golodnitsky was born in 1910 near Bern, Switzerland, and became Harry Gold on arrival to the United States as a four-year-old. Hornblum

describes Gold’s hardscrabble early years in Philadelphia, where he endured bullying at school, worked jobs to help the family survive, and gradually became aware of the menace of fascism at home and in Europe. In 1933, desperate for work, Gold accepted the help of Thomas Black and went to work for him in Jersey City as chief chemist for the Holbrook Manufacturing Company. Black, a staunch communist, saw in Gold a potential convert. He worked hard to convince Gold that the only hope for defeating fascism lay in helping the Soviet Union since it had outlawed anti-Semitism. Though Gold never joined the Communist Party, he agreed to help it obtain industrial secrets from his employer. With that decision, there was no turning back. Gold eventually graduated to work as a courier for some of the NKVD’s most important agents in the United States, including Klaus Fuchs, David Greenglass, and, indirectly, Greenglass’s brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg.

¹⁴ John Wexley, *The Judgement of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg* (New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1955), 66, 73, 373, 384.

Hornblum describes Gold's "gradual seduction into industrial espionage" (45) and his often harsh on-the-job training administered by illegals who served the Soviets in the United States. After WW II began, Gold's assignments were redirected onto military targets. The most important agent he serviced was Klaus Fuchs. Although Hornblum writes that Moscow Centre approved Gold as a contact for David and Ruth Greenglass, who were part of another network, (145) John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev in their book *Spies* revealed that Gold met with Greenglass as a last-minute substitution for another courier.¹⁵ In any case, had this contact not occurred, the Rosenberg network might have escaped exposure.

The Invisible Harry Gold treats Gold's espionage assignments with the atom spies in consid-

erable detail. According to Hornblum, FBI investigative work identified Gold as Fuchs's courier. This is contrary to a version reported by Robert Lamphere that Fuchs himself identified Gold as his courier from a picture.¹⁶ The end result, however, was Gold's arrest, prompt confession, and his damning testimony at the Rosenbergs' trial.

Hornblum presents a well-documented, convincing picture of Harry Gold as an anti-fascist who only wanted to help an American ally. Caught up in Soviet espionage he had been unable to forsake, he was sentenced to 30 years in jail and served over half that time. The ultimate irony of this story is that while the American communist agents charged with espionage lied about their participation, Harry Gold, the non-communist, is the only one who told the truth.

The Kremlin's Geordie Spy: The Man They Swapped for Gary Powers, by Vin Arthey. (New York: Dialogue, 2011), 242 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index, 2nd edition revised.

The first edition of this book was published under the title, *Like Father Like Son: A Dynasty of Spies*. It told the life story of KGB illegal Col. Vilyam "Willie" Fisher, aka: "Col. Rudolf Abel, KGB."¹⁷ The new title may puzzle American readers, but it makes immediate sense to a Brit. A *Geordie* is the common nickname for those from the Tyneside region of North East England, the region in which Willie Fisher was born on 18 April 1902, in Newcastle upon Tyne.

Author Vin Arthey explains Fisher's connections to the USSR—his father had been active in revolutionary activities in Russia and in 1901 fled to the UK, where he was involved in clandestine shipping of arms and literature back to Russia. The family returned to the Soviet Union when the younger Fisher was 17. He subsequently served in the Red Army as a radioman. In 1927 he joined the NKVD. His first overseas assignment was to England in 1935. There he worked for Alexander Orlov and Arnold Deutsch of Cambridge Five fame. Dismissed from the

service during the Great Purge of 1938, Fisher was recalled in September, when there was a need for trained radio operators. After WW II, he was trained as an illegal and in 1948 was sent to the United States, where the Soviet networks were in disarray thanks to defectors and the Venona decrypts.

Arthey reviews Fisher's many assignments, including the handling of Soviet agents Morris and Leona Cohen and atom spy Theodore "Ted" Hall. Fisher used a number of codenames—the best known was Emil Goldfus—and his cover was as a commercial artist. Things began to go bad with the arrival of his future replacement, Reino Hayhanen, who proved to be an irresponsible drunk. Fisher had him recalled, but on the way home Hayhanen defected to the CIA in Paris and revealed that he knew a KGB illegal in New York. When the FBI arrested Fisher he gave his name as Col. Rudolf Abel, a prearranged signal to the KGB that he was in trouble. (The real Col. Abel was dead.) Fisher was serv-

¹⁵ Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, *Spies*, pp. 102–3.

¹⁶ Robert Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986).

¹⁷ Vin Arthey, *Like Father Like Son: A Dynasty of Spies* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2004). (In the Bookshelf review of the book in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 3 (2005) Fisher's first name was incorrectly rendered as "Willi.")

ing a 30-year sentence when he was traded for U-2 pilot Gary Powers. Fisher returned to limited duty for a while but soon retired. He never revealed what he did in England or the United States. He died on 15 November 1971 at age 59.

While there are no major changes in this edition, a number of corrections have been made and new details added. These include Fisher's date of birth, the name of his imprisoned brother—Ivan not Boris—and spelling errors. There is also some new material on Fisher's trial, the

negotiation that led to his return to the Soviet Union, and "the Forbidden City"—the location of the KGB headquarters in Potsdam.

The Kremlin's Geordie Spy is the only biography of Willie Fisher in English that includes details of his KGB career. Arthey examined new materials from Russia, Britain, and the United States to piece together Fisher's extraordinary career. The result is a welcome contribution to the intelligence literature.

Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950–1960. Richard H. Cummings (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2010), 257 pp., endnotes, appendices, bibliography, photos, index.

The Crusade for Freedom (CFF) was an early Cold War domestic propaganda campaign aimed at arousing the "average American against the Communist threat." (1) Intensely popular at the time, citizens contributed funds, attended rallies, marched in parades, participated in essay contests, and read the *Crusade for Freedom Newsletter*, which described the nature of the threat and advocated means to counter it. A principal component of the public program was Radio Free Europe (RFE), a broadcast service that sent the 'truth about communism' to countries behind the Iron Curtain. What was kept from the public at the time was that both CFF and RFE were covertly sponsored by the CIA. The CIA role was officially revealed in 1976, but *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom"* adds details not made public at the time.

Author and former RFE officer Richard Cummings admits that some might consider CFF and its radio operations as a fraud on Americans. But his view is that if they were a fraud at all, they were benign and probably contributed to a Cold War anti-communist consensus. His book is devoted to documenting that position.

Cummings focuses on CFF and RFE from their planning stages in 1949 until CFF was terminated in 1962. RFE continued to function under CIA sponsorship until 1967, when RFE came under independent management, an arrangement that exists to this day. Cummings first de-

scribes the program's origin and goes on to review the bureaucratic and financial conflicts that persisted throughout its existence. Finally he looks at the program's clandestine elements.

The book treats the public side of CFF in some detail. This includes discussion of an extensive publicity campaign involving Hollywood celebrities, the news media, and political, industrial, and military figures. Here we read about the support of Eleanor Roosevelt, Bing Crosby, Ronald Reagan, General Eisenhower, President Truman, Walter Cronkite, President Kennedy, and the Boston Symphony Orchestra, to name a few. Defectors from the Soviet bloc were pressed into service. Col. Joseph Swiatlo of the Polish secret service is a case in point. In RFE broadcasts he informed those behind the Iron Curtain how the KGB dominated the security services of the bloc countries. The CIA role in CFF and RFE was exposed by journalist Drew Pearson in March 1953 (95). Fulton Lewis Jr. added critical remarks in 1957, noting "Dulles doesn't want it known." (171) Cummings explains how these events were dealt with and how they led to the demise of CFF in 1962.

Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom" is well documented and contains a useful chronology of major events. Cummings does not comment on the overall value of CFF, but judging from this history, it is unlikely that anything like it could be attempted successfully today.

Secrets of the Cold War: US Army Europe's Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities against the Soviets, by Leland C. McCaslin. (Solihull, England: Helion and Company Limited, 2010), 200 pp., glossary photos, no index.

There are no secrets in this book. Most of the 19 chapters contain reminiscences written by the more than 50 contributors listed on pages 12–14. Curiously, “Special Comments by Francis Gary Powers, Jr.,” though listed in the contents, are nowhere to be found. Author and retired military intelligence officer Leland McCaslin adds brief introductory comments to most chapters and contributes two himself, one on the annual military intelligence (MI) ball, the other on travel in Cold War Europe.

The topics covered are not without interest. They include the Soviet and Allied military mis-

sions that collected intelligence in occupied zones in Germany, the US-Russian hotline, defectors, counterintelligence, the Berlin duty train, and several case studies. The latter are illustrative and contain no specifics—first names only. No sources are provided.

Secrets of the Cold War with its many photographs does deliver a glimpse of military intelligence activities in Europe during the Cold War, but its content does not live up to the promise of its title.

Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939–1945, by Alan Ogden (Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen & Sword, 2010), 284 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established early in WW II to run sabotage and support resistance groups in German-occupied territory. By 1943 the SOE was also involved in political subversion—regime change—in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, each one a German ally. Teams of the “wonderfully amateurish” (vi) businessmen, bankers, engineers and academics that staffed the SOE were dropped into each country to do the job. All operations failed to accomplish their primary objectives. *Through Hitler's Back Door* explains why.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with Hungary and Slovakia, the second with Bulgaria, and the third with Romania. Author Alan Ogden begins each part with a historical summary of the country and then turns to SOE efforts to bring it under Allied control. “From early on, SOE encountered difficulties in setting up subversive networks in Hungary,” writes Ogden. (23) The same would prove true in the other countries. The difficulties included political opposition from the British Foreign Office, competition with the Secret Intelligence Service, and a lack of any established partisan networks. Logistical problems—air support,

communications, and resupply—and the shifting loyalties of those contacted in the local governments also were problematic. But in the end, the uncompromising role of a Soviet Union on its own subversion mission was the dominant road block.

Ogden describes in considerable detail more than 30 missions, with emphasis on the persistent operational glitches encountered and their often herculean efforts to overcome them. He pays particular attention to the personnel involved—those that didn't survive and the few that did.

Though they fell short of their primary objective, the operations were not entirely in vain. Ogden tells how some tied up German forces that could have been deployed elsewhere and destabilized the planning of the Wehrmacht high command. He also records the considerable number of Allied aircrews the teams helped escape the enemy, often with partisan and OSS assistance.

This book is reasonably well documented, often with primary sources, though in some cases lengthy operational descriptions are not refer-

enced to sources—the efforts of the AUTONOMOUS team are an example. (249–52)

Through Hitler's Back Door concludes “there were few military or political laurels to emerge from Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria. Scantily

resourced and diplomatically constrained by the need to defer to and to consult with the USSR,” they succumbed to “the pull of insuperable political forces.” The brave efforts of the SOE teams are a tribute to their courage.

Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage, by Douglas Waller. (New York: Free Press, 2011), 466 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Donovan of OSS was the first of four biographies of ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan.¹⁸ It claimed to be the full story, and few in the public knew otherwise. The second and third made similar assertions, adding new details about OSS operations and bureaucratic battles.¹⁹ Was there anything new left to say? The existence of a fourth biography suggests an affirmative answer, and author Douglas Waller calmly and carefully documents this position. The principal difference, however, is one of focus. Waller is concerned more with Donovan the man than with OSS operations. The result depicts an ambitious, brave, hard-charging Donovan, who almost by accident created America’s first foreign intelligence service. It was only after completing two fact-finding trips to Europe for President Roosevelt that the idea occurred to him. With the encouragement of the British, Waller writes, Donovan convinced the president to establish the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), which became the OSS after the United States entered WW II.

The book concentrates on five aspects of Donovan’s life. The first concerns his military career, his success as a Wall Street lawyer, and his political ambitions prior to serving Roosevelt. The second deals with the bureaucratic battles he fought and the egos he ruffled as he struggled to establish COI (later, OSS), and then to maintain its existence in the face of vigorous opposition from elements in the War Department and the FBI. Here we learn that the Army never accept-

ed the OSS role and formed its own foreign intelligence service—nicknamed “The Pond”—under the control of Major John ‘Frenchy’ Grombach, a man Donovan had once fired. Donovan’s other biographers do not mention the Grombach episode, which was treated in this journal in 2004.²⁰ Donovan’s battles with Hoover and the FBI are also described in detail. On the operational side, Waller mentions Operation Kangaroo, a collection effort that defied an agreement with Hoover not to operate in Latin America, a topic covered in this book for the first time.

The third aspect of Donovan’s life treated in this book, and for the first time, dealt with his many dalliances with women, something Waller did not try to hide. Their impact on Donovan’s marriage did not do him credit.

The fourth part of the Donovan story concerns his frustrated attempts to create and head a postwar intelligence service after President Truman abolished the controversial OSS. Here, Hoover again enters the picture, and Waller leaves little doubt that it was Hoover who spread the rumor to the press that such a service would result in a domestic Gestapo, a charge that applied more to Hoover’s own ambitions to direct an all-encompassing, postwar intelligence operation. Donovan’s hopes were dashed forever when neither Truman nor his successor appointed him to head the new CIA.

¹⁸ Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

¹⁹ Richard Dunlop interviewed Donovan for his book, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982). The other was *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Times Books, 1982), by British journalist Anthony Cave Brown, who claimed “access to all Donovan’s papers and his wife’s diaries.”

²⁰ See Mark Stout, “The Pond: Running Agents for State, War, and the CIA—The Hazards of Private Spy Operations,” *Studies in Intelligence* 48, No. 3 (September 2004).

The final phase of Donovan's career that Waller covers is his service as ambassador to Thailand. Although in his late 60s, Donovan was still difficult to control. The concluding chapter covers Donovan's debilitating sickness that led to his death in 1959.

Wild Bill Donovan is absorbing reading. It is documented with primary sources, though the format used makes it impossible to tell what fact a particular document supports. In all other respects, it is a major contribution to the intelligence literature.

Memoirs

All Them Cornfields and Ballet in the Evening, by John Miller. (Kingston upon Thames, Surrey, UK: Hodgson Press, 2010), 324 pp., photos, index.

British journalist John Miller selected the title for this memoir from a line in the 1957 film, *I'm All Right Jack*, wherein a "leftish" shop steward played by Peter Sellers proclaims his desire to visit the Soviet workers' paradise with "all them cornfields and ballet in the evening." Beginning in 1960, Miller spent 40 years as a newspaper correspondent in the Soviet Union and Russia. His splendidly humorous reminiscences compare Soviet reality with the shop steward's fantasy.

While any firsthand account of life in the Soviet Union during the Cold War has inherent value, Miller's story is worthy of attention in an intelligence journal because of his encounters with several subjects of intelligence interest—Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and Kim Philby. He tracked down an uncooperative Maclean after acquiring a scarce copy of the Soviet phone book and going to his flat, though Miller was denied an interview four times. Burgess, always happy to talk to fellow Brits, gave Miller several interviews, and we learn some new details of Burgess's unhappy life in the Soviet Union. Miller carried a wreath at Burgess's funeral in 1963 and again met Maclean, who was more civil that time. Philby did not attend, but Miller later met him serendipitously in a Moscow restaurant where Philby was dining with his wife Eleanor and Maclean's wife (and Philby's mistress), Melinda. With a curse, Philby told him to "bugger" off, though Miller did acquire a photo of the elusive defector.

Like most correspondents, Miller got to know the MI6 head of station in Moscow at the time, Rory Chisholm, who was handling the British end of the Penkovsky case. Miller met Penkovsky once at a social function and later covered his show trial. Miller gives two accounts of Penkovsky's execution—a shot in the back of the head, and being burned alive in a crematorium furnace. The latter version has been reported before, and although Miller names a firsthand witness, the evidence is hearsay and the Soviet denials must be considered.

A variety of other vignettes include the Soviet reaction to their shooting down of the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers in 1960, Miller's encounter with Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a KGB "honey trap" that caught the British ambassador in an affair with the sister of Captain Eugene Ivanov, a key player in the Profumo affair, which contributed to the resignation of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1963. Miller recalls frequent "chats" with the KGB without ending up in Lubyanka, even though he reported the joke about Brezhnev's last words: "Comrade Andropov, please stop fiddling with the life support machine."

All Them Cornfields broadens one's understanding of Soviet society, adds colorful details to some well-known Cold War espionage cases, and is an unqualified pleasure to read.

The C.I. Desk: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence As Seen from My Cubicle, by Christopher Lynch. (Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, 2009), 433 pp., index.

After graduating from Michigan State University, Christopher Lynch found a job in an FBI mailroom as a GS-2 clerk. It was all uphill from there. After 10 years with the Bureau he joined the CIA. Twenty years later, he retired as a GS-14 and wrote his memoir. Like all dutiful intelligence officers before him, he submitted the manuscript for clearance, twice: once to the CIA and once to the FBI. In an author's note, Lynch writes that the "successes in which I participated often seemed to get excised from the text....As a result operations that fizzled out or otherwise went nowhere get an unwanted emphasis." (vii) He is right about that! *The C.I. Desk* reads like the story of a serial misfit whose cockroach persistence gets him through a 30-year career. Though he advanced from the FBI mailroom to become a counterintelligence (CI) analyst at the FBI and the CIA, something dissatisfies him in each job, and he is soon looking for another position. At the FBI he cut his teeth on the Boris Yushin case and learned how to do CI case reviews, a task he apparently performed skillfully. He later worked for two years for Robert Hanssen, with whom he got on well, he writes. His description of Hanssen as a "nice fellow" challenges those offered by other contemporaries who cast him as an eccentric computer nerd with few social skills.

In 1986, Lynch moved to the CIA where the pattern of job-hopping continued. He tells about his 20 years there, describing the CI cases he analyzed in most of the major divisions in the clandestine service. Many of the assignments were initially interesting, others quickly frustrating. His work on the Ames case and his tours in the new Counterintelligence Center are examples of the former. His assignment to the Office of Security is an example of the latter. Either way, after a year, or at the most two, he would declare that his "frustrations in the Branch kept growing" (320–21), or words to that effect, and move on. Lynch spent most of his final years at the CIA reviewing files for declassification and doing CI case reviews in an unspecified office where he "drifted from desk to desk." (424)

Despite his career turbulence, Lynch writes that he loved CI work and the challenges it presented. It is difficult to pin down the message he wants to convey in this book or to explain his candor in conveying it. But he does seem to be emphasizing the importance of doing one's work well. A most unusual contribution to the intelligence literature.

Holding Hands with Heroes, by Jack Kassinger. (Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Publishing Co. Inc., 2010), 242 pp., photos, glossary, no index.

It takes unusual qualifications to begin a CIA career as a GS-4 and retire as a supergrade. In *Holding Hands with Heroes* Jack Kassinger tells how he did it: no college degree, service in the Marine Corps, a recommendation from Dave Phillips (a senior CIA officer stationed in Latin America), and an impressive track record as a clandestine service support officer. In one respect, Kassinger's memoir is a typical account of worldwide assignments and service at CIA

Headquarters while raising a family—his wife, Cherie, was a career officer too. But it is also atypical in that unlike the memoirs of clandestine service officers such as Phillips and Milton Bearden that tell of espionage cases in which they were involved,²¹ Kassinger explains the critical services a support officer provides to espionage and covert action operations. His vivid descriptions of CIA support operations in Somalia and other African nations make the point. In

²¹ After retiring, David Atlee Phillips, wrote a memoir of his career, *The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service* (New York: Atheneum, 1977); Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The CIA in Battle with the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 2003)

the early 2000s, Kassinger was assigned to the Central Eurasia Division, and from that vantage point he describes the impact of the Ames case, the efforts to rebuild a new, secure embassy in Moscow, support operations in the Balkans and Albania, and the turmoil that followed the appointment of John Deutch as Director of Central Intelligence.

The book's title refers to the many officers with whom Kassinger served, some of whom will be familiar to those who worked in the CIA after the Vietnam War. In *Holding Hands with Heroes* Kassinger offers himself as an exemplar for those considering a CIA career.

Intelligence Abroad

The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010), 301 pp., endnotes, index.

In the foreword to this book, British investigative journalist Nick Fielding warns that the Russian intelligence services "have little tolerance for criticism...since 2000 seventeen journalists have been murdered." (vii) That same year Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan created Agentura.ru (in Russian and English), "a journalism-based website for monitoring the Russian services." (7) Though they have been careful to base their often critical articles on open sources and have been interrogated more than once by the Federal Security Service (FSB),²² the principal successor to the KGB, so far they have managed to survive. *The New Nobility* summarizes their work to date, with emphasis on the sudden breakup of the KGB, the struggle for power among the surviving elements, and the ascendancy of the FSB. It was Nikolai Patrushev, the successor to Vladimir Putin as FSB director in 1999, who called the FSB the "new nobility" with the mission of "stability and order." The authors take care to point out that the FSB should not be "mistaken for a revival of the Soviet KGB," though some journalists have made this error. With all its power, the KGB was subordinate to the Communist Party; the FSB is free of party and parliamentary control, reporting only to the president or prime minister. (4–5)

After the chaos of the Yeltsin era, the FSB moved rapidly to consolidate its power. The au-

thors tell how it worked to "ferret out foreign spies," (36) to bring human rights organizations under control, and to deal with the oligarchs (giving them the choice of leaving the country or going to a jail in Siberia). A program to plant informants in "liberal organizations" was also established. New counterintelligence regulations were created that allowed access to private correspondence and communications through wiretapping. Restrictions on surveillance were removed and the right to search all premises was granted. (114ff) As incentive, FSB officers were given special benefits, including new brick dachas on land confiscated from the oligarchs.

There are several chapters on the FSB response to terrorism, the one area in which the organization has not been very successful. It was while the authors were preparing articles critical of Russian counterterrorism operations that they were summoned to the notorious Lefortovo prison; they don't provide any details of the ensuing interrogation. They do assert that FSB assassination teams have been sent abroad to deal with Chechen terrorists. And while they note the stories that claim the FSB poisoned Alexander Litvinenko using polonium-210 in London, they conclude that "there is no information about whether his death was ordered by the Russian leadership" or by mercenaries. (208)

²² Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti.

The final chapters deal with two interesting issues. The first looks at rumors that the FSB would absorb the foreign intelligence missions of the SVR (foreign intelligence service) and the GRU (military intelligence service). That hasn't happened yet, and for the time being Russia has three foreign intelligence services, with the FSB empowered to deal with the former Soviet republics. The second issue concerns the FSB pro-

gram for cyberwarfare that uses its own cadre of experts and from time to time employs independent hackers.

The New Nobility presents a persuasive, well-documented view of the FSB that only dedicated, risk-taking Russians could provide.

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